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The purpose of this study is to analyse, compare 
and evaluate two alternative policies for stabilizing· 
the economy. These refer to the "Rules versus Discretion" 
debate with particular reference to the U.K. monetary 
policy. with this aim in mind a model is built which 
attempts to capture the main elements of both the income-
expenditure approach as well as the monetarist approach. 
The rationale of this framework of analysis emanates 
from the fact that the income-expenditure camp advocates 
"discretion" whereas the monetarist camp supports "rules". 
Therefore particular attention is paid to the specificat-
ion of each equation so that the alternative hypotheses 
which underlie the two opposing views would explicitly 
be taken into consideration. In addition special emphasis 
is given to the interrelationships between the real and the 
monetary sector of the economy and the associated lags. 
The model thus specified is subsequently estimated by the 
method of A.R.T.S.L.S., and then evaluated by subjecting 
it to dynamic simulations. The strength as well as the 
timing of monetary policy is examined by deriving dynamic 
multipliers for various endogenous variables. Finally 
policy simulations are conducted to test whether "Rules" 
or "Discretion" achieve a better stabilization in terms of 
reducing the amplitude of the cyclical behaviour of the 
economy. On these grounds it turns out that "Discretion" 
is to be preferred over "Rules". 
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C HAP T E R I 
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
RULES VERSUS DISCRETION 
1.1 Introduction 
Current economic thinking regarding the management 
of the economy centres around two well distinct views. 
According to the first the economic system is equipped 
with automatic forces that stabilize the economy. The 
idea is very old, in fact dates back to the writings of 
Adam Smith who thought that all it was done by the "in~ 
visible hand". faith in its efficacy has revived nowadays 
with the development of monetarism or the "monetarist 
revolution", as some economists have called it. ~1) The 
advocates of this new lessez-faire view claim that active 
stabilization policy causes more fluctuations than it 
cures and therefore their main policy prescription can 
be summarized as a call for limited government intervent-
ion. (2) 
(1) See K. Brunner (1970) and H.G. Johnson (1971). 
(2) for example, friedman, one of the main protagonists 
of this new lessez-faire view, has put it like this:. 
n ••• the market ••• is ••• the only means so far discovered 
of enabling indivudals to coordinate their economic act-
ivities without coercion. I recognize that government has 
an important role to ·play, but I am suspicious of assign-
ing to government any functions that can be performed 
through the market, both because this substitutes coercion 
of voluntary cooperation in the area in question and be-
I 
cause, by giving government an increased role, i~ threat-
ens freedom in other areas". Friedman (1960, p.4). 
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The second view stems from the Keynesian revolution 
the,message of which, according to Leijonhufvud, is that 
there is no "invisible hand" or an auctioneer and there-
fore government intervention is needed when the economic 
system shows signs of "malfunctioning". 
The present thesis attempts to provide an answer to 
these opposite and conflicting views regarding government 
intervention in one important area: managing the economy 
through monetary policy. In particular, this study is 
concerned with whether the monetary authorities in the 
U.K. ought to pursue a discretionary countercyclical sta-
bilization policy or ought to abstain from such practices 
and instead follow a policy of less intervention by adopt-
ing a simple rule for one of the monetary aggregates. 
As it is well known monetary policy is only one in-
strument at the disposal of the government to influence 
the so called macro-economic target variables; the other 
major instrument is fiscal policy, although in recent 
years incomes policy has also become equally important. 
It should be stressed though that the present thesis 
leaves aside the question of the efficacy of the other 
instruments of economic policy. This, of course, does 
not mean to imply that monetary policy is in any way 
more important than its rival policies. 
The problem the authorities are faced with can be 
viwed as follows. The economy grows following a cyclical 
path as the one illustrated in fig. 1. The stabilization 
target can then be thought of as an' attempt to dampen 
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these cycles; theoretically speaking one may visualize 
it as an attempt to fully eliminate these cycles, that 
is, allow the economy to grow on its trend. In terms of 
this analysis our objective is to analyse and evaluate 
different policy prescriptions for stabilizing the eco-
nomy. In particular we examine two views. According to 
the one, the new lessez-faire view, the appropriate po-
licy is the formulation of a simple rule for one of the 
monetary aggregates; for example a 5% increase in the 
money stock. According to the other, the Keynesian or 
better the non-monetarist camp, the appropriate policy 
is one of discretion, that is changing monetary policy 
by making it easy or tight in accordance with some in-
dicators of the state of the econo~y in comparison with 
the desired state. 
One must be clear nevertheless about the precise 
meaning and nature of the policy of a rule and of the 
policy of discretion. Rules may, in general, refer to 
the guiding of policy or to the structure of the system 
itself. A provision tor increasing the money supply by 
a fixed rate each year would be a rule in the guiding 
sense. A 100 percent reserve ratio is a rule in the 
structuring sense. A commitment to confine open market 
operations to Treasury bills only is a rule in that it 
confines the limits whereupon a particular method is 
to be applied. 
In these terms the controversy of Rules versus 
Discretion may seem to be one of degree. But reconcili-
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ation on these grounds, as Whittlesey has pointed out, 
"is unlikely on either the role of rules in the exercise 
of discretion by central banks or the degree of discretion 
that should be allowed in the observance of rules".(3) 
It must be stressed that the purpose of a rule is 
to preclude or to circumscribe discretion. A rule is in-
consistent with discretion. But the opposite is not true: 
discretion is not inconsistent with rules. Indeed, a wise 
discretionary policy not only allows rules but also pre-
sumes their existence. Discretion is against universal 
rules. As Professor Sayers has once put it "we are doomed 
to disappointment if we look for rules applicable to .!ll 
times and places. We have central banks for the very rea-
80n that there are no such rules n .(4) 
'In our case, following a rule does not mean that the 
authorities remain idle but instead that they manipulate 
their instruments so as to achieve the desired percentage 
increase in the money stock, for example. Certainly what 
this means, and this is of enormous importance, is that 
the authorities do"not attempt to set their instruments 
80 as to change the actual path of some of the final tar-
get variables, e.g., the level of economic activity, as 
in the case of discretionary stabilization policy. What 
is at issue therefore is whether aiming at controlling 
intermediate targets (all monetary aggregates may be con-
sidered as such) or final targets produces better stabi-
(3) Whittlesey (1968, p.252) 
(4) Sayers (1957, p.7) 
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lization. In this context it is the belief of the pro-
ponets of this new lessez-faire view that aiming at a 
desired percentage increase in one monetary aggregate, 
e.g., money stock, would produce a better stabilization 
than in the case where active stabilization would be 
undertaken. And we are led to ask why? Is it simply a 
matter of the authorities committing errors in the appli-
cation of monetary policy? Or is it that the alternative 
policy prescriptions follow from different theorizing 
of how the economy works? If the answer depends on the 
first factor alone then the problem loses some of its 
importance in that it is restricted in time and place. 
ro~ example, it might turn out that rules are to be pre-
ferred for the U.K. economy. But from such evidence alone 
nothing can be deduced, not even indicatively, about any, 
other country. Even within the~:U.K. rules might be pre-
ferred today but tomorrow discretion might produce even 
better results. The problem in this case becomes one of 
perfecting information or technically speaking, one that 
belongs to the ,targets-indicators issue. 
If on the other hand the problem stems from differ-
ent theorizing of how the economy works then the impli-
cations are more general. We believe that although much 
depends on the first factor the significance of the latter' 
i8 even more important. A::definite answer, however, must 
await until after we have examined the theoretical frame-
work that underlies the views of each camp. 
1.2 The Theoretical framework of the 
New Lessez faire View 
The central postulate of this view is that changes 
in the stock of money will cause, after a lag, changes 
in aggregate money income. In particular, it is argued 
that, while" in the short run money affects real variabl-
es - output, employment, real rate of interest - in the 
long run - defined as the situation where expectations 
are realized - it determines the level of prices, the 
inflation rate. One implication is that there is no "tra-
de off" between inflat~on and unemployment in the long 
ru~only in the short run. Whatever the market shows as 
unemployment rate this is the "natural rate" .. due to fri-
ction and voluntary search activity. The causes of in-
flation are excess demand and expectations. 
The insight of this postulate rests on the follow-
ing argument: Starting from a position of long run equi-' 
librium with constant prices a permanent increase in the 
rate of change of the mone~ stock will have the effect 
\ 
of reducing the real as" well as the nominal rate of in-
terest. This will stimulate investment and thence output. 
Thus unemployment will be reduced in the initial stages. 
But the increase in income will lead to an increase in 
the demand for money and hence to a rise in the interest 
rate. Moreover, the demand for loans would increase too 
and this provides ari additional reason for a rise in the 
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interest rate. Hence, while the initial effect of the 
monetary increase is a fall in the real and nominal rate 
of interest, at a, later stage this effect will be reversed 
and both rates would tend to come back to their original 
levels. Since the prices of the products respond more 
quickly to excess demand than the prices of the factors 
of production - hence assuming a demand-pull approach to 
inflation - households will start asking for bigger wages. 
Expectations of further increase in prices will make wa-
ges grow faster than prices and this will reverse the 
initial tendency of unemployment to fall. Assuming now 
that expectations of price changes are based on the hi-
story of actual changes with a very high speed of adjust-
ment only the nominal rate ~ interest vill be affected 
which will move to clear the money market. However, since 
the nominal rate is assumed to have no effect on any real 
variables no further adjustment in output and employment 
will occur, as a result of the initial lItonetar"y action. 
Adjustment in output and empoyment, though, will still' 
take place due to expectations alone - the rise in the 
rate of change of wages will help to create more unemplo-
yment. In the long run equilibrium - when all anticipat-
ions are realized - the unemployment rate will have come 
back to the point where it started from, i.e. tho natural 
rate of unemployment, and the inflation rate will be the 
same as the rate of monetary increase. 
The main task of the monetari~ts has been to provide'. 
a theoretical framewoTk for the above insight of 'the work-
-14-
ing of the economy. While until now they have failed to 
provide a rigorous rationalization of their argument 
there are many monetarist Yritings which offer characte-
ristic positions and assertions of the monetarist thought 
and yhich at the same time attempt to differentiate their 
position from the Keynesian view. 
It is the purpose of the remainig of this section to 
show that the above insight of the yorking of the economy 
does not stem from a completely different structure than 
the Keynesian one. The main thesis is that in most of their 
writings monetarists usually charge Keynesian' thinking 
with positions that do not characterize the vieY of the 
latter or with positions that are oversimplifications 
simply made by Keynesians for convenience in the handling 
of some problems or for pedagogical purposes. And that 
indeed although major differences exist between the two 
schools of thought these stem from an essentially common 
structure to which different assumptions have been made 
about particular parameter estimates and elasticities.(1) 
We find it convenient for analytical purposes to examine 
the main monetarist assertions and tenets under five head-
ings. 
(1) This is a position that is shared by many economists. 
for example, friedman in two papers (1970, 1971) has attempt-
ed to show his theoretical differences with the Keynesian 
school starting from a common structure - the IS-LM model~ 
Tobin (1972) also explains Friedman's positions through an 
IS-LM model. See also Laidler (1970, ch.4), Smith (1956,) 
and Teigen (1972). There are also some exceptions, see, 
Brunner (1971). See also footnote 2. 
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lA) The organizational framework for the monetarist 
analysis is the quantity theory of money especially in its 
post Keynesian reformulation. In two articles, however, 
friedman abandons this framework and adopts the IS-LM.(2) 
But this may not be an important point after all, since as 
Tobin has pointed out the form of the organizational frame-
work regards the language in which substantive arguments 
are expressed, not the substance of the arguments. l3 ) 
lB) Belief that the central equation of macroecono-
mics is the demand for money. According to friedman, "the 
quantity theorist ••• regards the demand function for mo-
ney ••• as playing a vital role in determining variables 
(2) friedman (1970, 1971). Not all monetarists however 
view this particular model as an appropriate description 
on which to build an analysis. Brunner, for example, wrote:, 
hIt is useful to emphasize ••• that the logic of the mone-
tarist analysis based on the relative price theory approach 
requires that attention be directed to the interaction 
between output market, credit market and Walrasian money 
market. This requirement cannot be satisfied by the ge-
neral framework used by ,friedman. This framework'is tha 
standard IS-LM analysis offered in an essentially Keynes-, 
ian spirit. And this very choice of basic framework 
, , 
actually creates the analytical problems clearly recognized 
by friedman in his subsequent discussion ••• Our analysis 
••• established however that the standard IS-LM diag~am 
is not a very useful device for the analysis of monetary 
processes." Brunner (1971, p. B2). 
(3) Tobin (1972). 
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that he regards as of great importance for the analysis 
of the economy as a whole, such as the level of money 
income or of prices. It is this that leads him to put 
greater emphasis on the demand for money than on let us 
say the demand for pins ••• "(4) In the "restatement" the 
quantity theory is presented as a theory of the demand 
for money. As H. Johnson has put it "the revival of a 
quantity theory that would claim to rival the Keynesian 
theory required a restatement of it that would free it 
from these objections ••• (he means that the quantity 
theory in its pre Keynesian formulation was a tautology 
and that it assumed full employment) ••• and give it an 
empirical content. Such a restatement was provided by ~. 
rriedma~'s classic article, which redefined the quantity 
theory as a theory of the demand for money (or velocity).n(5) 
(4) Friedman (1956, p.16) 
(5) Johnson (1972, p.23). Not everyone accords with r~ied­
man's "restatement" of the quantity theory. Patinkin, for 
example, believes that Friedman's analysis is similar to 
that of Keynes because the former treats the demand for 
money as anaeset; Friedman's primary concern is the op-
timal ~elationship amon~ stock of assets (which is also 
Keynes primary concern). Neoclassical theory, on the other 
hand, emphasized the optimal relationship between the stock 
of money and the flow of planned expenditure. Hence, Pa-
tinkin concludes, Friedman's work is "mislabelled" and 
it is not to be found either in the oral or written tra-
dition of the University of Chicago. Patinkin (1969). 
Lately however Friedman has ceased to refer to the Chica-
go tradition and has admitted that the restated quantity 
theory has been much "influenced by the Keynesian liquidi-
ty analysis" Friedman (1969, p.73). 
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friedman's treatment of the demand for money differs 
from that of Keynes in abandoning an analysis of the 
motives that prompt people to hold money. The relevant 
question according to friedman is: Given that people 
hold money - since money is an asset one form of wealth, 
therefore introducing capital theory - what factors de-
termine how much money people hold.(6) The demand for 
money is assumed to depend on asset prices or relative 
returns and wealth. 
This theory of the demand for money, however, is 
also a theory of nominal income. Thus for example, O. 
~,nd states,;"the quantity theory, in its post Keynesian 
reformulation, is a theory of the demand for money and 
a theory of money income".1(7) Also in another instance 
he writes: "the modern quantity theory uses the money 
deMand function to predict the level of money income 
and prices if output is given ••• " (8) To make the the-
ory of the demand for money a theory of Money income 
friedman needs three steps. The first step is to intro-
duce homogeneity in prices and nominal income in the de-
mand for money function. This is a sufficient step to 
enable him to derive his basic equation 
(6) Post Keynesians also regard money as an asset alter-
native to other assets. Nevertheless the main contribut-
ion of friedman remains, as H. Johnson has pointed out, 
"that income is the yield on capital, and capital the 
present value of income ••• "; "its theoretical significance 
lies in the conceptual integration of wealth and income 
as influences of behaviour ••• " Johnson (1972) •. ~:-
(7) fand (1969, p.561) 
(a)7fand (1970, p.228) 
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Y. VCR, W, T)PI 
where Y = nominal income, R = a vector of relative prices, 
T = tastes, PI = stock of money, V = the velocity function, 
W = human and non human wealth. 
The second step is to assume that the money supply is 
exogenous, so that the causation runs from money to income 
and not the other way round. The third step is to assume. 
that the velocity or what amounts to the same thing the 
demand for money is a stable function. According to fried-
men, "the quantity theorist accepts the empirical hypothe-
sis that the demand for money is highly stable ••• The 
stability he expects is in the functional relation between 
the quantity of money demanded and the variables that de-
termine it ••• (and) ••• he must sharply limit ••• the 
variables that it is empirically important to include in 
the function. for to expand the number of variables re-
garded as significant is to empty the hypothesis of its 
empirical content; there is indeed little if any fif'er-
ence between asserting that the demand for money is high-
ly unstable and asserting that it is a perfectly stable 
function of an indefinitely large number of variablesU.(9) 
The stability of the velocity is very important _ince the 
etability of the money multiplier depends upon it. If the 
demand for money is more stable than the consumption 
function then the money multiplier is more stable than 
the autonomous expenditure multiplier and therefore mo-
(9) friedman (1956, p.16). 
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ney is more sifnificant than investment or autonomous 
expenditure in explaining changes in money income. 
friedman recognizes that a necessary condition for 
the stability of the velocity function is that either 
velocity is .inelastic with respect to the variables 
that determine it or all these variables are to be taken 
as rigid or fixed. In either case his analysis rejects 
the Keynesian transmission mechanism and substitutes it 
with another one more direct. This brings us to the third 
point, the inelasticity of velocity with respect to the 
rate of interest. 
(c) Until recently, monetarists thought that this 
elasticity was zero. One of the most serious attempts to 
discharge the Keynesian transmission mechanism is portayed 
in friedman's 1959 paper(10) where money is considered 
as consumer durable good, and the permanent income hy-
pothesis is used to reconcile the different behaviour of 
velocity secularly and in business cycles. The use of 
(10) friedman (1959). The evidence provided by friedman 
in support of the zero elasticity of velocity with re-
spect to the rate of interest is doubtful and ambiguous: 
He first correlates velocity with permanent income and 
then finds that the residuals are not correlated with 
the rate of interest. Laidler (1966) using the same 
data .and the permanent income hypothesis has shown that 
the interest rate is an important variable even secular-
ly. The obvious implication is that this study by fried-
man cannot reject the Keynesian transmission mechanism. 
-20-
I 
the permanent income hypothesis is very important for 
three reasons: (i) Since Friedman's empirical results 
show that the interest rate is unimportant in explain-
ing the behaviour of velocity the Keynesian transmission 
mechnism can be rejected. (ii) Although velocity is not 
a constant, as the classical economists believed, it is 
a stable function of just a "few" variables. (iii) The 
effect on current income is very powerful, indeed much 
more powerful than the one predicted by the classical 
formulation.(11) 
However, the accumulation of empirical evidence(12) 
showing the importance of the rate of interest has made 
friedman and others to reject their view of a zero e1a-
sticity.(13) Instead they now argue that it is the size 
of this elasticity that differentiates Keynesians and 
monetarists. Friedman argues (14) that "only a finding 
of near absolute liquidity preference would raise ••• 
fundamental issues" in monetary theory~since it would 
(11) However, Tobin and Swan (1969) have shown that if 
velocity is made a function of interest and of money's 
own rate, the behaviour of velocity can be explained 
equally well and that permanent income coincides with 
current income. The implication is that monetary po-
licy is not so powerful as the ~ermanent income for-
mUlation would have led us to believe. 
(12) Some of this evidence is summarized in Laidler 
(1969). 
(13) Friedman (1966). 
(14) friedman (1966, p.144). 
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imply an unstabl~ velocity~ On the other hand, mon~tarists 
view themselves as taking the position that " ••• although 
marginal and average velocity differ, the velocity funct-
ion is sufficiently stable to provide a relation between 
h i d h i 1"ncome." (15) Ho'~-c anges n money an c anges n money w 
ever, these arguments attempt to identify the Keynesian 
position with the liquidity trap, and hence they are mis-
leading. The fact of the matter remains that differences 
in the opinions regarding the response of velocity to a 
monetary shift do not depend on assumptions about the 
demand for money - liquidity trap e.t.c., as the mone-
tarists claim - or on ,assumptions about the price level, 
but on assumptions regarding the labour market. In f~c~ 
Teigen (16) has shown that if the demand for and supply 
of labour are made functions of the real wage rate, and 
the market always to clear, one can obtain the quantity 
theory result: changes in the quantity of money leave 
the velocity unchanged - a "stable velocity" - no matter 
what the size of the interest elasticity of the demand 
for money. 
On the other hand, if one assumes a Keynesian type 
of labour market where money wages are sticky, velocity 
may rise, fall, or remain constant to a monetary shift. 
The result depends on the sizes of the partial elastici-
(15) fand (1969, p.563-4). 
(16) Teigen (1972). See also Smith (1956). 
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ties of the whole class of relationships in the system 
and not only on the interest elasticity of the demand 
for money. 
\ 
(0) Another important aspect of the monetarist 
thought is the assertion that the demand for money is 
a demand for real, not nominal, balances, while the au-
thorities control the nominal supply of 'money. friedman 
has argued that "the distinction between real and nominal 
magnitudes ••• is at the heart of the quantity tDeoryll.(17) 
Th~ importance of this distinction is viewed by mone-
tarists as providing a basis for their contention that 
their analysis implies a much broader transmission me-
chanism than does the Keynesian model. This transmission 
mechanism is based"on a portofolio adjustment that. in-
cludes financial as well as physical assets. At the 
same time it is assumed by monetarists that Keynesian 
analysis restricts the effect of a money change on a 
small group of financial assets, such as government or 
corporate bonds. In sharp contrast monetarists believe 
that an increase in the nominal stock of money will, 
in addition to changing the yi~lds of financial assets 
and thence the prices of goods and services, also change 
directly the prices of physical assets, and therefore 
the general price level, through increased spending 
directly upon them. Thus, it is the preference of money 
(17) friedman (1970, p.69) 
hQlders on real, and not nominal, balances that gives 
rise to a rationalization of the generalized :transmission 
mechanism through the effects of spending decisions on 
the price level. In the monetarist model therefore the 
demand for money determines the desired quantity of 
real money balances and not the level of interest rates. 
This argument rests fundamentally on the assumption 
that in the Keynesian model the price level is exogenous-
ly determined. Indeed this is the position assigned to 
Keynesians by many monetarists. For example, Friedman(18) 
argues that in the IS-LM,model there is a "missing equat-
ion" - the model being underdetermined since its number 
of endogenous variables is greater than one from the 
number of equations. The differences between Keynesians 
and monetarists, he continuous, arise from the different 
assumptions made by each camp to close the system. Keynes-
ians,~according to Friedman, assume that the price level 
is determined outside the system while monetarists make 
the assumption that it is the level of output that is 
determined outside the system. From the two assumptions 
the less satisfactory is, according to Friedman, the , 
Keynesian one since it is much more arbitrary, " ••• a 
deus ex machina with no underpining in economic theory". (19) 
The monetarist asumption on the other hand is less blatant 
since output is assumed to be determined by a Walrasian 
(18) Friedman (1970) 
(19) Friedman (1970, p.e8) 
. -~ 
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system of equations and thefefore the quantity theory 
may be regarded as a subset of a complete system. 
It is true that in the static IS-LM model Keynes-
ian analysis ignores the price level. This means that 
the price level does not change during the comparative 
static exercises of this model. This has sometimes 
been rationalized on the grounds that prices are rigid 
when dealing with mass unemployment or simply that it is 
an oversimplification merely made for pedagogical pur-
poses. 
Clearly therefore it would be a mistake to conclude 
from the argument offered by Friedman that the differenc-
es between the two schools of thought arise from the 
assumptions made to close the system. (20) In fact the 
price level is not necessarily exogenously determined 
when one corisiders the augmented IS-LM model - that is, 
the IS-LM with a production function and a labour market 
which substitute the Walrasian system of the monetarist 
approach. This system is closed by either assuming rigid 
wages in a': downward direction or by assuming that the 
general price level is exogenously determined. The 
assumption of rigid wages however seems more plausible 
since it implies a solution of the system that is compat-
ible with any level of employment - while the monetarist 
model provides only one solution, ,the full enployment 
solution - and hence it remains in the true Keynesian 
(20) Even some monetarists do not accept this point. See 
in particular footnote 2. 
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spirit.(21) 
The situation therefore appears to be one in which 
the price level even in the Keynesian system is endoge-
nously determined. l22) Thus it is not correct to argue 
in line with the monetarists that the Keynesian system 
is inconsistent with the general portfolio adjustment 
transmission mechanism implied by the monetarist model. 
that 
And indeed, such a stance means/one overlooks the work 
of Tobin and others in this field as well as the incor-
po ration of such ideas in the econometric work of the 
Federal Reserve Board - MIT model. In other words, an 
endogenous price level permits the same process of ad-
Justment to a change in the nominal stock of money 
through price level changes, as the monetarists believe. 
The fundamental difference therefore between post 
Keynesians and monetarists is not that the model of the 
latter implies a much more general transmission mechanism 
than the one implied by the Keynesian model, but rather 
the difference lies on the quantitative importance attach-
ed to financial and physical assets as channels through 
which monetary impulses .are trasmitted - an empirical 
(21) There is ample evidence that post Keynesian .thinking 
take this position. For example Ackley: "Macto-Economic 
Theory" ch. IX; Allen: "Macro-Economic Theory" ch. 7; 
Bailey: "National Income and the Price Level" ch. 3; 
Smith: "A Graphical Exposition.of the Complete Keynesian 
System", .(1956). 
(22) This does not mean that the comparative static Keynes-
ian model offers an adequate explanation of the determinat-
ion of the price level. 
-~ 
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question. Post Keynesians believe that the burden of 
adjustment falls on financial assets with only a small 
effect coming through physical assets; on the other 
hand monetarists believe that the burden of adjustment 
falls on physical assets, with only a small effect com-
ing through financial assets. This difference however 
has one important implication for the conduct of mone-
tary policy. According to the Keynesian belief monetary 
policy is more effective if the authorities control the 
rates of interest while under the monetarist thought 
the authorities ought to control the stock of money in 
order to maximize the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
(E) Another monetarist position relates to their 
view that their analysis provides a monetary theory of 
the price level while Keynesian analysis provides a 
monetary theory of the interest rate. According to this 
view the rate of interest in Keynesian analysis is ei-
ther determined solely in the money market (23) or it 
is jointly determined by the interaction of the whole 
system (i.e. by some ve~sion of the IS-LM model). Accord-
ing to bot~ views however, Keynesian analysis results 
In a relationship between interest rates and money 
stock in the opposite direction; that is, an increase 
in money supply would result in a lower interest rate 
(23) For example Fand (1969, p.564) argues that "In 
the Keynesian theory the exogenously given quantity 
of money, together with the liquidity preference 
function, determines the interest rate". 
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in the new equilibrium. This position is usually con-
trasted to the monetarist view of the response of the 
interest, following a monetary disturbance. Indeed it 
is argued that a positive relationship between money 
stock and interest rates will be observed. (24 ) 
Perhaps the best expression of this view is found 
in Friedman's presidential adress to the American Eco-
nomic Association. The immediate response of interest 
rates, it is argued, will be in the opposite direction 
of the monetary shift. This movement represents the 
"liquidity effect" - the substitution effect of micro 
theory.-But there also exists an income effect: The 
initial fall in the rate of interest would stimulate 
investment and other forms of expenditure and thence 
income and employment. The rise in income would in its 
turn increase the demand for money and thus the rate 
of interest would start rising. To the extent however 
that the rising income is accompanied by rising prices 
a "price expectation effect" is also set in operation 
(24) Zwick argues that "(T)he alternative concepts of 
Keynes and Fisher concerning the adjustment of the e-
conomy to monetary changes are mirrored in their dif-
ferent notions concerning interest rate determination 
and the response of interest rates to monetary changes. 
The IS-L~ framework suggests that, so long as the IS 
and L~ schedules represent independent relations a mo-
netary expansion causes interest rates to fall because 
of the outward s~ift of the L~ schedul~. In the Fisher-
ian model,oa monetary increase raises the level of ex-
penditures; the upward response of loan demand due to 
the increased expendi ture causes interest rates -to rise". 
(1971, p.78). 
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for as inflationary conditions prevail lenders would 
increase the rate th~y charge and borrowers would be 
prepared to pay a higher rate of int~rest. 
Thus, according to monetarists, Keynesian compa-
rative static analysis recognizes only the liquidity 
effect and hence it implies an inverse relationship 
between the stock of money and the rate of interest. 
But this is certainly not true. The new equilibrium 
position of the rate of interest might be above the 
initial equilibrium and therefore the relationship 
between the stock of money and the interest rate might 
be positive if the IS,schedule is positively sloped. 
This surely is the case when the sum of the propensi-
ties to spend is more than unity. 
Some monetarists writings, however, give the 
impression that the relationship between the stock of 
money and the interest rate does not refer to comparat-
ive static equilibrium points but to the dynamics of 
the system. And it is argued that it is in this context 
that Keynesian analysis is inconsistent with a positive 
relation. 
However, even within such an interpretation the 
Keynesian model is not inconsistent with a positive 
relation and surely it is misleading to assign it only 
the liquidity effect. Teigen has shown that. "observed 
parallel movements between money and interest rates 
are quite consistent with the basic IS-LM structure 
no matter which way the IS curve slopes, given the 
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reasonable and widely accepted premise that the moneta-
ry sector adjusts much more quickly than the real sector 
to external shocks".(25) 
To summarize, then, monetarists differ from Keynes-
ians in two respects. first, on the behaviour assumed 
about the labour market and not, as it is argued by mo-
netarists, about the behaviour of velocity. Second, on 
•• ,' 1; :~., ,~.~:, ~.r ... .,; .... , .. ", ,.' (. . -
the quantitative importance attached to physical and 
financial assets as channels through which monetary 
impulses are transmitted to the economy and not, as it 
is again argued by monetarists, that their analysis 
implies a much more general transmission mechanism. Both 
differences though follow from a common structure. 
(25) Teigen (1972, p.19) 
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1.3 The Logic of a Rule 
The theoretical model put forward in the previous 
section provides theoretical justification for the ad-
option of a rule. The argument can be best seen by con-
sidering the role of monetary policy in stabilizing the 
economy. A good stabilization policy should be governed 
by two basic principles. 
~ 
Figure 1 
When the economy is in the region AEB (fig. 1) monetary 
policy should become less stringent and therefore the 
supply of money should increase. On the other hand when 
the econmy is in the r~gion BFC monetary policy should 
become more tight and the supply of money should ther.-
fore decrease. The policy of a rule secures that these 
broad principles are satisfied if and only if the eco-
nomy behaves as it is implied ~y the above monetarist 
model. A caricature of the argument is provided by 
assuming that the econ~~y behaves according to the 
t 
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modern quantity theory of money 
y • v( yP ) M 
where yP • permanent income and the others symbols stand 
as before. On the assumption that the velocity is a stable 
function(1) 
the percentage increase in income equals the percentage 
increase in the money stock. That is, if income is to be 
on its trend, in other words if the economy is to b~ ab-
solutely stable, a sufficient condition is that the stock 
of money grows at a constant rate equal to that of income. 
furthermore the behaviour of velocity over the 
business cycle secures that the above stabilization 
principles are met. for example, in the downswing of a. 
cycle, DE in fig. 1, the demand for money decreases and 
thus with a constant increase in the supply of money 
there would be an excess supply of it in the whole of 
the region AEB. The effect is even greater if we assume 
in line with monetarists that money is a luxury good in 
which case the demand for money decreases proportionately 
more than income. Similarly in the upswing of a cycle, Ef 
(1) Mathematically speaking it should be a constant in 
which case, howeve~ a perfect stabilization occurs. 
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in fig. 1, the demand for money increases and with a 
constant increase in the supply of money there would 
be an excess demand for it in the whole of the region 
BfC. But this is exactly what active (discretionary) 
stabilization should attempt to achieve. 
Thus ·the adoption of a rule automatically secures 
an excess demand for money in exactly those situations 
where monetary policy should have been tight, and an 
excess supply of money in exactly those situations 
where monetary policy should have been easy. But al-
though the basic 8t~bilization principles are met it 
is not at all certain that an active discretionary 
stabilization should not do better than a rule. The 
other leg therefore of the mbn~tary th~si~ 
consists of an attack on discretion. 
Thus although it may sound very strange, the 
biggest challenge to the view that discretionary mone-
tary policy is effective has come about by one who be-
lieves that monetary policy effects are very powerful. 
friedman argues that monetary policy effects are felt 
only after a long and variable lag, and that therefore 
the use of monetary policy may prove to be destabiliz-
ing while intented to be stabilizing. Indeed, friedman 
arguas, this is what has really happened in the case 
of the U.S. economy - monetary arrangements have be-
come a primary source of instability. "In almost every' 
instance major instability in the U.S. has been produc-
ed or, at the very least, greatly intensified by mone-
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tary instability. Monetary instability in its turn has 
generally arisen either from government intervention or 
from controversy about what governmental policy should 
be. The failure of government to provide a stable fram-
ework has thus been a major if not the major factor 
accounting for our really severe inflations and depress-
ions. 1I (2) The authorities, according to friedman, are 
not only to blame for not making the decisions at the 
right time but also for overreacting. On the part of the 
authorities 
" • • • there was a natural if regrettable 
tendency to wait too long before stepping on the brake, 
as it were; then to brake too hard; then, when this did 
not bring monetary expansion to a halt very shortly, to 
brake yet again".(3) 
Thus friedman and other monetarists believe that 
every major depression in history resulted from an ab-
solute decline in the money supply and that every inflat-
ion was the result of excessive expansion of the money 
supply. Hence, the use of discretionary anticyclical 
instead of 
monetary policy increased/dampening the cyclical behav-
iour of the economy. This increased instability is due 
to two main factors. first, on the lag that exists betw-
een the time that a monetary stimulus is required and 
the time when a substantial proportion of it has actually 
been felt in the economy. Second, and most important, 
on the premise that the main determinant of spending i~ 
(2) friedman (1960, p.9) 
(3) friedman (1960, p.17) 
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the stock of money. 
The inevitable result of these two factors is that 
unless business forecasting is relatively accurate, 
monetary policy cannot be properly timed. Even if it 
can be timed the long lag would pose a difficult problem. 
Suppose that the contemporary situation demands a 
monetary contraction and that accurate forecastiong 
predicts that the effect would be felt after two years. 
However, the situation after two years might have been 
reversed on its own and so the effect of monetary policy 
would be to increase the perverse effects - that is to 
increase instability. To the extent, however, that the 
lag is not only long but is also variable, as it is 
argued ~y friedman, monetary policy cannot be properly 
timed even if forecasting is good. According to this 
view, therefore, "the central problem is not to construct 
a highly sensitive instrument that can continuously 
offset instability introduced by other factors, but 
rather to prevent monetary arrangements from themselves 
becoming a primary source or instability". Indeed the 
basic premise is that the economy is basically stable 
and not necessarily subject to recurring periods of 
severe recession and inflation. "What we need ••• (there-
fore) ••• is not a skilled monetary driver of the economic 
vehicle continuously turning the steering wheel to adjust 
to the unexpected irregularities of the route, but some 
means of keeping the morietary passenger who is in the 
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back seat as ballast from occasionally leaning over and 
giving the steering wheel a jerk that threatens to send 
the car off the road".(4) 
It follows from this view that the obvious way of 
preventing major instability in the economy is to adopt 
a monetary policy . that avoids sharp swings between 
monetary ease and restraint. The best way to do this is 
to abolish discretionary monetary policy and adopt a 
simple rule. ~A satisfactory policy guide or rule should 
be connected more directly with the means available to 
the monetary authorities ••• and ••• the most important 
magnitude thattha monetary authorities can ~ffectively 
control ••• is the stock of mon ey ll.(5) According to 
friedman, therefore, the stock of money is the relevant 
magnitude in terms of which to formulate monetary rules, 
the simpler being one that dictates a constant rate of 
increase of the money supply. To the monetarists, the 
precise rate is not so crucial, but its constancy is. 
Wa may now summarize the argument as follows: The 
theoretical validity of a rule stems from lhe principle 
that the economy is basically stable. Destabilizing 
shocks in the economy are not caused by instability 
in the behaviour of the private sector, e.g. autonomous 
(4) friedman (1960, p.23) 
(5) friedman (1960, p.88) 
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changes in private investment but by instability in the 
application of monetary policy. The main factor that 
explains fluctuations in economic activity are monetary 
rather than real impulses. 
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1.4 The Role of Monetary Policy in the 
Interventionist Camp 
The role assigned to monetary policy by the non 
monetarist camp stems from a belief about the trans· 
mission mechanism. Monetary impulses are thought to 
be transmitted through interest rates(1) to investment 
expenditure and then via the famous multiplier to 
income and employment • This process, however, might 
be hindered for several reasons: firstly, the demand 
for money may be characterized by absolute liquidity 
preference - the so called "liquidity trap". Many 
Keynesian economists thought that this was the actual 
8tate of affairs and this meant that, if the economy 
was in a state of unemployment, monetary policy would, 
then, be completely impotent - the "money does not 
matter at all" thesis. Secondly, the process might be 
brought to a halt because investment expenditure might 
not respond to changes in the rate of interst.(2) This 
means that even if abso~ute liquidity preference was 
not the case monetary policy would have a 8mall effect. 
This small effect, however, would have been maximized 
(1) In fact, Keynes states that "the primary effect of 
a change in the quantity of money on effective demand 
i8 through its influence on the rate of interest". 
"General Theory" p. 298. 
(2) Radcliffe Committee: "Memoranda of Evidence" vol. 2 
" Part VII, B. Also Minutes of Evidence",especially quest-
ions 11543 and 11478. And the best known 8ritis~'inve8ti-
-38-
if the authorities had manipulated directly interest 
rates in the first place rather than the money supply 
preferably by keeping them down as low as possible, 
what has come to be known after the Second World War 
as "cheap money policy". 
Thirdly, the position has been put forward, 
especially in the Radcliffe Report, that money cannot 
even be defined so it is meaningless to discuss its 
controllability. The Committee emphasized that though money 
is defined by what it does - therefore money are all 
those assets that serve directly or indirectly the 
medium of exchange function - there would be no complete 
and permanent taxonomy between assets, and therefore 
no definition of money. What may be regarded as money 
today might not be regarded so tomorrow; instead, it 
is "liquidity" that affects expenditure and there'o~e 
it is this variable that should be controlled through 
interest rates. 
rinally, there is another strand ot Keynesianism 
that argues that the supply of money is endogenous 
and therefore cannot be controlled.(3) 
The empirical evidence which has accumulated since 
ion: "Oxford Studies in the Price Mechanism" (1951). 
(3) There are many variations in the way this argument 
is expressed. One is the position advanced by Cambridge 
Keynesians, e.g. Kaldor (1970). Another is the "N~wView" 
see for exmple Tobin (1963). 
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then, has brought a change of belief among Keynesians 
about the role of monetary policy. Indeed, the empiric-
al evidence shows, beyond any doubt, that the liquidity 
trap has never been a reality;(4) this means that changes 
in the stock of money have an effect on interst rates. 
Accumulated evidence, too, has shown that SUbstantial 
interest rate effects exist both in the consumption for 
durables and investment;(S) and this in its turn means 
that monetary policy affects real expenditure and hence 
real income and employment. In addition, to the extent 
that monetary policy intensifies and strengthens aggreg-
ate demand in excess of aggregate supply a substantial 
effect would be shown on the general level of prices. 
Therefore monetary policy has a role to play in fight-
ing inflation too. 
These ideas have led many Keynesians to the belief 
that monetary policy along with fiscal policy has a great 
role to play in countercyclical stabilization policy, 
that discretionary monetary policy is a useful instrum-
ent. 
Lately,' however, all these income expenditure 
theorists have come under severe attack by Leijonhufvud. 
The efficacy of monetary policy as a stabilization tool 
depends, according to Leijonhufvud, on the diagnosis 
(4) For a summary of the empirical evidence see Good-
hart (1970), Harris (1968), Laidler (1970), Teigen (1965). 
(5) For a summary of this evidence see Hamburger (1969), 
Fisher and Sheppard (1972). 
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especially in the case of deficient aggregate demand. 
Once the system came to depart from the full employment 
state with stable prices, and is still at the neighbour-
hood, the diagnosis points to a 'wrong' level of interest 
rate - the market rate departed from the 'natural rate' 
- and therefore the stabilization policy should rely on 
monetary policy. If, hoeever, the characteristics of 
deep depression are present - the system is far away from 
the neighbourhood of full~employment - the diagnosis points 
to entrepreneurial expectations as the source of the 
trouble. In this case monetary policy is unreliable; 
fiscal policy, instead, should do the trick. 
To summarize, then, among Keynesian economists, 
there are those who attribute little, if ~ny, import-
ence to discretionary monetary policy simply because 
they believe that money does not matter; there are 
others, however, who believe in the potency of discret-
ionary monetary policy because they recognize that there 
are channels through which money affects the economy. 
Even within this strand however monetary policy is 
considered to be a difficult weapon to use. The reason 
is that although monetary policy may have a substantial 
effect it might take a long time for its effects to be 
fel t in the economy'. Pluch of the empirical evidence 
that relates to the U.S. economy, as for example the 
FRS-PIIT econometric model, suggests that there are long 
lags in the effects of monetary policy. Although these 
lags can prove very damaging to the effectiveness of 
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discretionary monetary policy it has not been suggested 
by the various studies that its effects may be destabiliz-
ing. What is even more important is that it has not been 
suggested that discretion should be abandoned in favour 
of a rule because of the difficulties referred to above. 
The major reason is that although money may be one of the 
factors that contribute to the cyclical behaviour.of 
the economy other factors such as autonomous expenditure, 
expectations about economic developments e.t.c., are 
considered to play a much more important role in ex-
plaining business cycle. In this context a rule is not 
to be expected to secure stabilization • 
. 
If indeed the lags are very long and thus discret-
ionary monetary policy a very dangerous weapon to use 
the non monetarist camp would not argue in favour of a 
rule but in abandoning monetary policy altogether in 
favour of another discretionary policy - 8uch as fiscal 
policy. 
Thus whether rule or discretion should be u.sed de,pends 
on the causes of business cycles. Those who are in fav-
our of discretion believe that the cyclical behaviour 
of the economy is mainly due to autonomous changes in 
the behaviQur of the private sector. On the other hand, 
those who are in favour of a rule believe in a pre-
dominantly money caused business cycle mainly due to 
instebility in the behaviour of the authorities.(6) 
(6) This is tr.ue irrespective of whether the lags are 
-~ 
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A straight answer, however, cannot be given to 
this question. We are thus led to investigate it in-
directly by examining other factors. The most important 
of these are:(7) The endogeneity/exogeneity of money. 
Obviously if money is endogenous, in the policy sense,(8) 
then a rule is not feasible since the authorities would 
not succeed in increasing a monetary aggregate by a 
constant percentage in each year. 
(b) The interest elasticity of the velocity function. 
If interest rates do not affect the velocity, monetary 
analysis can be divorced from analysis of the real 
long or short. Thus the st. Louis model provides evidence 
of short lags. Nevertheless Andersen (1971) is also in 
favour of a rule because it is argued that for various 
reasons policy makers destabilize with their actions 
the economy. The most important of these reasons are: 
(i) The policy makers overlook the importance of money. 
lii) They use wrong indicators of monetary policy. 
(iii) Attempt.to stabilize' the economy ~ith fiscal 
policy without paying much attention to the ways of 
financing it, though, it is argued, only by increasing 
the supply of money (as.a means of financing the budget) 
can fiscal policy have any effect. liv) They attach more 
importance to unemployment rather than to inflation. 
(7) These factors are only mentioned here but they are 
taken up separately in the next chapter where the model 
is specified. 
(8) Much o~ the controversy about the endogeneity/exoge-
neity of money stems from a confusion about its mean-
in~ for a clarification and an extension of this point 
see footnote and the discussion of the supply function 
of money in the next chapter. 
-43-
sector. In this case the causes of business cycles 
are solely due to instability in the behaviour of 
the authorities. If, however, interest rates affect 
the velocity then both the private sector and the 
authorities contribute to the instability of the eco-
nomy and therefore a general equilibrium analysis is 
required. 
(c) The channels through which monetary variables 
affect the real sector of the economy and the associat-
ed lags. (d) The sensitivity of consumption to changes 
in current income. Obviously the strength and stability 
of the autonomous expenditure multiplier depends on 
the relationship between consumption and current income. 
(e) The strength and stability of the money multiplier. 
While each one factor has a role to play one can-
not single out just one and disregard the others. All 
factors must be taken into account. Such treatment 
requires a general equilibrium analysis through the 
specification of a model. The model must be flexible, 
nevertheless, to capture the different views on the 
working of the econo~y. This task though presupposes 
the existence of a common structure. This is essential 
for an evaluation of the policies.(8) In this context 
although the controversy of Rules versus Discretion 
stems from different theorizing of the working of the 
(8) A common structure is indeed very important because 
in addition it gives us the opportunity to test through 
policy simulations the Rules versus Discretion debate. 
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economy it is not a product of two compl etel y di fferent 
structures. Indeed, the main task of section 2 is to 
establish that most of the differences follow essent-
ially from the same structure to which, however, differ-
ent parameter estimates and elasticities are assumed 
by each camp. 
The next step in the analysis is the methodology 
upon which to build up such a model. Before we tackle 
this point, however, we must look at the empirical 
evidence regarding the Rules versus Discretion debate. 
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1.5 The Empirical Evidence Concerning the strength 
and Timing of Monetary Policy 
(a) The monetary case 
There are two empirical issues underlying the debate 
about the usefulness of monetary policy as discretionary 
stabilization tool. First, is the well known question of 
the relative strength of monetary policy as measured by 
the monetary multiplier. The second empirical issue 
concerns the timing lags of monetary policy. This section 
provides a brief summary of the empirical evidence concer-
ing the above two issues. 
The starting point should be the definition of the 
lag. Friedman views the lag between the peak rate of 
increase in the money supply and the absolute peak in 
economic activity as a measure of the delay in effect 
of monetary ~hanges or as the lag that would apply 
between a change in monetary policy and its effects. His 
findings, then, easily follow: "The rate of change of 
the money supply shows well marked cycles that match 
closely those in economic activity in general and precede 
the latter by a long interval. On the average, the rate 
of change of the money supply has reached its peak nearly 
16 months before the peak in general business and has 
reached its trough over ••• 12 months before the trough 
in general business ••• Moreover, the timing varies 
considerably from cycle to cycle - since 1907 the short-
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est time span by which the money peak preceded the by-
siness,cycle peak was 13 months, the longest 24 months; 
the corresponding range at troughs is 5 months to 21 
months". (1) 
Many economists were simply not prepared to believe 
Friedman's estimates of either the length or the variabi-
lity of the lag. As Culbertson put it, "if we assume 
that government stabilization policies, act with so 
long and variable a lag, how do we set about explaining 
the surprising moderateness of the economic fluctuations 
that we have suffered in the past decade?" Culbertson's 
own ~~~ conclusion was that the "broad record of exper-
ience support(s) the view that (countercyclical) monetary, 
debt management, and fiscal adjustments can be counted 
on to have their predominant direct effects within 
three to six months, soon enough that if they are under-
taken moderately early in a cyclical phase they will 
not be. destabilizing".(2) 
leaving aside, at the moment, the question of whether 
the data provide support to the interpretation given by 
Friedman we first examine the validity of the method 
used. This method is simply to compare two time series 
and infer that one is the cause and the other the effect 
by simply observing that there is a lead/lag between 
the two series. The fallacy to this line of argument 
(1) Friedman (1958, P.P.249-50) 
(2) Culbertson (1960, p.621) 
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is suggested by the following reductio ad absurdum 
offered by Kareken and Solow: "Imagine an economy 
buffeted by all kinds of cyclical forces, endogenous 
and exogenous. Suppose that by heroic and perhaps 
even cyclical variation in the money supply and its 
rate of change, the Federal Reserve manages deftly to 
counter all disturbing impulses and to stabilize the 
level of economic activity absolutely. Then an observ-
er following the Friedman method would see peaks and 
troughs in monetary change accompanied by a ·steady 
level of aggregate activity. He would presumably 
conclude that monetary policy has no effect at all, 
which would be precisely the opposite of the truth U .(3) 
The importance of the above argument is that the 
question of the effects of monetary policy can only 
be made through a model. It is therefore the case 
that if Friedman's findings are interpreted in accord-
ance with his method they are compatible with many 
hypotheses about why events have turned out just so. 
Supposing now that we ignore this methodological 
point then the relevant· question is whether the data 
provide support to the interpretation offered by 
that 
rriedman. It turns out/the evidence depends on mis-
leading comparison of time series. Friedman compares 
the rate of change of the money stock with the level 
(3) Kareken and Solow (1963, p.16) 
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of economic activity. The question is if the result 
would have changed had the level of money stock been 
compared with the level of economic activity or had 
the rate of change of the money stock been compared 
with the rate of change of the level of economic act-
ivity. If this is the case then the result is arbitrary 
depending on the the definition one cares to choose. 
On general terms the answer is provided by consider-
ing what would be the lag if the stock of money and 
the level of economic activity are assumed to reflect 
simultaneously smoothed cyclical fluctuations. In 
such a case the rate of the stock of money will show 
a constant lead over economic activity. If, in addit-
ion,.each series is at all irregular either in its 
period or in the time shape then the lag would also 
be a variable one. 
Even if we waive this general point the matter 
still remains that the answer depends on the definit-
ions of the series to be compared. Kareken and Solow(4) 
have shown that if one compares the change in the 
money stock with the change in economic activity 
the two series move more or less simultaneously and 
therefore that the "lead of the change in the stock 
of money over economic activity is a pure arithmetic 
artifact".(5) 
A second piece of evidence in favour of the long 
(4), (5) Kareken and Solow (1963, p.18). 
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and variable lag is provided by friedman and Meisel-
man.(6) The evidence is based on simple correlations 
between the stock of money and consumption or on 
multiple correlation coefficients between current and 
past values of money and consumption. The highest 
correlation observed was between consumption and 
money two quarters earlier; this implies an average 
,lag of six months. "Sut the lead will not be six months 
in every case. It may on one occasion be zero, on an-
other twelve or fifteen months~.(7) This finding, 
however, is not inconsistent with that reported in 
the previous study by friedman. "The relation stated 
(in this ~tudy) is between the level of money and the 
level of consumption. The relation (in the previously 
cited study) is between the rate of change of money 
and the level of general business. Since the peak 
rate of change of money precedes the peak level of 
money by a substantial interval, it is entirely 
consistent that it should lead the level of business 
by 12 to 16 months, whereas the level of money leads 
by only 6 months n .(8) 
These results were also cast into doubt. At the 
very least the mass of correlation. coefficients 
computed by the various discussants showed that it 
(6) friedman and Meiselman (1963) 
(7) friedman and Meiselman, OPe cit. p.214. 
(8) friedman and Meiselman, OPe cit. p.214, footnote 1. 
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would be impossible to reach a clear and definite 
verdict. Results turned out to depend on the sample 
period, on the simplicity or complexity of the model 
used. Moreover, the interpretation of the results was 
complicated by the inability of correlation. techniques 
to ,distinguish between cause and effect - an influence 
of money on business from an influence of business 
on money. (9) 
Most of these points were taken into consideration 
by the st. Louis Model~10) According to this model 
the size of the money multiplier is very high and the 
total response of G.N.P. to changes in the money stock 
is ~ompleted within a year. In particular a once and 
for all· increase in the money supply of £1 billion in 
quarter 1 will have raised the level of G.N.P. by £6.6 
billion by quarter 4. In contrast, Oavis(11) found 
that in the fRB-MIT model a once and for all increase 
in the money supply of £1 billion in a given quarter 
has almost no effect on G.N.P. in that quarter and, 
even after four quarters, the level of G.N.P. is only 
about £400 million higher than it otherwise would be. 
He commented, therefore, that the "most surprising 
(9) In the U.S. the main discussants were Ando and 
Modigliani (1965); Oe Prano and Mayer (1965); Hester 
(1964); friedman and Meiselman. In the U.K., Barrett 
and Walters (1966); Artis and Nobay (1969). 
(10),.Andersen and Jordan (1968); Andersen and Carlson 
(1970). 
(11) Davis (1969). 
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thing about the world of th~ st. Louis equation is 
not so much the force, but rather the speed with which 
money begins to act on the economy"; and he concluded 
that "what is at stake in the case of the St. Louis 
equation is not merely a 'shade of difference' but a 
strikingly contrasting view of the world - at least 
relative to what is normally taken as orthodox view 
roughly replicated and confirmed both in methods and 
in result by the fRS-MIT model".(12) 
There seem to be two issues that need to be 
examined: first, how good are the purely statistical 
properties of the sort of relationship presented by 
Andersen and Jordan? Second, how much of the relation-
ship they find is due to a reverse influence of business 
on money. Davis subjected the st. Louis equation into 
various statistical tests. He concluded that "neither 
omission of the fiscal variables nor different techniques 
for estimating the. lag structure affect significantly 
the results of the st. Louis equation. Moreover, the 
coefficients were proved to be reasonably stable 
when the whole period was broken into subperiods. 
In their critique of the st. Louis model de Leeuw 
and Kalchbrenner (13) hold that the surprisingly power-
ful and quick acting effects of money are biased 
because money or even the monetary base are not truly 
(12) Davis, OPe cit. p.p.122-3. 
(13) de Leeow and Kalchbrenner (1969). 
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exogenous. The monetary base includes borrowed reserves, 
and currency, which is affected by the behaviour of the 
public. Using the non-borrowed monetary base or non-
borrowed member bank reserves instead of the money stock 
or the monetary base de. Leeuw and Kalchbrenner find 
results similar to those reached in the fRS-MIT model. 
They conclude that the coefficients of the st. Louis 
equation are in fact heavily distorted by simultaneous 
equation bias, and that once this is removed tithe results 
closely resemble the sort of world most of us h.ve 
always believed inti. 
However, one migh~ argue in defense of the st. Louis 
model that the theory put forward by monetarists is 
between money and G.N.P. (and not between non-borrowed 
reserves and G.N.P.) and thus the appropriate variable 
is the total base.(14) The sole fact. therefore, that 
(14) It is surprising that Andersen and Jordan did not 
pursue such a line of defense. In their rejoinder to 
~~e Leeuw and Kalchbrener they dispute the contention 
that borrowed reserves and currency should be subtract-
ed from the base to obtain a more 'exogenous' variable. 
The truth of the matter, however, remains that the 
problem of identifying a suitable exogenous monetary 
variable does not seem to have an entirely obvious 
solution. In his examination of the evidence, Gramlich 
observed that tI ••• just as the 1965 debate stalled on 
the inability to choose an autonomous variable that is 
really exogenous, the 1968 debate has apparently stalled 
on the inability to choose an autonomous monetary 
-53-
the effect of non-borrowed reserves on G.N.P. is very 
small and slow acting might be a mere image of the 
wrong specification and test of the theory. It is 
possible, that money exerts a powerful and quick effect 
on G.N.P •• Indeed, Davis found that a substantial 
proportion of the variance of money was left unexplain-
ed when only the non-borrowed base was included as an 
explanatory variable; the result did not change 
substantially when the discount rate was also included. 
rurthermor~, the influence of the base on money was 
found to work with a long lag. This result confirms 
the hypothesis that t~e relationship between money 
and G.N.P. is ve~y much weakened if it is substituted 
by a relationship of G.N.P. and non-borrowed reserves 
and therefore the size of the multiplier is under-
estimated and the lag between money and G.N.P. is 
overestimated. 
Whatever the validity of this point, however, the 
variable"; Gramlich (1971, p.215). It should be clar-
ified that the issue here involves two different 
notions of exogeneity. According to the first, exogenous 
means a variable subject to control by policy makers, 
whereas according to the second notion exogenous means 
a var~ble which does not respond to current movements 
in the endogenous variables. In terms of this debate 
it is not disputed that currency and borrowed reserves 
are endogalous in a statistical sense - that is, whether 
in a structural model one would include equations for 
them - but whether the central bank can offset endogenous 
movements in borrowed reserves and currency to put the 
~, 
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the truth of the matter remains that reliability on 
the estimates of the st. Louis equation can only be 
attached if the reverse influence of G.N.P. on money 
is eliminated. In fact, it is certain that the high 
proportion of the variance of money that is left 
unexplained contains the influence of business on 
money. While this feedback effect may be large there 
is no ample empirical evidence concerning its size. 
Davis provides an estimate of this feedback effect 
from G.N.P~ to money that is rather small. He there-
fore concl~des that "only a relatively modest part 
of the gross relationship between money and G.N.P. 
exhibited in the st. Louis equation may reflect a 
feedback effect from G.N.P. to money~. Much of the 
powerful influence of 'business' on money ••• must 
be reflected by variables other than G.N.P •••• 
Therfore it does not seem easy to dispose off the 
association between changes in money and changes 
in G.N.P. by showing that it is primarily or largely 
8 matter of reverse causation".(15) 
monetary base on target. 
(15) Davis (1969, p.130). 
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(b) The Keynesian case 
Keynesian attempts to provide an estimate of the 
lag stem essentially from the mechanism through which 
a change in the money supply is thought to influence 
real income. Thus the effects and the lags of interest 
rate changes on components of aggregate demand seem 
to be the main determinants of the power and speed of 
monetary policy. On these lines Kareken and Solow 
provide estimates of the lag in the effect of monetary 
policy by examining the lag of inventory investment, 
and producer's durable equipment. They conclude that 
works 
"monetary po1icWneither so slowly as Friedman thinks, 
as 
nor/quickly and surely as the Federal Reserve itself 
seems to believe ••• Though the full results of policy 
changes on the flow of expenditures may be a long time 
coming, nevertheless the chain of effects is spread 
over a fairly wide interval. This means that some 
effect comes reasonably quickly, and the effects build 
up over time so that some sUbstantial stabilizing power 
results after a lapse ~f time of the order of six or 
nine months U .(16) 
However, as Mayer pointed out, «this statement is 
inconsistent with the evidence provided by Kareken and 
Solow. Estimates of the complete lag are reported only 
for inventory investment and this lag is much larger 
than Friedman's lag. For producer's durable equipment 
(16) Kareken and Solow (1963, p.2) 
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they provided estimates for only part of the lag, but 
even this is longer than Friedman's lag. Thus, Mayer 
conclKdes that Kareken and Solow "should have criticiz-
ed Friedman, not for overestimating, but for under-
estimating the lag".(17) 
Overall, the overwhelming evidence that stems from 
studies of the financial determinants of various forms 
of private expenditure points also to long lags.(18) 
But is such an evidence sufficient to point to the 
conclusion that monetary policy, to the extent that 
its effectiveness comes from its power to influence 
expenditure through interest rates, works very slowly 
with a substantial lag and ther.fore cannot be used 
for cyclical stabilization? The answer is certainly 
no for lags and parameter values 'in other sectors of 
the economy play an equally important role in determin-
ing the dynamics of the system. In particular, Tucker(19) 
has shown that the lag in the effect of monetary policy 
depends on the response of interest rate to changes in 
the supply of money. If it were the case that the interest 
rate adjusts gradually "to money supply changes then 
another lag would have to be added to the distributed 
lag of investment. If on the other hand, the initial 
response of the interest rate is a vigorous one then 
(17) Mayer (1971, p.326). 
(18) For a very good survey of this evidence see Fisher 
and Sheppard, OPe cit.; Hamburger, OPe cit. 
(19) Tucker (1966) 
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it is possible that the lag in the effect of monetary 
policy is very small. 
Tucker examined separately the evidence from 
various studies providing estimates of the lags of 
investment to changes in interest rates and of inter-
est rates to changes in the money supply. He concluded 
that the lag in the money demand function tends to 
counteract, rather than reinforce, the investment lag. 
This result was not contradicted when the problem was 
pursued through a dynamic model. Tanner, by estimat-
ing a model that incorporated the real and the monetary 
sector, found that wh~le there was indeed a long lag 
in the investment function the bulk of the effects of 
monetary policy on aggregate demand occurs within three 
to six months of the change in the money supply. He 
therefore concluded that "monetary policy is ideal for 
and consistent with short run stabilization require-
ments". (20) 
Tanner's conclusion, however, must be qualified 
since (i) he treats the supply of money as exogenous; 
(ii) he makes no attempt to measure the impact of a 
shift in the IS schedule in response to a: change in the 
money stock; and (iii) his results are very sensitive 
to the definition of income. 
Maroney and Mason(21), unlike Tanner, treat the 
(20) Tanner (1969, p.p.803-4). 
(21) Maroney and Mason (1972). 
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supply of money as endogenous on the grounds that move-
ments in the short term rate of interest, by influencing 
portfolio behaviour, will exert a positive impact on the 
money stock. Their results although indicate " ••• the 
important role of the money stock in determining the 
rate of agg~egate economic activity,,(22) point to a 
"careful management of the monetary base, which would 
seem to require avoiding erratic changes,,(23) As such, 
their conclusion is at variance with Tanner and Andersen 
and Jordan. 
The powerful impact of monetary policy in the model 
of Maroney and Mason, however, is due to the inclusion 
of the stock of money in consumption and to changes in 
consumption in the investment function. Maroney and 
Mason justify the inclusion of the money stock in 
consumption by arguing that it reflects a liquidity 
effect. However inclusion of other liquid assets as well 
as the money stock would have ~reduced substantially 
the effect of monetary policy as well as the length of 
the lag. 
Large scale models· also provide estimates of the 
lags in the effects of monetary policy. These estimates, 
however, differ substantially from one another mainly 
because of differences in the structure. One can in 
(22) & (23) Maroney and Mason (1972, p.793 & p.810). 
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principle distinguish models that give little emphasis 
on the financial sector, the major role being kept for 
the real sector, and models that assign a great role 
to the financial sector and its links with the real 
sector. In the first category belong the Wharton Econo-
metric model, the Evans model, the Office of Business 
Economics model, the Suits's Michigan model and others. 
models 
In the second category belong/such as: the Ando-Goldfeld 
model, the Brookings model, the fRB-MIT model. Obvious-
ly models of the first type cannot be relied upon in 
providing answers for the timing of monetary policy. 
Even within the second category however there are sub-
stantial differences in the results. The main reasons 
are the following: (a) The specification of the monetary 
policy variable. for example, the variable to represent 
open market operations has been treated differently in 
the large scale models. And while it is certainly true 
that there are a number of plausible variables to re-
present open market operatione the use of different 
definitions will lead, in general, to different results. 
Hamburger, for example," argues that "the choice of the 
exogenous monetary variable has a significant effect on 
the estimate of the lag in the effect of policy. If the 
money supply, the monetary base, or total reserves are 
used as the monetary variable, the results suggest"that 
the total response of G.N.P. to a change in policy is 
completed within four or five quarters. On the other 
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hand, those who consider unborrowed reserves to be the 
appropriate variable would conclude that less than 40 
percent of the effect occurs in five quarters and that 
the full effect is distributed over two and a half 
years tt .(24) This finding is corroborated in a. surv~y of 
the policy simulations of the effects of open market 
operations in fisher and Sheppard. The Ando-Goldfeld 
model in which the monetary variable is represented 
by unborrowed reserves plus currency shows a strong 
and quick acting effect - five quarters. The fRB-MIT 
model, on the other hand, in which the policy variable 
is unborrowed reserves shows an effect distributed 
within 3 years. 
(b) Differences in the choice of initial conditions. 
This becomes a very important reason for differences 
in the results if the model shows non-linearities. 
(c) Differances in the structure of the financial 
sector. This is another important reason because the 
strength of monetary policy is mediated, in part, by 
the decisions of financial intermediaries. 
In what way can the above empirical evidence help 
us to build a model for the U.K. economy? An answer 
must await until we have considered the methodology 
upon which to build up such a model. It is to this task 
that we now turn, our attention to. 
t24) Hamburger, op.cit. p.293. 
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1.6 Reduced Forms or structural Forms? 
In this section we examine alternative ways which 
would enables us to construct the mOdel. Basically there 
are two approaches, the reduced form and the structural 
form. The former is used by monetarists and the latter 
by Keynesians. 
The reduced form approach attempts to formulate 
directly the effects of changes of policy variables on 
some target variable, such as the level of economic acti-
vity, without specifying any intermediate steps or causal 
links. There are two basic reasons that are usually put 
forward in favor of this approach. First, if one is pri-
marily interested in explaining the behaviour of a few 
key variables such as GNP, prices and unemployment, it 
is unnecessary to estimate all the parameters of a large 
scale model. Second, the economy is so complicated that 
even a large scale model would fail to capture the inter-
relationships and evaluate the structure. Therefore a 
structural approach might yield at least as much as mis-
leading results as the reduced form approach, Whatever 
the merits of this approach it might be argued that the 
reduced form approach presupposes a given structure and 
therefore it provides the same amount of statistical 
information as the str~ctural approach. This is certainly 
true in the case of a just-identifiable system for there 
is one-to-one correspondence between them. It is not how-
ever the case when the system is overidentified for then 
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the reduced form does not incorporate the extra a priori 
restrictions. In this case the reduced form is consistent 
with many structures and it might well be that these 
structures are "mutually exclusive." Hence there is no way 
to test the underlying theory and therefore to provide a 
significant interpretation of the results.(1) 
The truth of the matter, however, is that in the re-
duced form approach the equations are merely asserted to 
be reduced forms because the structure is never spelt out. 
In such a ~ase it could be that the alleged reduced form 
has no acceptable structure. Gramlish(2)for example exam-
ined the reliability that can be attached to results obtain-
ed from the reduced form approach. He estimated a whole 
class of reduced form equations of the same system with 
the purpose of determining whether all reduced forms" imply 
internally consistent estimates of the underlying structur-
al parameters. His results were not surprising: substant-
ial inconsistencies were indeed found within the estimated 
reduced forms of the same system. Hamburger,-on the other 
hand, in his survey of the evidence on the lag in the 
effect of monetary policy, argues that "the use of re-
duced form equations does not lead to estimates of the 
t1") See Fisher G.R. and Sheppard O.K. "Interrelation-
ships between Real and Monetary Variables: Some Evidence 
from Recent U.S. Empirical Studies" in Issues in Mone-
tary Economics ed. by H.Johnson and A.R. Nobay, esp. pp. 
236-248. 
(2) Gramli&h OPe cit. 
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effects of monetary policy on the economy that differ 
from those obtained from a structural model.,,(3)He 
bases his argument on the evidence provided by de 
Leeuw and Kalchbrenner, who using a reduced form 
approach estimated a lag which seems to lie whithin 
the region of results reached by the fRS-MIT simulations. 
Although this is a pleasent coincidence it does 
not prove in any way the superiority of the reduced 
form approach over the structural approach, nor that 
reliance should be attached to the former; for one thing, 
it leaves a certain degree of ambiguity as to whether 
the preferred variables, their definition, or the form 
of the equation were simply chosen to satisfy the 
investigstors intensions. Thus, Klein(4)has experiment-
ed with the st.Louis equation using levels rather than 
first differences. His results totally condradict those 
of!Andersen and Jordan. In addition, Gramlish shows 
that whether one takes a 'money mostly' stance, a 'fiscal 
mostly' stance, or a both matter stance, depends on the 
decision of which variable to take as exogenous. This 
is hardly a scientific method! 
The lesson, therefore, seems to be that the reduced 
form approach always leads to unsatisfactory resolution 
of the issue if for no other reason than that one can 
never convince anybody else that one is right. On the 
(3) Hamburger (1971, p.292) 
(4) Klein (1971) 
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other hand, the case for the structural approach is 
put very convicingly by frisch: "But no amount of 
statistical information ••• can by itself explain 
economic phenomena. If we are not to get lost in the 
overwhelming, bewildering mass of statistical data ••• , 
we need the guidance and help of a powerful theoretical 
framework. Without this, no significant interpretation 
and coordination of our observations will be possible".(5) 
Turning now our discussion to large scale models 
we observe that these too suffer from some weaknesses. 
Apart from those already mentioned the following are 
in order: (a) Omission of intersectoral dependence. 
While in principle it is possible to construct a model 
with as many sectors as one wishes, in practice, at 
least three sectors seem to be essential: a non bank 
private sector, a banking sector and a government sector. 
Though this intersectoral dependence should be taken 
into account by incorporating a balance sheet equation, 
showing as assets of the one sector the claims of this 
sector on each of the others and, as liabilities, the 
claims of the others on this one, none of the models 
referred to above does so. (b) None of the models 
described has a government budget constraint equation 
nor the stock of privately held government securities 
appears as apolicy variable. (c) With the exception of 
(5) frisch (1933, p.1) 
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the fRS-MIT model all models consider only the cost of 
capital channel of influence ignoring alternative or 
additional channels. Even within this channel, however, 
the cost of capital is presented by a small set of 
market interest rates while the monetarist approach 
has emphasized that a great number of interest rates 
determines the cost of capital. ld) The inclusion of 
nominal rather than real rates of interest in the 
various expenditure functions. In this context equations 
that explain price expectations are needed; and to the 
extent that these depend on current and past changes 
it will be necessary to include price wage equations 
in order to correctly specify and assess the role of 
monetary variables. None of the models uses real rates, 
and furthermore the price wage equations are relatively 
poorly specified. 
Apart from the above weaknesses relating t~ economic 
structure large s~ale models also suffer from problems 
relating to econometrics. Disaggregation is a very 
serious problem. The greater the disaggregation the 
greater the probability ~f mispecification and the 
greater the difficulty of detecting it. furthermore, 
the greater the disaggregation the harder it is to 
obtain appropriate reliable statistics and to the extent 
that such variables have to be constructed the reliabi-
lity on the estimates is very much weakened. finally 
the greater the disaggregation the greater the complex-
ity in the estimation and the time dependence of the 
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error terms both within an equation and between equat-
ions. 
Another serious problem is the assessment of the 
performance of a model since there are no standard 
measures of model performance. 
from the above discussion it becomes clear that 
there is no correct answer on how to build up a model. 
Thus we are faced with a dilemma. We can either build 
up a model based on the reduced form approach or along 
the lines of large scale models. In the first case our 
conclusions would not be particularly strong for the 
reduced form approach conceals the transmission mechanism 
and provides no way of testing the validity of the re-
sults, thus making them largely a matter of opinion 
and formulation. On the other hand, by building up a 
large scale model we inevitably bias our results to-
wards a Keynesian viewpoint. To illustrate, in these 
models representative market rates are sought and while 
these are consistent with a Keynesian viewpoint they 
are a burden to a monetarist viewpoint because there 
is an essential qualitative difference between the two 
schools of thought in terms of the range of assets and 
interest rates considered. 
A reconciliation is therefore needed if one is to 
avoid the shortcomings and caveats of the two approach-
es. The clue is provided by small scale models. These 
models are in the spirit of the reduced form approach 
since a model of this form can meaningfully be solved 
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for an endogenous variable, such as income, thus provid-
ing a reduced form. At the same time, however, such a 
model makes the structure explicit and testable and thus 
it bypasses some of the criticisms of the reduced form 
approach. In small scale models, it is meaningful - that 
is, it is not biased towards a Keynesian viewpoint - to 
seek for representative interest rates for these now 
relate to very aggregated magnitudes. 
Small scale models also suffer major weaknesses. In 
examining, in the previous section, the evidence from 
such models we found that the results are sensitive to 
omission or introduction of some variables in key relation-
ships. We believe therefore that in building up a model 
we should not introduce variables on an ad hoc basis, 
however reasonable it seems to do so, but instead we 
should solely rely on theory. In this context chapter 
II makes explicit the underlying theory of the relation-
ships that comprise our model for the U.K. economy. 
C HAP T E R II 
THE MODEL 
11.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this model is to explain aggregate 
economic activity which in very broad terms is determin-
ed by the interaction of aggregate demand and supply. 
In the textbook treatment, aggregate demand is disaggre-
gated into consumption, investment, exports and government 
purchases. Our treatment follows the same approach but 
with greater disaggregation in consumption and invest-
ment. Clearly the determinants of purchases of consumer 
durables are much different from those of other consumpt~ 
ion. Thus we have one equation for non durables and a 
separate one for durables. Investment is also disaggre-
, 
gated into three components: investment in dwellings, 
non residential fixed investment and inventory invest-
ment. The rest of the real sector consists of an equat-
ion that determines real disposable income ; an equation 
for imports, and the equilibrium condition. 
The monetary sector consists of a demand for and ' 
supply of money, an equation that determines the mone-
tary base and an equation that determines the term 
structure of interest rates., We now turn to an exam-
ination of each one of the equations that comprise the 
model. 
, ' 
11.2 The Rea 1 5 e c tor 
11.2.a. Consumers Expenditure for Non-Durables 
and Durables 
The new theories of the consumption function emphasize 
the role of the present value of total resources that are 
"available to the consumer over some future period as the 
most important variable determining current consumption(1): 
In particular, the permanent income hypothesis treats the 
present value as a flow concept defined as the amount a 
consumer unit could consume while maintaining his wealth 
intact; but due to lack of data it is approximated as a 
weighted average of current and past incomes over a ne~r 
period - the "horizon" - of usually 2-3 years duration. The 
life cy~le hypothesis, on the other hand, asserts that cur-
rent consumption depends on lifetime's resources - a stock 
variable - comprised of current earned income, expected fu-
ture annual earned income and the value of total assets at 
the beginning of the period~ 
Now, in Keynes fomulation of the short run consumption 
function although a number of variables may prove to be im-
portant, current teald!sposable income is quantitatively 
the most important. Such formulation has two iMportant imp~i-
cations. firstly, it assigns to consumption a passive role 
in business cycles. Secondly, it provides the basis for a 
stable autonomous multiplier. This stability combined with 
the volatility attached to investment makes autonomous ex-
(1) M. friedman (1957); A. Ando and f. Modigliani (1963); 
R. Brumberg and f. Modigliani (1964). 
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penditure a very important variable accounting for the cyclic-
al fluctuations of income and points in favour of the use of 
discretionary counter-cyclical stabilization policy over,the 
adoption of a rule. 
This state of affairs, though, is inconsistent with the 
monetarist thesis of a predominantly money caused business 
cycle. It is the very essence, therefore, of the permanent in-
come hypothesis to deprive autonomous expenditure of its im-
portance in explaining the cyclical fluctuations. The theory 
attaches such a small role to current income in determining 
current consumption that renders the autonomous multiplier of 
negligible value so that it is no longer worth bothering about 
it. The same is alSo true, in theory at least,of the life 
cycle "hYPDthesis, but in practice this is not the cas~ for 
fluctuations in current income are transmitted in the present 
value of future income since Ando-Modigliani refer that the 
best estimates are obtained by a formulation in which expected 
average income depends only on current income. But is this a 
fair criticism on the Keynesian consumption function? Taking 
the implication of both theories to ita extreme means, aa 
while 
LeijonhUfvud(2) has pointed out, that/~n' individual loses 
he 
his job/continuous to spend the same amount of money on con-
sumption. His level of consuption alters - while he remains 
unemployed - only when, and to the extent, that his estimate 
of long term income or resources is changed, which is obvious-
ly insensitive to short term fluctuations in income. Clower,(3}, 
(2) A. Leijonhufvud (1968). 
(3) R. Clower (1965). 
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in addition, has shown that in the context of a money eco-
nomy and in disequili~rium situations income is not a choice 
varia~e in the short run. furthermore wealth is of no use in 
the short run because the individual cannot liquidate it 
without suffering a capital loss. Thus the individual is 
constrained in the short run to make a decision on current 
consumption based on current income. His behaviour would 
change, however, if the unemployment state persists. In 
such a case he will proceed to a liquidation of his assets 
even at a capital loss. But obiously this will happen in the 
long run. Therefore we can say that the Keynesian formulation 
is relevant for the short run while the new theories provide 
a formulation relevant for the long run. 
for our purposes the importance of the previous analysi~ 
rests in determining the length of the horizon in which the 
consumer bases his estimate of long term income whereby the 
~.quantitative importance of current income,when forming an 
estimate of the long term income, can be assessed. The great-
er the weight attached to current income the greater the sta-
bility and quantitative importance of the autonomous multiplier 
and therefore the stronger the caee against simple rules of 
the monetary aggregates. 
The specification of our consumption for non-durables 
emanates from these considerations. Thus we postulate that 
n* desired consumption for non-durables, Ct ' depends on the 
present value of the resources,Rt , that are available to the 
consumer over his "horizon" (to be specified empiritally). 
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( 1 ) 
We define total resources in period t as the sum of the ex-
d pected average real disposable income, Ypt ' and the real va-
lue of accumulated liquid assets, Lt - 1/pt" 
Rt=Y~t+Lt_1/. Pt 
n 
Y~t= ~ biY~_i 
i=o 
(2) 
(3) 
And if we make the assumption that the weights, bi , follow a 
geometrically declining series then (3) becomes 
(4) 
~here L represents the lag operator. By linearising (1) and 
combining equations (1), (2), and (4) the final form is obt-
ained. 
Our approch differs from that of Modigliani in that we have 
done 
used liquid assets rather than total wealth. We have/so for 
t~o reasons: (i) Liquid assets can be more reliably measured 
than wealth, and so can be used as a.proxy variable for wealth. 
(ii) It is believed that from all forms of wealth liquid assets 
play the greater role. 
The inclusion of liquid assets in our definition of the 
long run income or resources quite apart from providing a mo-
re accurate measure of it, also helps in distiguishing our 
hypothesis from other rival hypotheses. One such hypothesis, 
advanced by Brown,(4) is that consumption depenss on current) 
(4) Brown (1952) 
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rather than permanent, income and the level of liquid assets 
but because of habit persistence consumers are slow to re-
act to changes in income - that is, there is, some inertia 
in their behaviour. This hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
* e~ = aoY~ + a 1 (L t _ 1/Ft ) + a 2 + u t (5) 
* 
en en t - t-1 = (1-b')(e~ - e~_1) (6) 
providing the following final form: 
R.f.2 
The two hypotheses, thus, differ by the inclusion of Lt _2 • 
Therefore if the coefficient of Lt _2 proved to be negative 
and significant this would be interpreted as support for 
the permanent-income or the life-cycle hypothesis. 
Other considerations, however, may be called for in 
analysing the role of liquid assets. It is argued, for ex-
ample, that alternatively or in addition to the use of 
liquid assets as part of their total resources consumers 
are induced in changing. their expenditure whenever there 
is an imbalance between desired and actual liquid assets.(S) 
This hypothesis can be stated as follows:(6) 
(5) This view is shared by many economists; for example 
M. friedman (1959, p. 609) in his description of the work-
ings of the quantity theory of money provides this kind of 
rationale for the mechanism throug~which the economy ad-
justs from a position of disequilibrium toward equilibrium. 
(6) See, for example, Zellner, Huang and ehau.(196S). 
~~ 
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C~ = a o + a1Y~t + a 2 (L t _ 1 - L~) (7) 
Consumers may have a preferred amount of liquid assets be-
cause of the need to satisfy transactions, precautionary 
and speculative motives. Demand for liquid assets to finance 
transactions is undeniably important and self explanatory 
that needs no further comment. Demand for precautionary 
purposes, on the other hand, depends on the degree of un-
certainty: the higher the degree of uncertainty the more 
it pays to be more liquid and to borrow less from the banks. 
Any level of liquidity in excess of that needed to satisfy 
the demand for both motives leads to excess spending.(7) 
A direct formalisation and estimation of this approach is 
very difficult however partly because of the problems in-
volved with aggregating the behaviour of individuals and 
partly because of the difficulty in determining the desir-
ed level of liquidity. It is thus the case that, in general, 
statistical analysis cannot discriminate between the two 
hypotheses: that liquid assets are important in determin-
ing consumption expenditure because they are part of wealth, 
and that an imbalance in the desired level of liquid assets 
leads to changes in consumer spending. The desired level of 
liquid assets is assumed to be determined by one of the 
following forms: 
L~/Pt = AY~t (8a) ; L~ / Pt = ~Y~t - ~ rst (8b) ; 
L~ / Pt = ~ AjL t _ j (8c) 
(7) We ignore the demand for speculative purposes. 
--~ 
-75-
Equation (8a) is tupical offriedman's approach - demand 
for liquid assets depends only on permanent income. On the 
assumption that long run income is determined as in (4) the 
reduced form of this hypothesis is as follows: 
R.f.3 
However, models R.f.1 and R.f.3 have the same reduced forms 
and because R.f.1 contains over identified parameters and 
R.f.3 a mixture of over- and under-identified parameters, 
the empirical estimates provide no information which would 
help to distinguish between the different theories underly-
ing them. 
Equation (8b) ;all6ws also some room for the interest 
rate, in line with the overwhelming evidence on the demand 
for money of a substantial interest rate effect. The reduc-
ed form of this hypothesis would be 
R.f.4 
Equation (8c), finally, states that the desired level 
of liquid assets is some sort of average of past levels. 
This hypothesis gives the following reduced form on the 
assumption that the weights in (8c) decline geometrically. 
d d . C~ a 80{1-b)(1-A) + a 1(1-b)Yt - a1(1-b)~Yt_1 + a2(1-~)lt_1 
-a2(1-~)blt_2 + (b+~)C~_1 - b~Ct_2 R.f.5 
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Thus many hypotheses could a~count 'or the same reduc-
ed form. This would complicate things in explaining the empi-
rical results. 
It is not surprising that purchasing patterns for dur-" 
abIes are quite different from those for other consumption. 
Purchases of durables depend on prior stocks and can be post-
poned or accumulated much more easily than other consumption. 
It is therefore believed that the determinants of expenditure 
for durables would differ from the rest of consumer expend-
iture. 
Thus income, although important in itself, lacks the 
significance it has for non-durables because the consumer 
can draw much more easily either on liquid assets or on con-
sumer credit. 
Although the price of a durable is a much higher pro -
portion of income compared with the price of non-durables 
and thus purchase of durables often needs prior saving, the 
use of credit enables the consumer to save after he has pur-
chaged a durable good instead of before. This situation 
arises in particular in .the case of durables and therefore 
it is expected that the availability of credit has a much 
greater impact on durables than on non-durables. Restrict-
, 
ing therefore the availability of credit unambiguously de-
ters spending in the short run although the long run effect 
is ambiguous. 
Apart from the availability of credit - considered 
here in"two forms, bank advances and changes in hire pur-
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chase - the conditions under which it is sup,plied are also 
of great importance although expenditure on durables is un-
likely to be affected by changes in these controls in the 
long run. Changes in the conditions of hire purchase regard 
the minimum deposit to be paid by the consumer and the max-
imum period of repayment , and are subject to statutory 
control. 
Neither the Radcliffe Committee nor the Commission on 
Money and Credit attached any importance to changing interest 
rates as a means of affecting consumer expenditure. The case 
however seems to be quite the opposite. Hamburger (1967), 
among others, has found a substantial interest rate effect;he 
thus concluded that " ••• consumer behaviour is influenced 
not only by the supply, but also (by) the demand for loan-
able funds, in particular the demand for credit by other 
sectors of the economy." (a) The inclusion of interest rates 
provides, according to Hamburger, " ••• an alternative to 
both the Keynesian and the Chicago views concerning the 
channels through which monetary policy operates. Contrary 
to the Keynesian income - expenditure approach, they would 
imply that 'monetary policy has a direct effect on consumer 
behaviour. n (9) II This mo~e direct link is recognised in the 
alternative approach expounded by Friedman and Meiselman, 
but they argue that it is neither very illuminating nor 
useful to view the effects of monetary policy as operating 
through interest rates."(10) Thus the inclusion of interest 
rates in ~he equation for non-durables brings closer to-
(a) Hamburger (1967, p.1145) 
(9), (10) Hamburger (1967, p. 1131, P. 1149) 
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gether the Keynesian and monetarist views concerning the 
channels of monetary policy. 
Thus the equation for durables has the following form 
= a o 
(9) 
(10) 
where SA andAHP are bank advances and changes in hire pur-
chase respectively, and equation (10) is the famous stock 
adjustment principle. 
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II.2.b. The Investment Function 
Investment is a key relationship, particularly in the 
Keynesian theory, since it affects other forms of expendi-
ture. It is thus not surprising that much of the controversy 
for the importance or unimportance of money relates to in-
vestment - on whether and how changes in the stock of mo-
ney aff@ct investment expenditIJre.:Formulations of the in-
vestment function, however,usually lack systematic treat-
ment, being in essence ad hoc specifications without a 
sound theoretical justificationi This was the case since it 
was questioned whether investment demand - ex ante invest-
ment - can be derived either at a micro or macro level from 
the demand for capital. 
The conventional theory of the firm in its comparative 
static form - a profit maximizer firm would hire an input 
up to the point at which its marginal product equals its 
price -yields a demand function for capital which is nega-
tively related to the rate of interest(1). Although the 
rate of interest enters the analysis its role merely con-
sists in affecting the optimal level of capital stock. 
Planned investment remains unbounded. As Haavelmo has put 
it: "the demand for investment cannot simply be derived 
from the demand for capital. Demand for a finite addition 
to the stock of capital can lead to any rate of investment, 
from almos~ zero to infinity depending on the additional 
(1) The derivation of this function is achieved by using 
either the present value rule or the internal rate of return 
rule and assuming diminishing marginal productivity. The 
subject of which methoa is superior has risen mu~h discussion; 
see Hirshleifer~958) and Alchi~n (1~5S) 
e-
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hypothesis we introduce regarding the speed of reaction of 
capital users."(2) 
It seams therefore important for our purposes to ~e-
view the" various theories from two points of view: (a) spe-
cification -whether they are derived rigorously from econo-
mic theory or constitute an ad hoc specification; (b)t the 
role they assign to monetary variables. We begin by cons i-
dering those studies that lie in the Keynesian tradition •• 
The comparative statics approach, as exposed by Lerner 
and Witte ,~3) derives an aggregate investment function re-
lated to lthe rate of interest and the level of national in~" 
come,~though the point still remains that this function is,· 
not,"a demand curve for anything and is not derived by ~ggre-
gation from similar micro investment functions. It depends 
on both demand and supply factors; its existence stems from 
the response of the capital goods supplying industry - con-
sideretions of rising costs, and capacity constraints on 
the part of the capital goods supplying industry. 
The naive accelerator is characterized by the belief 
that monetary policy is impotent in affecting the real se~ 
ctor of the economy - the norm, af.ter the/Second World Wa~ 
was thought to be an almost vertical IS-curve. According to 
this Keynesian view the rate of i~terest has no role to play 
in investment decision. The optimum capital stock is assumed 
to beer a constant proportion with output. 8y incorporating 
(2) T. Haavelmo: "A Study in the Theory of Investment" 
(3) A. Lerner:"The Economics of Control" ; J.G. Witte: "The 
Micro - foundations of the Social Investment ",JPE1963. 
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the most restrictive assumption of an optimum adjustment of 
capital in.-each period, net investment is a constant propo~ 
rtion of the change in output. 
Two rationales have been offered for the proportionality 
of the optimal capital stock to output. In the first a pro-
duction function is assumed with fixed coefficients and con-
stant returns to scale. Furtermore firms are assumed to be 
cost minimizers rather than profit maximizers. lIn the second, 
cost minimization is still assumed but the production function, 
now, provides some substitutability betwsen capital and labour. 
The naive accelerator is still obtained by assuming that the 
relative prices of inputs remain constant.(4) Whatever the 
rationalization the naive accelerator remains very restrict-
ve because it suffers from two major drawbacks. Firstly, it 
assumes that firms are never working with excess capacity; 
and secondly, it assumes that the supply, ... of capital is al-
ways optimally adjusted, that is the supply of capital goods 
is infinitely elastic. The latter assumption remains valid 
in the case of a relatively small firm, but becomes unreason-
able~ if the naive accelerator refers to the macro level. 
It is th~s very restrictive assumption that the fle-
xible accelerator relaxes by recognising that there are ~lB~s 
in the adjustment process. These lags are due to the decision 
making process by the firm on the one hand, and on the re-
sponse of the capital goods supplying industry on the other. 
(4) In this model perfect competition in the goods market 
is incompatible since constant returns to scale make the 
size of .the firm indeterminate. Thus an imperfect market 
is assumed; see Eckaus (1953). 
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Thus the rate of adjustment depends on both demand and supply 
elements •. Hence the flexible accelerator still retains that 
\ 
the optimal capital stock is determined by a fixed relation 
with output but the adjustment of actual to desired capital 
stock is determined by the famous "capital stock adjustment 
principle". 
This theory, however, does not provide a demand for 
investment; there is only a demand for capital stock, but 
realized investment is bounded due to delivery lags. furter-
more, the partial adjustment theory is ad hoc. 
The, above mentioned, two shortcomings of the flexible 
accelerator - both product of the application of comparative 
statics to a dynamic problem, i.e. investment - can be over-
come by an explicit consideration of the dynamic behaviour 
of the firm. Using this approach Eisner and Strotz, (1963), 
provided a rigorous rationalization of the flexible accele-
rator deprived of the above maotioned deficiencies. The main 
concern in this type of analysis is with the adjustment path 
uhich the firm follows from one position of equilibrium to 
another. Thus the problem of the firm is to maximize the 
present value of future net returns by choosing optimal p~ths 
for the inputs. 
To obtain a determinate micro investment demand Eisner 
and Strotz assume that adjustment lags are due to the fact 
that the unit cost of an addition to capital stock is higher 
the more rapidly the addition takes place. Under appropriate 
functional forms and with stability of the desired stock 
imposed as an additional assumption, the famou~~~capital stock 
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adjustment principle"~is derived.(5) 
In this analysis the role of the rate of interest is of 
particular importance. Changes in the rate of interest affect 
both the steady state solution and the path toward the steady 
state. Thus, a rise in the rate of interest will have a two-
fold effect; first, it \Jill reduce the long run optimal capital 
stock, and second, it will slow down the optimal adjustment 
of capital stock towards its long run equilibrium value. 
The neo-classical approach differs essentially from the 
Keynesian one. In the latter investment behaviour is seen as 
a set of two problems:(aQ what determines desired capital stock , 
and (b) how the actual stock adjusts to its desired level. 
In the neo-classical approach a set of assumptions on the 
one hand, and the methodol~gy employed - comparative dynamics-
on the other, serve to sidestep the problem of how the actual 
capital stock adjysts to the optimal level. 
The underlying assumptions of the neo-classical ~heory 
are: (a) No adjustment costs; thus firms have no incentive 
to delay adjustment of their capital stock. (b) No uncertain-
ty about technology, future prices of products and factors 
(5) A generalization of the. Eisner-Strotz approach is pro-
vided by Lucas(1967), for the case of multi-fixed inputs. 
He demonstrates that the simple flexible accelerator does . 
not generalise to the case of many capital goods. Instead, 
the rate of adjustment of the ith capital good in general 
depends on the difference between desired and actual s~6ck 
of all goods. 
Another restrictive assumption - that of decreasing 
returns to scale - is dealt by Treadway,&969) who shows that 
investment demand is inversely related to the rate of interest 
-~ .... 
and the price of capital independently of assumplions about 
the returns to scale. 
I finally, another important drawback of the Eisner _ 
: I 
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(including the rate of discount). (e) Perfect markets. 
(d) Full-employment of factors of production. (e) A product-
ion function that satisfies all the usual neo-classical pro-
perties. 
The result of these assumptions is that if the firm is 
a perfectly competitive long run profit maximizer then it 
always pays to optimally adjust, i.e.the actual capital stock 
would always be equal to the optimal capital stock for every 
period and problem (b)-above- is of no relevance. 
The maximization of the present value of the firm over 
time produces dynamic marginal productivity conditions 
Q(t) 
L(t) 
.. 
= 
wet) 
.... p (t) 
Q(t) 
.. 
K(t) 
• q(t)(r(t)+~) -q(t) 
= .-
li( t) 
c(t) 
pet) 
The great advantage of the above approach is that the 
rental price of capital - "the user cost of capital" as Jor-
genson calls it - has been derived from an explicit multi 
period optimization procedure. But looking back at conaitions 
(1) and (2), as Nerlove (1972) points out, because no adjusi-
ment costs or anticipated or uncertain lags in the delivery 
of capital goods are incorporated, Jorgenson's conditions 
for maximization turn out to be essentially those of the 
purely static case - what is called the "myopic decision 
cr i ter ia'~ Thus wha t thi s approach impl ies is that if a 
firm anticipates that output prices are going to be lower 
in some future time period, say tn' it simply ignores it 
until it occurs; hence the optimal time path of capital 
str~tz approach is that of stationary expectations - the 
entrepreneur anticipates that prices obtain'ed Eft the beginn-
ing of the period will obtain forever efter. Gould (1969) 
has shown that adjustment need not follow a flexible 
( 
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stock up to t is the same whether or not expectations of 
n 
lower output prices exist. 
Since the maximization procedure yields essentially 
marginal productivity conditions of the type of static micro 
theory, the neo-classical model of optimal capital accumu-
lation produces demand functions for labour and capital 
services and a supply function of output all having as ele-
ments the wage rate, w~ the user cost of capital, c, and tbe 
price of output, p. Thus: 
L*= L(w,c,p) (3) 
K*= K(w,c,p) (4) 
Q~= Q(w,c,p) (5) 
Having derived a demand for capital Jorgenson's approach 
enables him to obtain an investment demand function that va-
ries inversely with the rate of interest. His approach by-
passes the problem raised by Haavelmo since on the one hand 
the assumptions of his analysis imply that Kt=Kt for all t 
and on the other hand his method of analysis - comparative 
dynamics - does not allow discrete changes in the variables. 
Jorgenson's method consists in comparing two alternative 
optimal capital accumulation paths. Thus the demand for 
investment, as a function of the rate of interest as derived 
from the neo-classical theor~ is bounded. 
Monetary policy in this type of neo-classical model 
can. affect the rate of investment only through the influence 
of the-rate of interest on the optimum stock of capital. 
accelerator pattern in the case of non-stationary expectat-
ions. However, Gould does not obtain an invest~~nt demand 
function dependent on actual prices but only on expected 
prices. 
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This completes our survey of the various theories. AI-
though the two main theories differ in various respects toe 
key issue at an empirieal level . concerns the importance 
or unimportance of the relative prices as a determinant of 
investment. 
The specification of our non-residential fixed invest-
ment equation fo~lows from the neo-classical theory. That is 
on a micro level it is assumed that net investment, NIt' is 
or 
that is, orders are placed 'sufficient. ~o achive K*t by the 
time they are delivered. However, although the firm attempts 
to adjust instantaneOUS1Y;!iS faced with unanticipated deli-
very lags. Thus on an aggregate level actual investment ex-
penditure is a dis~ributei lag function of current and past 
orders, or changes in desired capital'.stock. If mJ represents 
the proportion of the orders placed J periods ago which will 
be delivered this period and if in addition we assume that 
all orders are delivered, that is L j=o m. = J 1 " then net in-
vestment would be 
(6) 
(7) 
where L= the lag operator. 
We assume that mel) is a rational lag function and the-
refore can be approximated by the ratio of two finite poly-
nomials in L. That is 
s(L) 
m(L)= --
w(L) 
(e) 
s.K*t . + 1. -1. 
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k 
L j=1 w.K t . J -J (9) 
Since our interest lies in gross investment equation (9) ) 
was transformed using the expression 
(10) 
( 11 ) 
This equation can be estimated as long as K*t is specified. 
Desired capital stock is assumed therefore to depend on the 
user cost of capital and the level of output. 
K*t = K*(p/c, Q) (12) 
One however could object to our using of Q as a prede-
termined variable, not on statistical grounds because si-
~multaneous equation techniques can be used to overcome the 
problem, but mainly on the grounds that the treatment of Q 
as a predetermined variable is inconsistent with the neo-
classical theory of the firm since output depends on input 
and output prices. following eoen and Hickman (1970), however 
we can bypass this briticismby assuming that the typical 
firm is a cost minimizer rather than a profit maximizer in 
which case the treatment of Q as a predetermined variable is 
justified. 
Now the long run properties of the two explanatory ~ 
variables of K*t seem to depend on the underlying product-
) 
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ion function. Jorgenson always makes use of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function in which case the long run elasticities 
of the desired capital stock with r.espect to output, Eqt and 
the relative prices, E I ' are unity. These properties follow p c 
from the uni t elastici ty of substi tution t (S', of the Cobb-Doug-
las production function. Thus in a critical appraisal on Jor-
genson's empirical work, Eisner and Nadiri (1968), argue that 
"the central featu~~ of the neo-classical theory (the respo-
nse of the demand for capital to changes in relative factor 
prices) is assumed rather than demonstrated since it appears 
that it follows from crucial, a priori, constraints put upon 
parameters".(6) If one had started with a C.E.S. production 
function as an alternative to the Cobb-Douglas then K* turns 
out to be: 
K* = A(p/c) Q + -v 
1-c:r E 
= A(p/c) pic E Q q (13) 
where v=returns to scale. It follows that if the C.E.S. pro-
duction function exhibits constant returns to scale, v=1. 
then the elasticity of output is unity. Therefore for every 
homogeneous production function it is true that Eq=1 as long 
as it is characterised by constant returns to scale. The same 
is not true for the price elasticity since from (13) it follo~ 
that Ep/c.o; which is true onl y in the case of a Cobb-Douglas 
production. Thus our formulation for K*t is such as to allow 
the long run elasticities to be different from unity. Confirm-
ation of the neo-classical theory ;s found if the estimated 
long run elasticities are equal to unity. If on the other 
(6) Eisner and Nadiri (1968), p.370. 
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hand it turns out that E / =0 and E =1 then this provides p c q 
support for the flexible accelerator models. 
In addition following Bischoff (1969), we allowed both 
relative prices and output to have different lag responce~ 
functions, because by restricting both determinants of K*"to 
have the same lag structure we might introduce a bias on the 
effect of relative prices by picking up some of the effect of 
output. 
finally we should comment on the variable we used as' 
proxy for the cost 6f capital. Jorgenson uses two measures 
-interest and earnings and the U.S. government long term rate. 
use 
/ . 1/ We a long term rate - the 2 2 Con sol rate- for two reasons: 
firstly, because of the belief that a correct measure of the 
true cost of capital is almost impossible, at least at this 
level of aggregation. Secondly, we are ~~g interested in the 
response of investment to the rate of interest rather than 
the whole cost. following Eisner and Nadiri we accept that 
although the true cost of capital is more than the government 
long term rate, it is very likely that it may only be propor-
tionately greater than this interest rate, because market 
arbitrage is expected t~ establish a fairly constant ratio 
between the interest rate and the true cost of capital. 
Thus the specification of our non-residential fixed in-
vestment is as follows: 
k' 
si(Art_n_i+~rt_n_1_i)+L sl.,.(A~t_n'_i' +~Yt-n'.1-i 
i '=0-
(14) 
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We now turn to a discussion of the determinants 
of investment in residential construction. Orders for 
new dwellings are put by two basic groups. Individuals 
who contract for or build a house for their own use, 
builders or developers who start new units with the 
purpose of either renting or selling them. 
Orders for residential construction depend on two 
separate decisions: (a) The number of dwellings to be 
built; (b) The average size, quality and value of each 
unit. Then expenditure on new dwellings is the product 
of the number of units times their average value. 
The relevant question, now, is what factors 
determine the number of new dwellings the entrepreneurs 
will order? Ex post, the actual number of completions 
is a lagged function of previous housing contracts or 
starts. Ex ante, the desired number of new dwelling 
units will depend on the relationship between completions 
and vacancies. If completions grow at a greater rate 
than final demand, vacancies will build up and vice 
versa. Thus in equilibrium the number of new dwellings 
will equ~l changes in final demand. During disequilibrium, 
for example when vacancies exceed changes in final 
demand builders 1 profits will decline for two reasons: 
firstly, because excess vacancies exert a downward 
pressure on the selling price of dwellings; secondly, 
because there is a foregone income by holding vacancies. 
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The decline in profits will result in a reduction in 
new starts. Changes in profits and thus changes in 
builders' plans for new starts result also from changes 
in wages or the price of materials. 
We already stressed that expenditure for new 
housing depends on the number of units started as well 
as on the average value for each unit. The latter depends 
upon both the amounts households will spend for rent 
or imputed rents and the rates at which these rents 
are capitalized to give current values. In addition, 
the average value of dwellings should depend on credit 
terms as well. These take three forms: the interest 
rate payment, payments to capital and the required 
downpayment. following Maisel l1965) we assumed that 
all three forms of credit can be represented by the 
short term rate. The short term rate is preferred to 
a long term mortgage rate on the assumption that all 
dimensions of credit move closely in line with the short 
term availability, as reflected by its rate. 
Thus our equation for fixed investment in dwellings 
is 
where 
where r: = invesment in dwellings, St = starts and h(L) = 
polynomial in the lag operator. 
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:II.2.c. Inventory Investment 
Inventory investment fluctuates more than any other 
component of aggregate demand during the business cycle. 
Thus we believe that a correct specification of its determi-
nants and lag structure are essential for monetary policy. 
While disaggregation by industry and by type of asset is 
important, for there are differences among them, (1) a total 
stock equation is specified for all industries taken together, 
Total stocks are defined, here, as the sum of the value of 
the physical increase in stocks of materials and fuel, of 
finished goods, and the change in work in progress. 
The specification of the inventory investment equation 
is along the cost minimizing approach of Holt, et. ale (1961), 
In particular, the firm is assumed to choose its inventory 
level so as to minimize the costs associated with inventories 
Ct. further it is assumed that the firm incurs two kinds of 
costs - disequilibrium costs and adjustment costs. Any deviat. 
ion of the actual, Ht , from the desired or equilibrium level, 
H*t,gives rise to disequilibrium type of costs. A~positive 
deviation, for instance, leads to increased costs of storage, 
insurance, warehousing, etc, both in the case of raw material I 
and finished goods. A negative deviation;is associated with 
costs that arise from orders placed at irregulai intervals 
and in uneconomic batch lots in the case of raw materials, 
and to foregone earnings in the case of finished goods. The 
second type of costs - adjustment costs - arise whenever the 
(1) See Trivedi (1971). 
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current level of stocks is different from last period's. 
Such costs might take the form of administrative costs that 
usually arise with changing patterns of purchases of raw mate. 
rials. An uneven pattern of purchases may also give rise to 
uncertainty to the suppliers of raw materials and result in 
loss of price discounts that usually accompany a steady vo-· 
lume of purchases. Thus the typical firm is assumed to mini-
mize the following quadratic cost function: 
( 1 ) 
The minimization produces the partial adjustment equation. 
In this study the dependent variable is the net change in 
stocks since from a macroeconometric point of view it is 
this variable and not the level of stocks that is in accord-
ance with the income identity. Thus 
". 
c' 
AH k (H* H ) k- a ~ t - t - t-1 ' co+c 1 
(2) 
The desired level of stocks is assumed to depend on the level 
of expected demand for the output, the expected rate of inter-
est, and the liquidity or interal funds of the firm. The 
rate of interest represents both the opportunity cost of 
carrying stocks, and the cost of funds needed to facilitate 
inventory investment. The higher the cost, the smaller would 
be the desired stock, ceteris paribus. 
(3) 
It is assumed that expectations are formed according to the 
following rules represented by rational lag functions: 
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Thus the inventory investment equation to be estimated has 
the following form: 
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II.2.d The Rest of the Real Sector 
The rest of the real sector consists of the import 
function, an equation that determines current real dis-
posable income and the equilibrium condition. We examine 
each one separately. 
The specification of the imports function is very 
simple and, straightforward. Our only excuse is that we 
do not believe that for our purposes the simplicity of 
this function would affect our results, for one reason 
that the interaction between the monetary and the real 
sector is not greatly affected by the behaviour of imports. 
Thus the desired level of imports, IM*t' is assumed 
to depend primarily on the demand for both consumer and 
capital goods. Consumer demand in the U.K. is very im-
portant given the predominance of the foods component. 
In this case current real disposable income or some 
measure of long run resources should be the appropriate 
variable to use. On the other hand a proxy for the level 
of the demand for capital goods is the level of economic 
activity measured in this case by G.D.P. Thus on these 
d grounds one should introduqe both elements, Yt and Yt , 
into the imports function. But obviously such a speci-
fication would be eroneous. Thus a choice must be on sta-
tistical grounds. 
A variable that might possibly affect imparts is 
the ratio of the general price level, of the U.K. to that 
of the rest of the world. Obviously if the U.K. experienc-
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es a greater inflation rate than the rsst of the world, 
it would make the price of imports relatively cheaper 
to the domestic goods and therefore more attractive. 
from the monetary variables that might affect 
imports the availability of import credit, let' is con-
sidered to be the most important. 
finally we assume that because of capacity and de-
livery constraints on the one hand and lags in the deci-
sion making process on the othe; imports are only partia-
lly adjusted within each quarter. 
Thus the import function is 
1M*t - 1M [(Yt or Y~ , Lt - 1/Pt)' 1Ct,(P/P~)~ (1) 
lM t - IM t _1 • m(lM*t - lM t _1 ) (2) 
for the disposable income the following empirical 
observation is used 
(3) 
In this formulation we have suppressed the constant. 
finally the equilibrium condition is postulated as 
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where Et stands for a small residual error so that the 
equation is always satisfied. A bar over a variable 
means that this variable is exogenous. This has no 
further implication, apart from reasons of completeness, 
as far as the specification is concerned, but it becomes 
important for estimation purposes. The reason is that 
although the Gt , Xt ' and Et do not enter in anyone 
function, they would be used as instruments in the first 
stage of the T.S.L.S. in estimating each equation. 
11.3. The Monetary Sector 
II.3a. The Demand for Money 
The role the demand for money plays in the monetarist 
model has already been analysed and criticized in chapter 
I. In order to avoid repetitions, therefore, we simply 
add here how we have formulated the demand for money equat-
ion. The formulation is a standard one as it is implied by 
the voluminous evidence that has been accumulated in the 
last few years. 
The consideration of the store of value function of 
money, in addition to that of the medium of exchange, makes 
money an asset alternative to other assets and therefore 
justifies the treatment of the demand for money as an ap-
plication of portfolio analysis. In this context the role 
of income or wealth.- including or' excluding human wealth-
is that of a constraint in a maximization problem. In this 
formulation both forms of the constraint have been applied. 
The inclusion of the rate of interest in the demand 
for money follows from the widely acoepted principle both 
in theory and in practice that the adjustment of an indi-
vidual~ portfolip from ~ position of disequilibrium to 
equilibrium falls at least initially on the financial assets. 
The price level is explicitly introduced into the demand 
for money to test the proposition that the demand for money 
in real terms is invariant with respect to the price level. 
finally it is recognised that the adjustment of an 
individual's portfolio to equilibri~m does not occur in 
any single time period, (or it takes time for money holders 
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to become aware of changed conditions and therefore to 
rearrange their assets. In particular it is assumed that 
in any single period only a fraction of the desired dif-
ference is in fact adjusted. 
Thus the model of the demand for money is 
* e e () Mt = a O + a 1 Wt + a 2 Pt + a 3 r t 1 
IJ t = Vt (2a); IJ t = V
e 
t (2b) 
PIt = K( * ) (3) - Mt _ l Mt - Mt _1 
Ve = I (l} V t' : (4a) ; e m(l)r t (4b); P~ = n(l)pt (4c) r t = t 
The above model includes a wide selection of special 
cases. Thus equation (2) examines whether current income 
or wealth (both human and non-human) is the relevant vari-
able in the demand for money. In addition, equation (4a) 
permits a number of specifications for the wealth variable. 
(4 J 
Equation (4b) provides different formulations for the Keynesia 
"normal backwardation hypothesis". finally equation (4c) 
examines various short-run responses of the demand for 
money to changes in the price level. 
The only thing that remains to be considered is whether 
the above model is a mis-specification since it ignores the 
effect of non-bank-financial-intermediaries (NSf I) on the 
demand for money~by overlooking the amounts of or rates of 
return paid on near bank claims. The basic problem starts 
from the definition of money which becomes an, open question 
when in its distinguishing charecteristics is added the store 
of value function of it. There is not a clear cut case then 
of what constitutes money. In this context Gurley and ShC(w 
-100-
(1955;1960) argue that the liabilities of NBfI possess also 
the role of money. Since according to Gurley and Sh~w, the 
present methods of control discriminate against the commerc-
ial banks a rapid rate of growth in NBfI is to he expected 
associated with a fall in the demand for money which in its 
turn imlies a reduction in the effectiveness of monetary 
policy. But the growth of.NBfI is a long-run phenomenon 
and as such does not impede with the conduct of monetary 
policy. As. Clayton (1962) argues" In the long period the 
growth of NBf! implies that money, defined as currency out-
side the banks plus current accounts, will become a smaller 
proportion of total financial assets, and therefore the 
velocity of circulation of money will be higher than it 
would be in the absence of their growth. But it does not 
necessarily follow that, because the long-term velocity of 
circulation is higher, the short-term effectiveness of mo-
netary policy has also declined •••• (f)rom the point of view 
of cyclical policy the important problem is whether the switch 
from money to near-money assets is likely to occur during 
the short period when the monetary authorities are attempt-
ing to restrict monetar~ demand."(1) 
this question boils down to whether money and near money 
assets are very close substitutes. Evidence is provided by 
introducing into the demand for money the yields on near 
moneyass e ts.(2) 
(1) Clayton (1962)p.p.871 and 877 
(2) for example, feige (1964;1974) finds a small substitu-
tability between money and near money assets and that the 
demand for each one of those has exhibited a remarkable 
stability over both periods of monetary ease and ~tringency. 
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But this is an indirect approach and th~refore small reliabi-
lity can be attached to it. In other words one is never sure 
how high the degree of substitutability should be so that the 
effect of NBFI would be regarded as harmful. A direct approabb 
involves the construction of general equilibrium models of 
the type used by Tobin-Brainard (196~) for the U.S. economy 
or by Clayton et.al. (1974) for the U.K. economy. Though a 
positive answer cannot be given, since the subject is still 
open, it does not seem to us that our specification of the 
demand for money is meaningless. 
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II.3.b The Supply of Money 
The case against or in favour of a rule heavily depends 
on ~hether the money supply is endogenous or exogenous.If the 
supply of money is endogenous there is no point in trying to 
follo~ a rule. 
Nevertheles much confusion over this debate arises from 
an ambiguity over the meaning of the endogeneity / exogeneity 
since ther~ are t~o ~otions involved that do not always cor-
respond.According to the first, the statistical notion,the 
endogenous /exogenous term refers to a spesific model in 
whose context a variable is characterised as endogenous or 
exogenous depending on whether it is explained by some va-
riables of the model.According to the second notion exoge-
nous means a variable subject to control by pOlicyma~ers~1) 
Clearly the debate over the endogeneity/exogeneity of the 
supply of money does not relate to the first meaning since 
the issue is not over a specific model but over the real 
world. Indeed the endogeneity/exogeneity issue refers to 
the determination of the money stock where all three 
-
the authorities,the non~bank private sector,and the com-
mercial banks-- have a role to play;and it is concerned 
(1) The two definitions do not always correspond; for 
example, tax receipts are exogenous in the policy sense 
of being subject to manipulation by policymakers, but they 
are clearly not exogenous in the statistical sense of not 
responding to current movements in the endogenous variable 
income. 
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with whether and more importantly with the extent to which 
the public and the banks can initiate a change in the mo-
ney supply contrary to the willingness of the authorities; 
more technically the issue is whether changes in the stock 
of money are caused by a shift in the demand or supply 
schedule of it and with the interdependence between them. 
The debate can best be expressed in terms of the 
money multiplier. Early theories, from the exogenous camp, 
of the determination of the stock of money have been more 
or less mechanical arguing that the supply of money is 
linked to the monetary base via a multiplier, the latter 
being determined by the reserve ratio observed by the 
banking system, and the ratio between currency and deposits held 
by the public. On the assumption that the two ratios are 
constant the money multiplier is also a constant and there-
fore changes in the stock of money are solely due to changes 
in the monetary base. Assuming that the latter is determined 
by the authorities makes the supply of money exogenously 
determined. 
More recent theories(2)comprising the weaker version 
of monetarism emphasize the treatment of these ratios as 
behavioural relationships reflecting asset choices. The 
element stressed by these new theories of the money supply 
is that commercial banks are profit maximizing institutions 
with economic behaviour patterns on which the central bank 
must operate to control the money supply. Recent theories 
(2) See Brunner(1961); Brunner and Meltzer(1964); Meigs(1962), , 
Teigen(1964); Goldfeld(1966). 
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have departed from the money multiplier approach in two 
respects: (a)they stress the micro rather than the macro 
behaviour of the banking system; (b)in determining the 
level of desired reserves they apply economic theory and 
explain fluctuations in the assets held by the banks as 
emanating from changes between actual and desired reserves. 
According to this formulation the money supply is no 
longer under the complete control of the authorities; ra-
ther it is jointly determined by the authorities and the 
economic behaviour of the banks and the public. Ac.simple 
model along these lines can easily be constructed. 
Thus commercial banks are assumed to respond to cha-
nges in the return from lending, r, as well as to the ccrst 
d of borrowing, r,. Banks tend to increase their borrowing 
and decrease their excess reserves when the return from 
lending adjusted for risk rises, ceteris paribus. Similarly 
banks tend to increase their excess reserves if the cost 
of borrowing increases, ceteris paribus. Thus when it be-
comes more profitable to make loans, banks are assumed to 
be willing to increase the supply of money through increa-
sed deposits. Thus if p is the reserve. ratio then their 
behaviour is described as 
( r d) p=p r, 
The behavior of the public is assumed to be influ-
enced by the level of economic activity. the rate of inte-
rest paid on deposits, and on other assets. Thus the desi-
red currency ratio of the public i~ 
c'= c(r, r; Y) ; (2) c 1 ' c2 ' c 3 (0 
: .;: c • 
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The rationale for c 3<0 is that as income rises the demand 
for both currency and deposits increases but the demand for 
the latter increases proportionately more than the demand 
for the former since it becomes more attractive and luxur-
ious to finance transactions by cheque than by cash. 
Combining equations (1) and (2) with the definitional 
equations 
8 = R + C (3); M = C + 0 (4) 
gives the-following equation 
MS = feB, r, r d , 
t 
r , Y) (5) 
Whether the supply of money is endogenous or exogenous 
nou depends on: (a) the stability of the reserve and cur-
rency ratios; (b) the predictability of these ratios and 
the ability of the authorities to offset any changes in 
them by manipulating the various instruments which are 
under their control; and (c) the speed with which such off-
setting action can be taken. 
Those in the monetary camp that recognize this formu-
lation argue that the reserve and currency ratios are sta-
ble and predictable functions and that the influence of the 
authorities on the money supply mainly via their ability to 
control the monetary base dominates the other two influences 
emanating from the behaviour of the public and the banks so 
that the money supply as a whole can be taken as exogenous 
or rather autonomously determined. The argument can best be 
seen by taking the total differential of (5) on the assumpt-
ion that rd and rt are kept constant 
(6) 
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and assuming that f1 is greater than f2 and fs'taken to-
gether. 
The non-monetarist camp has put forward several count-
erarguments but the most important and elegant is expres-
" " sed in what has come to be known as new view~ The central 
approach of the " " II '. . . _,' new view.- is that -'monetary theory broad:" 
dly conceived is simply the theory of portfolio management 
by economic units: households, businesses, financial insti-
tutions and government. It takes as its subject matter stocks 
of assets and debts(including money) and their values and 
yields."(3) In this approach the link between the real and 
the monetary sector is not the quantity of money but the 
sructure of interest rates and the availabilities of credit.(4l 
The major imlication of the "new view" is that the quan-
tity of money is an endogenous variable:"the quantity of mo-
ney as convetionally defined is not an autonomous variable 
controlled by governmental authority but an endogenous or 
inside quantity reflecting the economic behaviour of banks 
and other private economic units.II(S) 
In this general-equilibrium approach the demand for 
bank deposits (or more generally the demand side of every 
asset and their interrelationship) and the role played by 
other financial institutions than commercial banks becomes 
very important. To illustrate, the preferences of the public 
may be such that the supply of money will be at its maximum 
(3) Tobin (1967,p.2) 
(4) This is why H.Jonson(1972) has argued that the"Dew view» 
provides a theoretical foundation of the Radcliffe Committee~ 
Position on monetary theory. 
(5) Tobin (1967,p. 3) 
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determined by the size of the monetary base and the banks 
minimum reserve ratio. In this case the banks' will be fu-
lly loaned up. If,hawever,demand is lower then the supply 
of money will be lower and the banks will "be operating 
with a reserve ratio higher than the minimum necessary. 
They will appear to have excess reserves. 
The important issue the "new view" raises is best ex-
pressed by H.Johnson: "The crucial issue is whether the 
interrelationships (deduced from rational maximizing be-
haviour on the part of all economic actors) in the fina-
ncial sector are stable enough to permit changes in the 
monetary base to be used to analyse and predict changes 
in the real sector (including both output and price level 
changes), or whether detailed understanding of the fina-
ncial sector and the effects of monetary changes on the 
structure of interest rates, asset yields, and credit av-
ailabilities is a necessary prerequisite of this endeavour."(6) 
In this connection the "new view" does not offer any test-
able theoretical propositions. It is true that it provides 
good reasons for the existence of slippage in the control 
of the money supply bu~ it does not really answer the 
weaker version of the monetarist case·-- for it has to show 
that the slippage is of considerable quantitative importance 
relative to changes in the monetary base. 
In this context the investigator is left with a me-
thodological problem: He can either indulge in the task of 
(6) H.Johnson (1972,p.41) 
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constructing a general equilibrium model in order to ana-
lyse the role of money or retain that the link between the 
real and the monetary sector is the quantity of money but 
recognize also that there are reverse influences on money, 
thus keeping in line with the spirit only of the "new view ll • 
We have chosen the latter view. 
The last point to be dealt with is whether this for-
mulation of the money supply is inapplicable in the case of 
the U.~ economy because of peculiarities in the institutions 
and the policies pursued by the Bank of England. The view has'· 
been put forward that reserve ratio theories cannot explain 
the volume of bank deposits and hence the money supply in 
the U. K. The argument is that a reduction in banks' :~reserves 
resulted from sales of securities to the customers of commer-
cial banks would not compel the banks to reduce their depo-"·, 
~its since the banks have the power to replenish their re-
serves by recalling money loaned to the discount houses.(?) 
This the banks can do since, because of existing arrange-
ments, the Bank will never refuse to lend money to the dis-
(7) The reader will have noticed that we persistantly used 
the term IIreserves ll of the banks avoiding to specify to what 
they refer - cash or liquid assets. The reason is that in 
late 1950s and 1960s there was a great debate over which 
method - cash or liquid assets ratio - was the best to cont.0 
rol the level of bank deposits. The issue is of no importance 
since the introduction of competition and credit control in 
1971 which established a uniform minimum reserve ratio of 
12"% in certain assets. (see Griffiths 1973) 
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count houses whenever they experience shortage of cash. 
Although the Bank always acts as lender of last resort 
to the discount market they can provide the money at a 
rate at their own disertetion: it could be the Bank ra-
te or above it -'""front door" assistance; alternatively 
it could be the cur~ent market rate of interest - "back 
door" assistance. In the latter case the Bank reverses 
its initial action of keeping the market short of cash 
and therefore there would finnally be no effect on banks 
reserves. On the other hand, whenever the Bank privides 
assistance at the"front door" creates an incentive tot, 
the discount market, by reducing the margin of profita-
bility between tr.easury bills and the cost of borrowing, 
to repay as soon as possible its debt to the Bank. In 
this case the discou~t houses borrow money from the non 
bank public by selling sec~rities to them,~ thus redu-
cing their assets.(B)The inevitable result will be a 
(8) It is not at all obvious whether the discount hou-
ses can and will do so. The routes by which they can rai-
se the money are: (a) By trying to reduce their taking in 
new treasury bills; (b), by trying to increase their bor-
rowing from non bank lenders. The first method would be 
a very difficult one because of institutional arrange-
ments according to which the discount houses agree to bid 
to cover the entire weekly tender of treasury bills. This 
arrangement makes it very difficult for the discount hou-
ses, by reducing the tender price, to reduce their hold-
ings of treasury bills to any degree of precision simply 
because of the unpredictability of, outside bids. The se-
cond method by which the discount houses can raise the 
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multiple contraction in banks deposits. It seems there-
fore that whether or not reserve ratio theories explain 
the volume of bank deposits depends on the policy of the 
Bank - front or back door assistance. 
But' why, one might ask , would the Bank on some occa-
sions lend at the front door and on others at the back 
door? The answer is that by doing so they can influence 
the short-term rates of interest. By providing ba~k door 
assistance the Bank indicates to the participantSof the 
financial markets that it does not wish to oppose any trend 
in interest rates. On the other hand, whenever the Bank 
provides assistance at the front door it indicates that 
it does not wish to see interest rates fall significantly. 
money-borrowing from non-bank lenders - can take several 
forms ,but the most probable is from sales of short bonds. 
By doing so, however , they put upward pressure on short 
bond rates which the authorities might not be prepared to 
concede. In this case the authori'ties intervene in the 
market and purchase the bonds being sold, thereby provi-
ding they the money to the discount houses. If the discount 
houses try to raise the money by selling from the existing 
stock of treasury bills or commercial bills to the non-bank 
p~blic they might not succeed in doing so because their act-
ions may lead to an interest rate adjustment - a competitive 
bidding up of short-term interest rates. 
The issue however is an empirical one; the question.is 
whether treasury bills are a close substitute for other short~ 
term assets- e~g. local authorit~temporary debt ~ in the por. 
tfolios of the public. In the 6as~ of perfect substitutabi-
lity the burden of adjustment falls 'on interest rates with 
quantities cbanging very little if not at all. 
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Thus as soon as the rates take the desired course the 
Bank relieves the market from the shortage of cash, either 
uith back or front door lending, by reversing their initial 
open market operations. In this case it is the authorities' 
choice to let the banks choose their oun reserves and hence 
make the supply of money endogenously determined. The over-
all conclusion therefore seems to be that whether or not 
reserve ratio theories explain the volume of bank deposits 
"relates to the characteristics not of a system, but of a 
particular policy, which may apply or not, from day to day~(9) 
The question therefore of whether the money supply is 
endogenous in the U.K. depends on how vigorously the mone-
tary authori ties pursued a "policy of leaning.: into the wind~ 
The authorities' intentions whetber they have been succes-
sful is an empirical matter - for most of the 1960s were to 
influence interest rates only in the short-run without re-
sisting any trend, i;.e., they tried to influence only the 
dev ia tions from the trend not the trend i tsel f. This of . ' .. ':',. 
course tantamounts to saying that whereas the money supply 
has been endogenous for each separate short period, for 
an overall period of 10·years it could be regarded as 
exogenous. 
Whatever the verdict for the pre 1968 period the for-
I 
mulation of the money supply equation makes more sense for 
the post 1968 period, when the authorities changed their 
tactics and especially since 1971 with the introduction 
of competition and credit control~ 
(9) Newlyn (1971) 
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III.3~c The Monetary Base 
In our discussion of the determinants of the supply 
of money we made the assumption that the monetary base is 
exogenous, under the control of the policymakers. Although 
this is the conventional approach taken by most of the stu-
dies in this field - a notable exception is Teigen (1969)--
it is clearly wrong to regard the monetary base as exogenous 
or rather as a policy target for two reasons: (a) in the first 
place why should the authorities attempt to set the monetary 
base at any particular value? It is reasonable to assume that 
the authorities do not behave randomly but instead "react" in 
a predictable and consistent manner to changes in economic 
variables according to their objectives, given the all too 
apparent'conflicts between them and the corresponding atta-
ched weights.(b) The monetary authorities, particularly in 
the U.K. where one of their task is the management of the 
National debt, are not free to set the values of their in-
sruments according to their targets but they are constrained 
by the need to provide finance to the governments' ·budget 
deficit. 
On these grounds the investigator should incorporate 
into the model of the economy another model that explains 
the authorities' behaviour, and proceed to a joint estima-
tion of the system. One notable advantage of such an appro-
ach would be to obtain consistent estimates of the parame-
ters of the system. 
The specification of our monetary base equation follows 
from the above two broad ideas. We begin therefore by briefly 
-113-
summarising the frame~ork for analysing the behaviour of 
the authorities~1)It is assumed that the authorities have 
a numbp-r of instruments at their disposal. An instrument, 
It, is a variable that is completely under the control of 
the authorities and is relatively immune from exogenous 
influences, e.g. the Bank Rate, the security portfolio 
etc. An instrument is assumed to affect some intermediate 
variables., F, such as the rates of interest or financial 
quantities ~hich in their turn affect the ultimate targets, 
,*' OJ , such as the rate of growth, the price level, the bala-
nce of payments etc. Onthe assumption that the monetary au-
thorities change the values of their instruments according 
to the latest available information about the value of the 
target variable{s) the following type of reaction function 
is obtained. 
(1) 
where n is the information lag. The reaction function will 
determine ~hether variables that in theory are regarded as 
instruments have been treated in practice as such. Thus 
Fisher (1970) found tha~ special deposits, hire purchase 
controls and the Bank Rate "revealed"-as instruments of mo-
netary policy in the U.K. 
(1) Since the introduction of the concept of a reaction 
function by Reuber (1962) a number of investigators exa-
mined the behaviour of the authorities, e.g. Dewald and 
Johnson (1963), Fisher (1970), Kernn and Babb (1969), 
Nobay (1974), Wood (1967). 
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There are however two basic approaches to the formu-
latioR of the reaction function. The one; e.g. by~Wood, is 
a maximization procedure of the authorities'~preference fu-
nction, which states their objectives, subject to the autho-
rities' model - their "view" of the working of the economy. 
This approach provides a formulation of how the authorities 
ought to behave given their preference function and their 
model of.the economy - that is it tests a normative hypo-
thesis. Although such an approach provides a rigorous trea-
tment of the problem, it suffers from a number of deficien-
cies.(2)The alternative approach provides a less "rigorous" 
but more pragmatic or ad hoc framework and as such bypasses 
some of the problems of the first approach. We can say that 
our approach is based, in principle, on the utility maximi-
zation method. This is so since our problem relates only to 
the behaviour of the authorities with respect to the mone-
tary base as it is influenced by one instrument - open mar-
ket operations - and thus avoids, because of its simplici-
ty, many of the problems associated with the first approach. 
~e begin by assuming that the authorities have two obje-
ctives: price stability~ and full employment. Furthermore, 
it is assumed that, through their model of the economy, the 
authorities can estimate the long run values of the price 
** ** level, P , and of the level of income,Y , associated with 
full-employment. In addition it is recognized that the au-
thorities when formulating and pursuing a policy might turn 
(2) See, for example, Nobay (1974), and Schwartz (1969) 
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out to be wrong either because of the lags involved or be-
cause of miscalculations in the required values of the in-
struments. Accordingly they are allowed to adjust by alter-
ing both their instruments and their policies in accordance 
to the latest information available. This means that the 
authorities have, in addition to their long-run objectives, 
* * short run target values designated by Yt +m and Pt +m for the 
level of income and the price level respectively; the m re-
presents the lag - which according to the authorities'views-
is needed for the effect of a change in the instrument- to 
have worked out. This behaviour is described by the follow-
ing equations 
* ** ~t) 0(a 1{1 Y·~·· = Yt + a 1 (Y····.-t+m (2) 
, 
* ** p t ) 0{a2<1 Pt +m = Pt + a2 (P - (3) 
where Yt and Pt are the latest information for the values 
of the long-run objectives. Thus, according to equation (1), 
the desired value of income m periods ahead equals the value 
of the latest information increased or decreased by a pro-
portion of the difference between long-run and actual valus; 
alternatively, if the actual value of income turns out to be 
smaller than the long-run value, the desired level of income 
to be realised m periods ahead will be adjusted upwards. 
Since m is usually large, of the order of 2-3 years,the 
authorities treat some of the financial qualities, f , as 
indicators of the state of the economy, and in addition as 
* * even shorter objectives than Yt +m and Pt +m• We assign this 
role to the monetary base, and thus we have 
(" ) 
This means that if according to the latest information the 
desired value of income, m periods ahead, should increase, 
the desired value for the even shorter target of the mone-
tary base must also be increased. Since the effect on the 
monetary base would come sooner than that on income it could 
also serve as an indicator of the sucess of the policy.Si-
milarly if it is judged that the desired price level, m pe-
riods ahead, ought to decrease the desired level of the mo-
netary base must also decrease. 
further it is assumed that our intermediate variable, 
Bt ' is affected by the open market operations, SPt ' the 
instrument of the authorities. And, finally, because severe 
changes in the authorities actions might provoke panic in 
the market, it is assumed that the authorities do not pur-
sue with much vigour their policies, but, ,instead, go gen-
tly about them allowing only a partial adjustment of the 
desired change in the monetary base within each quarter. 
Thus 
We now come to our second basic determinant of the mo-
netary base - the constraint on the monetary authorities' 
ability to influence the monetary base because of their obli-
gation to finance the budget deficit. It must be stressed,how_ 
ever, from the begining that this constraint is not always 
effective and thus impairative fo monetary policy. Indeed, 
the constraint becomes effective only when fiscal policy 
... ~ 
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works in opposite direction. to monetary policy,that is, 
only in those periods when the authorities attempt to 
apply restrictive monetary policy and the Treasury runs 
a substantial budget deficit. The crucial question, there-
fore, is how often does such a situation arise. The Go-
vernors of the Bank, in their various public speeches, 
complain that, during the last years, this is the usual 
case and even more importantly that it happens in exactly 
those periods when the monetary authorities feel that it 
is of atmost importance to apply restrictive monetary 
policy. Whether, however, in reality the situation has 
been as described by the Governors of the Bank is an 
, 
empirical question: How important has the governments 
borrowing requirement, BR, been in determining the 
monetary base? Thus on these grounds one should intro-
duce the governments'borrowing requirement into.equatio~ 
Goodhart (1973), however, has argued that not only 
does the borrowing requirement affect the monetary base 
but that the latter is not a choice variable; it is rather 
determined as a residual in the constraint of governments' 
finance - that is, as a decision that has to be taken 
once other interrelated-decisions have been taken. His 
argument can best be understood by looking at the follow-
ing identity that describes the various sources of govern-
ment finance 
or 
BR = SP + NMD + rCf - MAT + AB 
AB = 8R - SP - NMD + MAT - ECf (6) 
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are 
These sources/grouped, for analytical purposes, in three 
main categories: (a) Domestic borrowing; (b) external 
borrowing; and (c) finance which brings about an increase 
in the monetary base. Domestic borrowing involves transact-
ions in marketable and non marketable debt, NMD, and funds 
needed to repay maturing debt, MAT. 
Obviously the borrowing requirement, SR, and the funds 
needed to repay maturing debt, MAT, are not under the control 
of the authorities. In addition, since the authorities, for 
various institutional reasons, do not vary the rates of 
interest on marketable debt the inflow of funds from this 
source is not expected to contribute significantly to the 
governments' finance; rather the inflow of funds from this 
source has tended to vary inversely with the market interest 
ratesf 3 ) 
finally, under a regime of fixed exchange rates the 
authorities are constrained even further in their attempt 
to control the monetary base because capital flows tend to 
r,Bspond _to changes in domestic interest rates. 
Thus for all these reasons, Goodhart argues, it is 
impossible for the authqrities to control the monetary 
base; rather it is determined as soon as the other inflows 
of funds have been determined so that the constraint is 
satisfied. While we agree with Goodhart that all these 
elements constrain the authorities' ability to control 
the monetafY base, we cannot agree that, in reality, the 
(3) See Goodhart (1973) 
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authorities could not offset such movements - by varying 
the marketable government debt, ie, open market operations-
had they wished to. Now whether the authorities are prepar-
ed to do so and whether they have done so in the past, we 
believe is an empirical question. 
Thus it seems to us that we are justified in treating 
B as an endogenous variable which, though, could be influenc-
ed by the authorities. In addition recognizing the constraint 
for government finance we introduce in equation (5) the 
government borrowing requirement 
Hence the equation for the monetary base is the reduced 
form of equations (2), (3), (4) and (7) 
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II.3~d The Term structure of Interest Rates 
The equation for the term structure of interest rates 
follows from the "preferred habitat" theory now associated 
with the names of Modigliani and Sutch (1966, 1967). We 
thus begin by summarising its main points. 
The'starting point of this theory is one of the basic 
propositions of the "expectations theory", namely that un-
der rational behaviour, perfect markets, certainty, and ne-
gligible transactions costs, the holding period yield must 
be the same regardless of the securities purchased. 
In the real world, however, transactors, being either 
ultimate wealth owners or borrowers, are uncertain about 
the future course of interest rates. Furthermore, they might 
have definite preferences as to the length of time for which 
they want to invest or borrow (that is, they have a prefer-
red maturity habitat). In addition, transactors might be 
risk averters and pursue a policy of matching the maturities 
of their assets and liabilities, as the "hedging theory" 
suggests. Finally the theory recognises the existence of 
arbitrageurs who, although they have a preferred maturity 
habitat, are prepared to invest or borrow in maturities dif-
ferent to their preferred habitat if they are sufficiently 
compensated for the risk they undertake. 
The "preferred habitat" theory incorporates elements 
from the other three main theories on the term structure 
of interest rates,(1) being in essence an amalgam of all 
(1) That is, expectation theory, Hicksian liquidit.y premium 
t~eory, and the hedging theory. 
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three. We may now examine the way in which the theory can 
be formalised. First, although future short term interest 
rates are uncertain, the theory assumes that these rates 
can be described by a probability distribution of possible 
rates. Second, if a transactor, with an n period habitat, 
is a risk averter, the only way to secure certainty of the 
return is to invest for n periods; since if he invests for 
a shorter period he exposes himself to risk about the 
interest-income of the principal, and if he invests for a 
longer period he exposes himself to risk about the princip-
al because of price fluctuations. It is, furtermore, recogn-
ised that although transctors are risk averters, they might 
invest in different maturities if the expected return is 
sufficiently high to induce them to undertake the risk. 
Therefore, according to this theory, the expected re-
turn from all bonds, regardless of term to maturity, will 
be identical for any given holding period. The return is 
defined as the sum of cash payments plus any increase in 
the money value of a bond. Thus, if 
r Lt =.the current long term rate 
rat = the current short term rate 
g~ • the expected capital gain (or loss) on long 
term bonds over the holding period 
a = risk premium 
e r t = rate of interest on long term bonds expected 
in period t to rule in-period t+1 
then the above proposition can be stated as 
( 1 ) 
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strictly speaking equation (1) holds if either the 
holding period is equal to the maturity period of short 
term debt or the expected short term rate is equal to the 
ruling rate. If neither of these conditions holds, the 
expected capital gain must be considered as the difference 
between capital gain (or loss) on long term and short term 
debt. 
Now, 'if we denote the price of a long term bond by 
P, then by definition we have 
(2) 
If we make the assumption that the expected capital gain 
is proportional to the expected fall in the long rate, eq-
uation (2) can be written as 
(3) 
where b is a proportionality factor and in general depends 
on the number of debts considered as well as on r~. The 
above equation can be shown to remain a good approximat-
ion even if the bond does not sell at par, but in the neigh-
bourhood, and r: is defined as the average yield to maturity. 
To close the model one needs a hypothesis about the 
formation of expectations. However, one of the major diffic-
ulties with the empirical tests on this subject lies in 
the hypotheses advanced about the tormation of expectat-
ions. The question is whether the empirical evidence re-
futes the theory that is tested, or merely some investigat-
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or's empirical version of the formation of expectations.(2) 
The only way out of this problem is to formulate a general 
hypothesis that includes al'ternative hypotheses as special 
cases and then let the data reveal the appropriate pattern 
of expectations. We have developed such a model elsewhere(3) 
and the results were very encouraging. However this formu-
lation - as most in this field - attempts to capture the 
formation of expectations by advancing a hypothesis that 
relates past movements of interest rates with investor's 
expectations of the future. But apart from the history of 
past rates investors take, for sure, into account other 
(4) factors as well, such as prices, output e.t.c.. Here 
a preliminary attempt is made to take both approaches into 
account and we hope that in a later report we will be able 
to present a more sensible formulation. At the moment the 
equation for the formation of expectaions has the follow-
ing crude form 
--1----[b(L)rLt_1 + c(L)Y t + d(L)P:l lJ(L) J 
(2) for an elaboration of this point see ch. 1 of the au-
thor's M.Sc. thesis (1975). 
(3) Karakitsos (1977) 
(4) for such an approach see the ra~ional expectations pro-
cess as proposed by Muth (1961). 
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11.4 The Model: A summary 
The model described so far can, in principle, be 
reduced to the following equations which can either 
be thought of as reduced forms of the various submodels 
or as general specifications which include as special 
cases the. alternative hypotheses underlying a specific 
structure. 
(3) 1~ = i~(L)Yt + i~(L)rst + i~(L)lt_1 
(4) It.= io{L)[ArLt +£rLt-1 + i 1 (L)[AY t + ~Yt-~+ 
+ i 2 (L)I t _1 
(S) AH t = ho{L)Y t + h1lL)rLt + h2 (L)L ct_ 1/Pt - h3 {L)H t _ 1 
(6) IM t - IM[{Y t Dr Y~. Lt_/Pt ). let' {P/p ... )t. ll'lt_l] 
(7) Y~ = Y1 Yt + Y2Y~-1 
(8) Y t = c~ + c~ + 1~ ~ It + 6 Ht + Gt + Xt - IM t + Et 
(9 ).: d Mt = do(L)Y t + d1(L)rst + d2{L)Pt + d3 (L)M t _ 1 
(10) s Mt = mo + m1r st + m2{L)8 t + m3r dt + m4Pt + mSY t + m6Mt _ 1 
(11) Md t = M
S 
t = Mt 
C HAP T E RIll 
THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
111.1 Introduction 
Before presenting the results of the estimation 
'-'lJe briefl y discuss the data and the methods of esti-
mation used. The study is quarterly and covers the 
period from the first quarter of 1963 through the 
closing quarter of 1975. All data are seasonally 
adjusted and at constant (1970) prices. All variables 
are in billions of pounds unless otherwise stated. 
Interest rates are expressed as percentages ( that is, 
a rate of 5 percent is expressed as 5.00 ). A more 
detailed description of each of the series used is 
given in the Appendix. 
The criteria for judging the performance of an 
equation are the standard ones: goodness of fit; the 
t-test for significance of coefficients; the extent 
to which the signs of regression coefficients agree 
with prior expectations; the degree to which the re-
siduals exhibit serial correlation, etc. 
As it is very well known the estimation of rela-
tionships involving time-series variables, which are 
typically highly correlated with one another, is con-
fronted with many difficult problems. In this context 
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..... . the invest1gator is faced with, among others, the 
problem of free or constrained estimation of coeffi-
cients. Free estimation involves the risk of distorting 
the results because of multicollinearity; constrained 
estimation on the other hand involves the risk of in-
correctly constraining the coefficients. There are no 
a priori criteria that can guide the investigator in 
choosing between the two methods and hence an element 
of personal judgment is unavoidable. We are no exception 
to this rule and thus we offer no special justification 
for our assumptions. Nonetheless a comment must be made 
about multicollinearity. We should note that "multicolli-
nearity is not a condition that either exists or does 
not exist in economic functions, but rather a phenome-
non inherent in most relationships due to the nature of 
economic magnitudes,,~1) The presense of srong multicolli-
nearity will impair the variances and covariances of the 
estimated regression coefficients making them infinitely 
large in the case of perfect multicollinearity. Thus our 
t-statistics would tend to go to zero, with the obvious 
implications that some explanatory variables will be shown 
as insignificant. Nevertheless, even high multicollinearity 
leaves the statistical estimates of the coefficients 
unbiased; only perfect multicollinearity will make the 
coefficients indeterminate. 
(1) Koutsoyiannis (1969, p. 225) 
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There is no conclusive evidence, however, concern-
ing the degree of multicollinearity which, if present, 
will affect seriotlsly the parameter estimates. All 
econometricians accept that multicollinearity impairs 
the estimates due to lack of sufficient independent 
variation in the sample. The information in the sample 
is not sufficient for reliable estimation of all coeffi-
cients. Thus the corrective solutions which are suggested, 
involve the use of more information, acquired from extran-
eous estimation; from increased sample etc. This pro-
cedure is justified for multicollinearity, although 
creates estimating difficulties, "it does not impair 
the theoretical validity of the model; it is a "disease" 
of the sample data and not of the construction of the 
model.,,(2) 
A second problem that usually arises in estimation 
is that of autocorrelation. The problem is particularly 
keen in the presence of lagged endogenous variables as 
regressors. In this case the standard Durbin Watson 
statistic is biased and hence there is, in addition, the 
problem of detecting autocorrelation. Nonetheless use 
of generalised least squares (G.L.S.) will provide 
consistent estimates. The problem however becomes even 
worse when one uses the data to distinguish between 
(2) Koutsoyiannis (196 p. 245 ) 
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different lag schemes as in our case. Then as Griliches 
(1967) points out "we may be asking too much of our data".(3) 
The point is that any lagged variables that may appear 
to be significant might be due either to autocorrelation 
or to a distributed lag model. To illustrate, consider 
the equation: 
Such an equation could arise either from the distributed 
lag model 
(2 ) 
or from a first order lag scheme and a second order serial 
correlation scheme in the residuals 
1 
Yt = (a~t + bZ t ) + 1 - dL' (1 - pL) (1 - dL) 
(3) 
To complicate things even more equation {1) could 
also arise from a model. with different order lag schemes 
(4) 
Actually, however matters are not as bad as they 
look. As long as there are some expgenous variables in 
(3) Griliches (1967, p. 17) 
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the. model, additional restrictions between the coeffi-
cients may help to distinguish between these hypotheses.(4) 
To illustrate this point take a simpler case 
(5) 
If this equation comes from the slightly generalized 
Koyck model 
",here 
W(L) = Wo + W1L(1'+ ~L + ~L2 + ••• ) 
Wo + (W 1 - AWo)L W(L) = 
1 - ~L 
(6) 
(7) 
then a2 (the coefficient of xt _ 1 ) should be positive. 
If on the other hand equation (5) comes from the model 
(8) 
with serially correlated residuals 
(9) 
then 
(10) 
(4) tor an excellent statement of the problem see 
Griliches (1967). The present analysis rests heavily 
on that paper. 
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In this case the coefficient of Xt _1 should turn out 
to be significantly negative and equal to minus the 
product of the Xt and Yt-1 coefficients. Thus this 
constraint would help to distinguish between the two 
hypotheses. 
Fortunately Professor sargan(S) has suggested a 
method that deals with this problem. We briefly sum-
marize its main points. Assume that the model to be 
estimated can be represented by the equation 
(11) 
and the error term follows a first order autoregressive 
scheme 
(12) 
where e t is a pure random error satisfying all the 
usual assumptions, and p is the autoregressive para-
meter. Lagging equation (11) one period and multiply-
ing through by p and then subtracting from (11) we 
have 
(13) 
in which no autocorrelation exists. This equation, 
which is called the "restricted transformed equation", 
(5) Sargan (1964) 
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involves a non linear restriction between the parameters. 
One can ignore, however, the restriction and proceed to 
the estimation of the so called "unrestricted transform-
ed equation" 
The correct procedure, now, is to test the validity of 
the restriction, which is, in effect, a test of the 
correctness of the dynamic specification of equation 
(11). The test is a X2-test which if it proves to be 
insignificant means that the restriction is satisfied 
and that therefore the lags are due to autocorrelation 
In this case one can proceed by approximating (14) by 
(13) and then go on to find that p that minimizes the 
residual sum of squares using an iterative procedure. 
Now e t- and a x2-test is employed to see if autocorre-
lation exists. If it does not exist then we choose (11). 
If it exists then we choose (13) on the grounds that 
autocorrelation has been detected and eliminated. On 
the other hand the X2-test for the validity of the 
autoregressive restrictions might prove to be signi-
ficant. In such a case we cannot approximate (14) by 
(13) and test for autocorrelation since the lagged 
values that appear in (14) are due to a distributed 
lag model that has been omitted from the specification 
of (11). Thus the correct procedure in this case - a 
significant x2 - is to reformulate the dynamic speci-
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fication of (11) with the help of the lagged variables 
contained in the "unrestricted transformed equation," 
and repeat the method. l6 ) 
The above method can be used with ordinary least 
squares, lO~L.S.)t instrumental variables, lIV), and 
two stage least squares IT.S.L.S.). But the power of 
the test is very strong when it is used with O.L.S. 
while it becomes weak in the case of IV and T.S.L.S. 
In this case the X2 is a test of the independence of 
the 
the instruments used with/error term. But application 
of O.L.S. in our model is likely to produce biased 
estimates because of simultaneity. Thus we have used 
both methods - O.L.S. and T.S.L.S. - O.L.S. was used 
to test the dynamic specification of each equation 
- that is whether the lagged variables are due to 
autocorrelation or to a distributed lag. Then the 
"best" equations - that is, those whose lagged vari-
ables were due to a distributed lag - comprised a 
model that was estimated using the T.S.L.S. technique 
allowing for autoregressive disturbances lA.R.T.S.L.S.). 
Some further experimentation was then carried out to 
distinguish, if possible, among different lag schemes. 
From the plethora of models that were tried table 
1 presents the "best". As can be seen the model performs 
(6) To be able to employ this method we have used the 
program "GIVE" written by D.Hendry, L.S.E. 
Table 111.1 
The Model 
A.R.T.S.L.S.-estimates 
C~ = 1.0678 + 0.4092Y~ + 0.0338L t _ 1/Pt + 0.3756C~_1 - 0.1411C~_2 
(5.48) (g.42) (5.84) (3.55) (4.47) 
P = .... 0.6059 
(3.67) 
s = 0.0839 
d Ct = -0.2428 + 0.0682Y t + 0.02218A t + 0.9216bHPt - 0.0083rLt_3 + 
(2.58) (5.12) (3.59) (7.54) (2.21) 
d +0.2194C t _ 1 
(2.10) 
s~= 0.0326 
d d Yt = 0.1400Y t + 0.A364Y t _ 1 
(2.87) (14.09) 
s = 0.1502 
It = -0.4490 + 0.1440Y t _ 1 + 0.1049AY t - 0.0112rLt_3 - 0.0342b~Lt_: 
(2.54) (3.87) (2.54) (2.13) (2.13) 
+ 0.4639I t _ 1 
(3.84) 
s = 0.0501 
d It = 0.0628 + 0.0107Y t ~ 
d 0.0025r
st + 0.6377I t _ 1 
(1.69) (2.12) (1.77) (9.17) 
S I: 0.0180 
~Ht = -0.1773 + 0.3767Y t - 0.3603Y t _ 1 - 0.0125rLt_ 1 + 
(1.12) (4.27) (4.13) (1.79) 
+ 0.0260L ct_ 1/P t + 0.8428AH t _"1 
(1.76) (6.43) 
p = -0.5842 
(3.78) 
s = 0.0926. 
0.2294AH t _2 
(1.65) 
IM t = 
Yt = 
Md 
t = 
MS t = 
Md 
= 
8 t = 
r Lt = 
-0.6013 + 0.1144Y t + 1.1695ICt + 0.7768IM t _1 
(1.80) (2.25) (3.25) 
S = 0.0845 
Cn t + 
Cd 
t + It + 
Id 
t + AH t + Gt + 
-1.1301 + 0.1755Y t - 0.0536rst 
(2.25) (2.49) (3.76) 
s = 0.1789 
-0.0943 + 0.0046r
st + 1.24698 t 
(0.39) (0.30) (3.26) 
-0.0825r dt + 0.7469M t _ 1 
( 1 .22) (11.07) 
s = 0.1687 
MS = M 
-0.4914 + 0.1024Y t + 0.7556P t 
(2.66) (3.11) (2.93) 
+ 0.5855B t _ 1 
(4.80) 
s = 0.0594 
-1.5089 + 0.1621Y t + 0.8539P t 
(1.86) (1.65) 
-0.4242rLt_ 2 
(2.14) 
p = -0.4462 
(2.88) 
(1.69) 
S ::I 0.4244 
(9.47) 
Xt - IM t 
+ 2.2402Pt + 0.7454M t _ 1 
(5.65) (11.09) 
- 0.75208 t _ 1 + 1.1433P t -
(2.04) (2.02) 
+ 0.02548R t + 0.1035SP t + 
(1.49) (2.97) 
+ 0.1060r
st + 1.2094rLt_ 1 
(3.01) (6.24) 
-
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very well. All coefficients have the correct sign and 
all but three are significant at the conventional 5% 
level. l7 ) However such a sucess conceals many problems. 
The next section discusses and evaluates the present 
results. It shows that in some cases the equation 
stands for more than one lag schemes; in others that 
the lag sructure is very sensitive to minor changes in 
the specification; in still others that some of the 
standard criteria have failed us and hom our value 
judgment has then played a role in choosing between 
alternatives. 
(7) In some cases a one tail test is needed. This 
is quite legitimate since economic theory puts a 
priori constraints, on most of the coefficients. 
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111.2 Evaluation of the Results 
(A) In "chapter II we discussed various formula-
tions for the non-durables equation. The overall conclu-
sion was that many hypotheses could produce the same 
reduced form thus restricting the discriminatory power 
of the empirical tests. Table 111.2 presents some of 
those results and attempts to get the maximum informa-
tion for the underlying hypothesis. 
A minute's inspection of the table shows that 
liquid assets have a role to play. Equation (1) is the 
reduced form of Brown's hypothesis - Rf2 of Il.2a. 
Clearly this equation is badly determined. Although 
all coefficients have the right sign the coefficient 
of Ct _1 is ubnormally low, implying an instantaneous 
adjusment. Nevertheless not even the slightest confi-
dence can be attached to this result because of the so 
close to zero statistical significance of the coeffi-
cient. The same picture emerges from equation (2) - the 
Rf1 and Rf3 of Il.2a. In addition the insignificance 
of Lt - 2/Pt_1 - though in itself a weak test(1)- is not 
incosistent with the hypothesis that current income is 
much more important than long-run resources.(2)But sta-
tistical problems - as for example multicollinearity -
might be so severe as to distort the results and thus 
(1) See pp. 73-75. 
(2) Since equation (2) is the reduced form of both hy-
potheses Rf1and Rf3 we are not at all sure if this ia 
I 
r--
t'i 
<r-
I 
( 1 ) 
t 
(2) 
t 
(3) 
t 
(4) 
t 
(5) 
t 
Canst. 
1.4724 
5.88 
1.3952 
6.72 
1.3688 
8.47 
1.0678 
5.48 
0.6993 
2.92 
yd 
t 
I 
0.5386 
7.30 
0.4875 
6.89 
0.4382 
10;03 
0.4092 
6.42 
.0.5047 
6.81 
Table II1.2 
Non-OurableExpenditure 
functions 
A.R.T.S.L.S.-estimates 
d 
Yt-1 Lt - 1/Pt Lt - 2/P t - 1 C~_1 
0.0371 0.0104 
3.39 0.08 
0.0354 
-0.0002 0.4214 
3.25 0.07 3.78 
0.1308 0.0250 
2.59 2.84 
0.0338 0.3756 
5.84 3.55 
-0.2381 0.0226 -0.0002 10.5948 
2.37 3.68 0.05 4.51 
n C
t
_2 P 
-0.1411 -0.6059 
4.47 3.67 
-0.1106 -0.8322 
3.18 5.24 
SEE 
0.0922 , 
0.0840 
0.0846 
0.0839 
0.0843 
fl 
1 
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erroneously lead to rejection of the true hypothesis 
- Rf1 or Rf3.A direct test of the importance of long-
run resources is carried out in equation (3). Because 
of the plausibility and significance of all coefficients 
it seems that statistical problems conceal the role of 
long-run resources. In view of this evidence, therefore, 
one can ~roceed by making strong assumptions, thus sacri-
fising any deligate results, in order to avoid distortions 
from statistical problems. 
On these grounds equation (4) is derived by making 
the assumption that equal weights are attached to income 
and liquid assets when" forming an estimate of long-run 
resources, and in addition that there is some inertia 
in consumers' behavi~ur.(3)This i~ the only equation 
the correct interpretation; it could also be a rejection 
of the hypothesis that consumption depends on an imbalance 
in the desired level of liquid assets. 
(3) Thus 
yp = 1 - b yd • 
" t 1 _ bL t' 
c~ - C~_l - (l-k)[C~* - c~_~ 
providing the following reduced form: 
(1) 
(3) 
c~ = a o (1-b)(1-k) + a1(1-b)(1-k)Y~ + a2 (1-b)(1-k)L t _1/Pt + 
+(b+k)C~_1 - bkC~_2 
.-~~ 
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that seems to be well determined; but is it ~ecause of 
its simplicity that is well determined or is it the 
case that this is the actual state of affairs? One does 
not know for sure; an attempt to disentangle the weights 
attached to income and liquid assets - equation (5) -
is frought with too many difficulties. On the one hand 
the inertia hypothesis must be dropped - the lags now 
arising from expectations; on the other hand one cannot 
be sure whether liquid assets are part of expected 
resources or they give rise to consumer expenditure in 
disequilibrium situations as in Rf5 of II. 2a. 
Thus it seems that this is as far as one can go.(4) 
Equation (4) provides some support for the real liquid 
assets variable. This result seems to be important since 
in their study of consumer behaviour, Hilton and Crossfield 
(1970) - the first to examine systematically the role 
of liquid assets in the U.K. - could not find an impor-
tant liquid assets variable although they tried very 
hard. Lately, however, Townend (1976) reports a signi-
ficant but very small effect for liquid assets. further-
more, equation (4) has the additional advantage, if one 
wishes to stretch the data to their capacity limit, of 
being distinguishable from any formulation that postulat-
es that an imbalance in desired liquid assets gives rise 
(4) No interest rate effect was found to be significant 
thus providing no support for Rf4. 
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to increased spending; the underlying hypothesis of 
equation l4) seems to be that liquid assets affect 
consumption through their influence of long-run re-
sources. But such conclusions are not so reliable; 
deligate hypotheses and subtle questions such as these 
require better data and techniques than the ones we 
have available. 
(8) The performance of the equation for durables 
seems quite satisfactory well in accordance with a priori 
expectations; thus income, bank advances, changes in hire 
purchase are all significant with correct signs. This 
is not surprising since other studies in the U.K. have 
also isolated such a relationship.(5)What sets this study 
apart from others is the small but statistically signi-
ficant interest rate effect. Here a comment is required 
about the optimal lag structure which is derived statistic-
ally. The adjustment of the dependent variable in responce 
to changes in each one of the explanatory variables is 
assumed to begin at different time periods. Thus the 
equation is 
(5) See, for example, 8all, and Drake (1963), Hilton and 
Crossfield l1970), Townend (1976). 
Table 111.3 
[,' 
! 
Durable Expenditure functions 
A.R.T.S.L.S.-estimates 
d d SEE Canst. Yt ~HPt BAt r Lt r Lt- 1 r Lt- 2 r Lt- 3 
C
t
_
1 
C
t
_2 p 
( 1 ) -0.2987 0.0786 0.9712 0.0240 -0.0061 0.1167 0.3727 0.0330 
t 1.74 3.47 5.92 2.44. 0.92 1.01 2.17 
(2) -0.2541 0.0711 1.0096 0.0205 -0.0040 0.1361 0.3711 0.0330 
t 1.59 3.49 6.58 2.42 0.61 1.20 2.13 
{3 } -0.3157 0.0811 0.9597 0.0245 
-0.0080 0.1224 0.3446 0.0326 
t 2.17 4.36 6.80 3.10 1.78 1 .11 2.00 
(4) -0.2428 0.0682 0.9216 0.0221 -0.0083 0.2194 0.0326 
t 2.58 5.12 .7.56 3.59 2.21 2.10 
(5) -0.2721 0.0735 0.9438 0.0217 -0.0082 0.1658 0.1612 0.0327 
t 1.99 4.12 5.12 2.89 2.20 1.87 0.52 
_t....--~ ---- ~-.------__ ~ ------ --
-
-
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and n represents the lags of the independent variables. 
A non-zero value for n implies that a change in an ex-
planatory variable has initially a negligible effect on 
expenditure for durables, then rises to its peak, and 
declines ,geometrically thereafter. The maximum effect 
for all but one of the explanatory variables occurs in 
the initial time period; thus the response of expendi-
ture on durables to changes in income, bank advances 
and hire purchase occurs immediately.(6}The exception 
is the interest rate, a result not the least surprising 
given the overall evidence on the response of various 
forms of expenditure to changes in interest rates. Here 
a lag of three quarters elapses before any effect is felt 
in the economy.as can be seen from the first four equations 
of table 3. But our formulation assumes that within the 
fourth quarter the effect rises from a zero level to 
its maximum. This introduces an error which, however, 
is very small in our case as can be seen by looking 
again at the first four' equations of table 111.3. More 
general treatments of the distributed lag model were 
also tried but the problems created were more severe 
(6) The results of these tests are not presented but 
the overall picture was as follows~ Whenever lagged 
values for each of the explanatory variables turned 
out to be significant they had a smaller than the 
initial effect. 
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than the problems which were solved.(7)For example the 
coefficient of c~_2 in equation (5) has the wrong sign 
and its size is so high implying an unstable lag structure. 
On these grounds equation (4) seems to be the best. 
(c) From a first look the equation for non-resident-
ial fixed investment seems to perform very well. But in 
fact there are some problems with the lag structure of 
the rate of interest.(8)Table III. (4) presents some of 
those results and illustrates the problems. While a 
substantial interest rate effect appears in the third 
quarter - as it is shown from equation (2) - the peak 
is reached in the fourth quarter - equation (4). This 
means that the appropriate lag-structure is an inverted 
v-type. We tried to capture this scheme by equation (3) 
but the results are unsatisfactory. To overcome this we 
still tried an unconstrained estimate - equation (5) -
for the ascending part of the inverted V structure but 
this was fro~ht with even more difficulties. Thus we are 
faced with the problem of choosing between equation (2) 
and (4), that is either to disregard the peak of the 
(7) The results of these tests are not presented too. 
(8) The lag structure of income does not seem to have 
~ 
the same problems. Lagged values of income seem to have 
smaller effects than current values of income whenever 
they were introduced in equation 2 - the "best" equation. 
Results are not prssented for this case. 
Const. Yt-1 
( 1 ) :"0.4292 0.1401 
t 2.19 3.46 
(2) 
-0.4490 0.1440 
t 2.54 3.87 
(3) 
-0.4182 0.1439 
t 2.33 3.87 
(4) -0.4726 0.1466 
t 2.93 4.31 
[5) -0.4449 0.1382 
t 2.37 3.55 
-
AY t 
0.1063 
2.46 
0.1049 
2.54 
. -
0.1134 
2.69 
0.1135 
2.80 
0.1305 
3.04 
Table 111.4 
Non-Residential fixed Investment 
functions 
GLS-estimates 
r L t-2 ArL t-1 r L t-3 ArL t-2 r L t-4 ArL t-3 
-0.0122 -0.0065 
2.12 0.41 
-0.0112 -0.0342 
2.13 2.13 
-0.0104 -0.0340 
1.95 2.13 
-0.0136 -0.0379 
2.69 2.41 
0.0212 -0.0117 -0.0353 -0.0384 
1.27 0.72 2.08 2.43 
.. ---- ,-._ .. - _._-_. -- --- --- . - ---- --_ ... - -------
I t _ 1 I t _2 
-
0.4791 
3.79 , 
0.4639 
3.84 
0.3966 0.0476 
2.89 1.03 
0.4717 
4.16 
0.5064 
4.12 
p 
(, 
,f 
SEE 
R2 
0.0513 
0.9477 
0.0501 
0.9500 
-
0.0501 
0.9500 
0.0488 
0.9526 
--
0.0489 
0.9546 
j 
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fourth quarter for the sake of not ignoring the substant-
ial interest rate effect of period three or indeed 
ignore it and start from the peak. In either case we 
introduce a bias in the lag structure. We believe that 
for our purposes a smaller bias is introduced by choosing 
equation (2) than (4) since the impact effect of the 
third quarter little differs from that of the peak. 
Another drawback is that our formulation of the 
non-residential fixed investment equation assumes a 
perfect capital market, that is a market where, in 
addition to all other conditions, firms always get the 
funds they need in order to finance their expenditure 
as long as they are prepared to pay the price of credit. 
In other words in our model firms never experience credit 
rationing. But this is clearly wrong; it is a fact of 
life that credit rationing takes place. Consideration 
of an imperfect capital market however requires an 
explicit recognition of the role internal liquidity 
plays in the investment decision. This is a very difficult 
problem, if it is to be treated properly, since liquidity 
acts like a constraint which in some cases is binding 
and in others it is not. Thus whenever firms are liquid 
they can easily undertake the investment they wish 
without being constrained. This does not mean, however, 
that spare liquidity would persuade firms to undertake 
an investment project that looks unprofitable. The 
fact remains that liquidity alone i~.neither sufficient 
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to induce increased investment nor necessary as long as 
the firm has access to credit. 
Due to great difficulties in formulating a proper 
test for this hypothesis we examined the proposition 
that liquid assets held by the company sector exert a 
positive influence on investment expenditure. We found 
no support for this proposition; nor we found any support 
when we introduced changes in bank advances. 
On the positive side our results support the hypo-
thesis that the lagged effect of relative prices on the 
capital stock operates more slowly than the lagged effect 
of changes in output. This means that our model provides 
some support for the "putty clay" model advanced by Bischoff 
(1968). That is, the production function allows ex ante 
substitution (putty) but ex post factor proportions are 
fixed (clay). Thus changes in relative prices do not have 
any effect on investment in the short-run till the old 
capital is worn out, while changes in output have a 
more rapid effect. 
The investment in residential construction on the 
other hand turns out to be of the "putty-putty" variety. 
In this industry there can be no question of ex post 
fixed labour-capital coefficients. This finding is in 
broad line with that by Kalchbrenner {1972) for the fMP 
model. 
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(0) The inventory investment equation also needs 
some comments. Equation (5) of II.2c. was estimated by 
approximati~g the rational lag functions, specified in 
equations (4), by a ratio of two finite polynomials. Thus 
c(L) 
s(L) =- ; 
z(L) 
d(L) 
v(L) = --
z(l) 
• , u(l) = 
e(l) 
z(l) 
In addition each one of those ratios was specified as 
follows 
c(l) = Co + c 1l + c2l
2 
d(l) = do + d1l + d2l
2 
+ d3l
3 
+ d4l
4 
e(l) .. eo + e1l + e2l
2 
z(l) .. 1 - z1l - z2l2 
The degrees assigned to these polynomials proved suffic-
ient to indicate the optimum pattern of lags which . 
turned out to be as follows 
c(l) .. c 0 + c 1L 
d(l) .. d1l 
eel) = eo 
z(l) .. 1 - z1 L 
Results are only presented for the specification 
of the lag structure of the rate of interest, d(L), and 
appear in table 111.5. The first t~ree equations provide 
some of the results obtained by assigning the optimum 
values to c{L), ell) and zll) and experimenting with dll). 
y y 
l..Un::>L. L l.- I L"'-I 
( 1 ) 
-0.1773 0.3767 -0.3603 -0.0125 
t 1.12 4.27 4.13 1.79 
(2 ) 
-9.6901 0.4879 0.4399 
t 5.31 6 .1~4 5.08 
(3) 
-0.1281 0.3365 -0.3220 
t. 0.89 3.42 3.23 
(4) 
-0.2464 0.5888 -0.5599 -0.0089 
t 1.46 5.73 5.34 1.25 
(5) 1-12.0634 0.6316 0.4701 
t 5.66 6.39 4.97 
(6) 
-0.1858 0.5116 -0.4880 -0.0079 
t 1.11 4.70 4.54 1.16 
-(7) 
-11.802 0.5913 0.4702 
t 5.56 15.23 5.14 
,(8) 
-12.067 0.5718 0.4692 0.0264 
: t 5.45 6.22 5.21 0.99 
:"( 9) 
-12.843 0.6300 0.4719 , 
~t_ 5.33 6.62 ~ __ 5.1 0 _ 
--- ------- ---------
Table 111.5;' 
Inventory Investment functions 
A.R.T.S.L.S.-estimates 
L AH 
~"'-L L."'-~ ..... ,,- 'I ... "'- . 
0.0260 0.8428 
1.76 6.43 
-
-0.0968 -0.0471 -0.5015 
3.81 1.58 4.47 
-0.0127 0.0234 0.7950 
1.75 1.60 5.43 
0.7981 
8.28 
-0.0959 -0.4944 
3.53 5.66 
0.8826 
6.90 
-0.0911 -0.5306 
3.44 4.55 
-0.0968 -0.5397 
3.58 4.66 
-0.0977 0.0271 -0.4995 
3.48 0.89 4.01 
b.H 
- -
-0.2294 
1.65 
-0.1729 
1.79 
-0.2591 
1.85 
-0.1629 
1.12 
-0.1474 
1.47 
-0.1691 
1.66 
-0.1428 
1.39 
p 
-0.5842 
3.78 
0.9617 
48.91 
-0.5646 
3.53 
-0.5340 
4.09 
0.9613 
58.13 
-0.5784 
3.91 
0.9655 
58.41 
0.9700 
59.29 
0.9700 
61.02 
SEE 
0.0926 
0.0853 
--
0.0930 
0.0987 
0.0915 
0.0959 
0.0888 
0.0881 
0.0906 
fl 
! 
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One can immediately see that the i~troduction of r lt_2 
- equation (2) - destroys completely the specification 
of the equation in the sense that it assigns to the 
rate of interest eight times a greater impact and alters 
the signs of almost all of the rest coefficients. To 
explore this new situation we changed the polynomials 
c(l) and· ell). Equations 4-9 of table 111.5 present 
some of those results for the case where e(l) = 0, that 
is for the case where liquid assets have no role to play. 
Equations l6) and (7) reveal that the introduction of 
.liquid assets is not responsible for the distortion of 
the equation. In addition a comparison of equations (1), 
(4) and (6) indicates that liquid assets are not only 
significant but also improve the performance of the 
~hole equation. An alternative specification with 
223 d(L) = d1l + d2L or dlL) = d2l + d3L - equations l8) 
and (9) respectively - shows that exactly the same 
problem emerges, that is, the introduction of r lt- 2 
destroys the specification of the equation. finally we 
examined the possibility that the disturbance lies in 
the specification of the z(l) polynomial. However the 
source of error does not lie even there. We only present 
two of those equations indicatively that support this 
argument - equations l4) and (5). In sum, all attempts 
to obtain a sensible equation whe~ r lt_2 was introduced 
have failed. 
On these grounds equation (1) was chosen since in 
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addition to its superiority over equation l3) it also 
proved to perform better than the del) = d3l
3 
+ d4l
4 
-
which indicated no significant interest rate effect. 
(E) Our imports function turns out to be a very 
simple tine as can be seen from table 111.6. The concept 
of long-run resources does not seem to work. Thus whenever 
liquid assets were introduced - e.g. equation (5) - they 
appeared with wrong sign. Neither the concept of expected 
or long-run income seems to be applicable - the coefficient 
of IM t _2 in equation (3) has also the wrong sign. 
Due to great difficulties in constructing a reliable 
series for the general price index of the rest of the world 
the hypothesis tested was that an increase in the U.K. 
general price index would lead to increased imports; 
equation (2) provides no support for this hypothesis. 
On the positive side only income and import credit 
appear to be significant; in addition support is also 
provided for the lagged adjustment hypothesis. 
(f) The theoritical model of the demand for money 
as postulsted in chapter II includes a number of alter-
native hypotheses. Here we attempt to find out which 
of these hypotheses, if any, is sUilported by the empiric-
al evidence. 
r 
U1 
'r" 
I 
~ 
( 1 ) 
t 
(2) 
t 
(3) 
t 
(4 ) 
t 
----
(5) 
t 
! yd Canst. Yt t 
-0.6013 i 0.1144 
! 
1.80 I 2.25 i 
I 
-0.6013 I 0.1142 
1.78 I 2.21 
1 
-0.5485 I 0.1041 
1.63 i 2.01· i 
-0.6647 I 0.1866 
I , 
2.17 2.67 
-0.5311 0.1067 
1.35 1.92 
. Table 111.6 
Import functions 
A.R.T.S.L.S.-estimates 
i 
Pt 
! IC t 
IPl
t
_
1 
I IM
t
_
2 
L
t
_
1
/P
t 
i p SEE 
1.1695 0.7768 0.0845 , 
3.25 . 9.47 
-0.0035 1.1711 0.7789. 0.0855 
0.05 3.20 8.34 
, 
1.2642 0.6297 0.1877 0.08~5 
3.43 4.37 1.35 
1.1021 0.6445 0.0834 
3.09 5.44 
1.1025 0.7278 0.3170 -0.0121 0.0849 
3.12 4.65 1.97 1.01 
._--
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In this model expectations ( as specified in 
equation (4) of II.3a ) are thought to be determined 
by the following rational lag functions 
l(L) = 
b(L) 
. , 
W(L) m(L) = 
c(L) 
wtL) 
n(L) = 
d(L) 
w(L) 
We experimented with various degrees of the polynomials 
b(L), c(L), d(L) and w(L) - some of those results appear-
ing in table 111.7 - but we found no support for the 
hypothesis that expectations work in addition to a partial 
adjustment model. Thus we treated each one separately 
with the hope that the "appropriate" pattern of expect-
ations would entail a different reduced form from the 
one that is obtained from the partial adjustment model. 
Unfortunately, as it turns out~ this was not the case; 
the "best" hypothesis about expectational variables was 
obtained from a reduced form that was statistically 
indistinguishable from that of the partial adjustment 
model. In particular, expectations were found to perform" 
"best" when the polynomials assumed the following values 
b(L) • bo ' d(L) = d , o 
These values imply an exponential pattern for each one 
of the expected variables. Thus the demand for money 
responds to perman~nt income whic~ is best described as 
a weighted average of current and~ past incomes with the 
weights declining expohentially. This interpretation 
fits nicely with those of other studies i~ this field. 
Table 111.7 
Demand for Money functions 
A.R.T.S.L.S.-estimates 
Canst. ; Yt Yt - 1 r r Pt Pt - 1 
M
t
_
1 M p I SEE . I ! st st-1 . t-2 
( 1 ) .-0.57901-0.1849 D.2627 -0.1075 0.0592 1.9010 -0.6731 0.90141 0.0060 10.1723 
, 
I I ~ t 0 • .98 0.90 1.56 3.51 1.88 3.18 0.93 8.87 0.45 
-0.0995 I 0. 0484 1 I : 0.1749 (2) -0.6978 0.1769 1.7623 0.81921 0.0048 
; ! ! 
t 1.56 2.53 3.46 j 1.59 I 4.01 8.26 I 0.39 I , 
r-
; 
(3) -0.0557 I , o • 7248! O. 0054\ i -1.2993 0.2008 2.3049 ! 0.1809 
3.80 I I t 2.35 2.59 5.71 10.07 i 0.20 I I ! 
(4) -0.9800 0.1967 -0.0964 0.0457 1.7876 0.8148 i I ! 0.1709 I I I i 
t 2.11 2.48 3.29 1.49 4.05 11 .13 I ! 
(5) -1.1301 0.1755 -0.0536 2.2402 0.7454 I 0.1789 
t 2.25 2.49 3.76 5.65 11.09 I 
. - ----' I I 
I 
. -
_. 
-
, 
-- . 
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Similarly the pattern of the Yeights attached to the 
expected rate of interest is also exponential. This 
pattern, as it is Yidely knoyn, is consistent yith 
Cagan's adaptive expectations; that is, expectations 
about future interest rates are amended or adapted in 
proportion to past forecasting errors. Lastly, individuals 
respond to a Yeighted average price level in which 
they attach more weight to the recent experience. 
This is the interpretation of the results if it 
is assumed that the reduced form is obtained from a 
model where only expectations are at work. A quite 
different interpretation pertains if the reduced form 
is assumed to be derived from a partial adjustment 
model. In this case the underlying structural equations 
are (1), (2a) and (3) of II.3a with P~ = Pt in (1). 
This specification implies that the demand for money 
responds to current, rather than permanent, income and 
to current or normal rate of interest. As it is yell 
known, in the Keynesian demand for money each individual 
decides to hold either money or bonds according to 
whether the current rate of interest is considered to 
be below or above to what he thinks to be the long-run 
* normal level ( denoted by r ). This hypothesis can be 
represented as 
That is, when the current level of interest is above 
the normal level "the rate would be expected to fall, 
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and when it is below the normal level,it would be expect-
ed to rise. This formulation can also be written as 
e * r t = c r + (1 - c ) r t 
On the assumption that the l~ng-run normal rate is a 
constant, the expected rate is positively related to 
the cu~rent and thus the ~revious relationship is written 
as t9 ) 
e + 
Thus the partial adjustment model is also consistent 
with the "normal backwordation hypothesis" of Keynes. 
Although there is no way to choose between the. 
two alternative hypotheses - expectations and partial 
adjustment - one can claim, on the assumption that 
reliability could be attached to this reduced form, that 
propabilistically a partial adjustment model is more 
likely to be the relevant one in practice; this is so 
since for the expectations model to hold the weights 
attached to each one ~f the three expected variables 
must be the same. This is a serious limitation since 
there is no a priori reason why should the weights be 
the same. On these grounds a partial adjustment model 
seems more plausible especially since the limitations 
(9) Such an approach was adopted by John Wood (1964) 
", . 
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in its interpretation are more easy to swallow. 
(10) 
If we accept this interpretation then our results 
imply the followin~ elasticities 
rs 
y 
p 
Elasticities 
Short 
-0.042 
0.184 
0.239 
Long 
-0.168 
0.722 
0.940 
A number of implications can then be drawn: (a) Money 
appears asa "necessity" rather than as a"luxury" good as 
(10) Laidler and Parkin t1970) in their study of the 
demand for money provide also an intuitive interpreta-
tion of their results. In this they favour the expecta-
tions model. However, though a plausible criterion uas 
used, small reliability can be attached to their result~ 
since the reduced forms of the two submodels, the only 
estimates given (no estimate~ are reported for their 
general model), are not well determined - none of the 
interest rate coefficients, current or lagged, appears 
to be significant. 
Un the other. hand our interpretation seems to be 
in accordance with Goodharts (1970) interpretation, and 
especially with that of Price (1972) uho succeeded (because 
of disaggregation?) in isolatin~ for the personal sector" 
a general model as the one specified in chapter II. 
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suggested by Friedman. From another viewpoint economies 
of scale, as suggested by the invent~~y ~pproach 
of the transactions demand for money (Baumol (1952), 
Tobin (1956) ), do not seem implausible. (b) Forcing 
the same response to changes in output and prices seems 
a mistake. (c) The long-run price elasticity seems to be 
unity, and (d) A small but statistically significant 
interest rate elasticity is found, thus only rejecting 
the crude version of the quantity theory approach.' 
(G) We turn now to the supply of money equation 
where three points are worth mentioning: (a) The short 
term rate of interest, although appears with the wright 
sign - positive - is insignificant. This is not surpris-
ing recalling the discussion about the supply of money 
in chapter II. We stressed there that the present formu-
lation makes more sense for the post 1971 period when 
the holdings of earning assets by the banks varied 
significantly in response to interest rates. 
(b) The discount rate too enters with the correct 
sign but is also insignificant. Nevertheless a signifi-
cant coefficient would imply that the authorities in 
the U.K. tried to control the supply of money by 
manipulating the discount rate. But obviously, as it 
is very well known, the authorities have used the 
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discount rate to influence short-term capital movements 
rather than the supply of money_ In this sense the insi-
gnificance of the discount rate is not disturbing. 
(c) The supply of money does not respond to a full 
extent to current changes in the monetary base. If this 
were the case it would imply that the banks are trying 
to get full advantage of every single increase in the 
monetary base(11)by increasing their lending and through 
the latter their deposits and hence the supply of money. 
Similarly, however, any current decrease in the monetary 
base will force banks to decrease the money supply.(12) 
But such behaviour, implying a myopic response of the 
banks, would result in instability in the banking system. 
Thus a more plausible hypothesis is that the banks only 
partly respond to what they regard as a permanent change 
in the monetary base rather than to current changes in it. 
In passing through we note that the equation for 
the monetary base is very well determined, fully justify-. 
• ing our treatment of it as expressed in chapter II. 
(H) The last comment regards the equation for the 
term structure of interest rates. This equation also is 
the result of experimenting with various specifications 
of the polynomials of the rational lag function which 
(11), (12) The cbmparison concerns the presant formulat-
ion of the equation with an equation exactly similar but 
excluding Bt _1 • 
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for purp08es of space are not reported here. At the 
present of particular is the pattern of expectations 
that emerges from past experience of the rate of 
interest. The underlying rational lag function implies 
an inverted V-type for the formation of expectations.(13) 
This pattern is based on a synthesis of two widely 
held views. The first 1s the -normal level hypothesis" 
advanced by Keynes, according to which investors have 
in mind a normal level of long term interest rates 
based on past experince. Current rates are expected to 
move towards this normal rate. for example, when current 
rates are higher than 'normal' investors expect interest 
rates to fall, and vice-versa.(14) A quite different 
hypothesis has been. advanced by Duesenberry (1958), who 
argues that expectations may be extrapolative. "On a 
priori grounds there is no reason why the (Keynesian) 
argument should not be turned just the other way ••• 
It would not ••• be surprising if it turned out that 
a rise in rates led to an expectation of a further rise 
and vice-versa".(15) However, Duesenberry goes on to 
(13) It is interesting that the same pattern we astablish-
ed elsewhere, (1977). 
(14) This hypothesis can be presented as 
e ( 1-b ) r t-1 ~ 
r t - (1-a)r t + a 
.. 1 - bL 
on the assumption that the 'normal' rate can be appro-
ximated by an exponential function. 
(15) This hypothesis can be expressed as follows 
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say that both hypotheses may prove to be correct in 
practice and that thent'ore one ought to take both ele-
ments into account. "It is almost certainly true that 
most persons who take an interest in security prices 
will be influenced by both types of consideration ••• " 
This means, in other words, that expectations contain. 
both extrapolative and regressive elements. 
A combination of these two elements provides an 
inverted v-type, since because of the significance of 
the extrapolative element the weights rise at a decreas-
ing rate, in the initial stages, then reach a peak, and 
finally the weights decline toward zero because of the 
significance of the regressive element. l16 ) The jusi-
ification of this V-type, as de Leeuw (1965) has pointed 
out is that both elements affect expectations of capital 
gains. That is, "when long term rates are above 'normal', 
capital gains are expected, the long rate tends to fall 
relative to the short rate and the differential between 
long and short ratee is narrowed; at the same time, when 
or on the assumption that the lagged interest rate is 
replaced by a geometric average of recent past rates, 
thus allowing the model to discount the last period's 
level.~_if it proved to be a false signal as 
(1-d)r t _1 c 
1 - dL 
(16) The synthesis produces the following equation 
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. ·lon~ t~rm rates are rising, capitallosse~ are expect-
ed, the long rate tends toriserela.tive to the short 
rate and the differential ia.~iden~d". 
e . [ . ( 1-d) r t-1~ 
r t =- r t + c r t - 1 - dL 
which can be simplified a8 
+ J-< 1_~b_) r__ t_ ..... 1 _ r t] l1 - bL 
using a rational lag function. The advantage of this 
formulation is that it~oes not restrict the extra-
polative and regressive elements to follow a geometric 
pattern, thus providing a more general model. 
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III.3 The Dy~amic Properties of the Model 
In this section we investigate the dynamic per-
formance of the model(1) both. over the sa~ple period, 
1963-1975, and beyond the sample period. This is accompl-
ished by comparing the actual time path~ of the endo-
genous variables with those implied by the model. Such 
comparison involves ex post forecaating which basically 
can be dealt with in three ways. The first is based on 
the structural equations and is a partial analysis in 
the sense that it does not use the full model and there-
fore it does not provide evidence on the effectiveness 
of the model as a whole but for each structural equat-
. ion separately. To provide forecasts of the "dependent" 
(left hand) variables it needs information on all 111n_ 
dependent" or explanatory vatiables, both endogenous 
and predetermined. 
The second method is based on the reduced form and 
is usuelly called the total method. The full model 
constitutes a system of simultaneous equations in all 
the current endogenous variables whose forecasts are 
now obtained by feeding information only on the pre-
determined variables. 
(1) Although the question of stability or instability 
of the model conceptually belongs to the dynamic pro-
perties of the model and therefore ought to be treated 
here we postpone'its investigation until the next chapter. 
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The third method is based on the final form(2) and 
provides forecasts of the current endogenous variables 
by using the observed values of the exogenous variables 
and the initial only values of the lagged endogenous 
variables. That is, in subsequent periods the method 
allows the model to draw upon its own past forecasts to 
provide values of the lagged endogenous variables. As 
Goldberger (1959) points out this method I'may be con-
sidered as the strictest test of an econometric model 
over a series of years in that it is based upon the 
minimum requisite iMformation".l3) This method not only 
tests how well a model performs for individual equat-
ions but also how it functions as a complete system. 
Using this last method we have subjected the model 
into dynamic simulations to derive the time paths of 
all current endogenous variables over the sample period 
1963-1975. l4 ) These appear in charts 1-11. 
Our only excuse is that the technique used to test for 
the stability of the model rests on policy simulations 
and the implied dynamic multipliers. 
(2) The "final form" must be distinguished from the 
"reduced form". The former is an equation that express-
es each endogenous variable in terms of exogenous and 
lagged values of itself only; the latter is an equation 
that expresses each endogenous variable in terms of all 
predetermined. 
(3) Goldberger \1959, g.51) 
(4) The simulation program we have used is called '"HAVOC" 
and was written by M. Desai, L.S.E. 
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As one can see for himself some of the equations 
perform very well indeed. Overall the model seems1 to 
be able to generate closely enough the actual path of 
the endogenous variables(5) 
subjected 
Next the model is/into forecasting to see how it 
performs outside the sample period. Thus' we made ex 
post forecasting for the first three quarters of 1976 
by the structural method. The results are presented in 
table 111.8. One can immediately see that the predict-
ive power of the durables equation, real disposable 
income, non residential fixed investment, investment 
in dwellings, inventory investment, demand for money, 
and long term rate of interest equation, is very good. 
The X2-test for post sample parameter stability for all 
the above equations is. satisfied at the conventional 
5% level - which turns out to be 7.88. The X2-test for 
the nondurables equation is satisfied at the 1% level. 
Only three equations do not seem to perform well out-
side the sample period: the imports function, the 
supply of money, and the moneta~y base. The result is 
rather surprising for the last two equations given their 
overall good performance for the 1963-1975 period. 
Forecasting for only three periods, nevertheless, should 
(5) A measure that is sometimes ~sed to judge this close-
ness is the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE). Nevertheless 
there is no way to test whsther this magnitude is large 
or small. It makes more sense to use it if one wishes to 
compare, as in the case of Andersen (1970), the perform-
ance of two models. 
-176-
Table 111.8 
Ex post Foreca~ting 
for 1976, I, I I , III 
structural Method 
en 
t 
Cd 
t 
I II III I II III 
Actuals 8.085 8.070 8.125 0.791 0.742 0.803 
Forecasts 7.926 7.941 7.965 0.782 0.806 0.810 
F. Error 0.159 0.129 0.160 0.009 -0.064 -0.007 
X2 (3) 7.96 3.29 
yd 
t It 
Actuels 10.207 10.148 10.216 1.950 1.888 1.974 
Forecasts 10.280 10.189 10.164 2.039 1.985 2.015 
F. Error -0.073 -0.405 0.052 -0.089 -0.097 -0.041 
X2(3) 0.43 7.59 
. d 
It AH t 
Actuals 0.477 0.455 0.462 0.038 -0.118 -0.030 
Forecasts 0.463 0.466 0.451 0.133 -0.073 -0.046 
F •. Error 0.014 -0.011 0.011 -0.095 -0.045 -0.016 
X2\3) 1.30 1.31 
IM t Md t 
Actuels 3.366 . 3 •. 635 3.657 17.890 18.310 19.260 
Forecasts 3 • .480 3.369 3.597 18.206 18.625 19.117 
F. Error -0.114 0.266 0.060 -0.316 -0.315 0.143 
X2(3) 12.19 6.85 
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MS t Bt 
I II III I II III 
Actuals 17.890 18.310 19.260 7.649 7.974 8.382 
Forecasts 18.662 19.009 19.602 7.291 7.742 8.041 
F. Error -0.772 -0.699 -0.348 0.358 0.232 0.342 
X2 (3) 42.31 84 •. 70 
r Lt 
Actuals 13.760 13.900 14.180 
Forecasts 14.841 14.190 14.550 
F. Error -1.081 -0.290 -0.370 
X2(3) 7.58 
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Table 111.9 
Ex post forecasting 
for 1976, I, I I, I I I . 
final Method 
Cn t 
Cd 
t 
I II III I II III 
Actuals 8.085 8.070 8.125 0.791 0.742 0.803 
forecasts 7.848 7.894 7.928 0.808 0.856 0.872 
f. Error 0.237 0.176 0.197 -0.017 -0.114 -0.069 
It Id t 
I II III I II III 
Actuals 1.950 1.888 1.974 0.477 0.455 0.462 
forecasts 2.093 2.054 2.193 0.466 0.474 0.475 
f. Error -0.143 -0.166 -0.219 0.011 -0.019 
-0.013 
AH t IM t 
I II III I . II III 
Actuals 0.038 -0.118 -0.030 3.366 3.635 3.657 
forecasts 0.191, 0.238 0.139 3.489 3.529 3.554 
f. Error -0.153 -0.356 -0.169 
-0.123 0.106 0.103 
Mt 8 t 
I II III I II III 
Actuals 17.890 18.310 19.260 7.649 7.974 8.382 
. 
forecasts 1.8.694 19.497 20.234 .7.310 7.607 7.868 
f. Error -0.804 -1.117 -0.974 0.339 0.367 0.514 
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yd 
t Yt 
I II I I I I II III 
Actuals 10.207 10.148 10.216 12.175 11.795 11.973 
forecasts 10.028 10.117 10.186 12.117 12.381 12.350 
f. Error 0.179 0.031 0.030 0.058 -0.586 -0.377 
rst r L t 
I I I III I II III 
Actuals 9.210 10.900 11.770 13.760 13.900 14.180 
forecasts 6.955 7.604 8.540 13.803 14.097 14.542 
f. Error 2.255 3.296 3.230 -0.043 -0.197 -0.362 
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not be an adequate criterion for rejecting these equat-
ions because these observations might be after all ab-
normal. 
Table 111.9 presents dynamic ex post forecasting 
for the first three quarters of 1976. Even on dynamic 
predictions the model seems to perform satisfactorily. 
Chapter IV 
Policy Implications 
IV.1. Introduction 
In chApter II we concluded that a numher 
of factors determine the significance of a rule. These 
were -the importance of money in explaining business cycles 
and the associated lags in its effects. In the first section 
of this chapter we attempt, given the model, to evaluate 
these factors and thus through those to assess the case 
for or against a rule. In the second section we attempt 
a more direct test. This takes two forms which are rather 
compl emen tary to each other. The firs t compares the' actual 
behaviour of the economy with the behaviour that would have 
resulted had the authorities followed a rule. The second 
compares the behaviour of the economy that results from a 
vigorous discretionary stabilization policy with thAt of 
a rule. 
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I V.2. Rulps versus Discretion 
In this model monetary policy-i.e. changes 
in the supply of money - is considered to be effected by 
chariges in the authorities' instruments which affact the 
monetary base, with the latter assumed to affect the stock 
of money. The instruments through which ,the authorities 
can induce a change in monetary policy are considered to 
be open market operations, represented by the ,security 
portfolio of the Bank of England, and the discount rate. 
The effectiveness of monetary policy can be judged 
by means of policy simulations - examining, that is, the 
behaviour of the economy had a different policy been followed. 
In this instance the policy analysis is conduct~d by consider-
ing a change in the monetary base brought about by open 
market operations. Yet, examining the path ,of an endogenous 
variable, e.g. Y, from one position of static equilibrium 
to another after a once and for all change in open market 
operations is of no general relevance. The reason is that 
we expect the monetary authorities to react to changes ih 
economic conditions by continiously changing the path of 
open market operations. This means that a new change in 
open market operations would occur before the dynamic response 
to the first change has worked itself out. Recognising this 
important point the question we are asking is this. What 
portion of the dynamic changes .that continiously occur in 
Y can be attributed to anyone particular open market change 
t hat we c h 0 0 s e, arb i t r a r y ? I not her w,o r d s, sup po sew e sup e r-
imposA aperman~nt ~hanQA in opAn markRt op~rations on top 
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of their actual time path. How will Y now deviate from 
the time path it would otherwise have followed? The cal-
culation of time paths follows a £1billion increase in 
open market purchases initiated in the first quarter of 
19~3 - the beginning of the sample period - and sustained 
thereafter. The time path of'all the rest exogenous and 
policy control variables are considered to remain unchanged 
- that is they assume their actual values. In this way we 
examine the behaviour of the economy under the ceteris 
paribus assumption. Comparin~ the thus obtained time path 
of the endogenous variables with those that were obtained 
from the model before the £1 billion increase in open 
market purchases we calculate dy~amic multipliers(1)which 
indicate the response of an endogenous variable to a change 
in a policy instrument after each elapse of time. These 
multipliers appear in table IV.1. Their lIsefulness is 
considered from three points of view:(a) they provide 
evidence on the stability or instability of the model; 
(b) they provide evidence on the various lags - inte~­
mediate and outside lag; (c) they provide evidence of the 
importance or unimportance of money. 
With respect to the stability of the model one can 
immediately see from column 1 of table IV.1. that the 
system is dynamically stable - an exogenous shock that 
permanently disturbs the original path would have been 
(1) In particular, the dynamic multipliers are computed 
as the differences between the control ~nd policy simula-
tions. The control solution is ohtained by a~signing the 
actual values to all exogenous variables. The experimental 
solution is obtained by assigning to all but one exogenous 
variables their actual vnlues and to the last a specified 
increase on top of the Actual values. 
Table IV.1 
Dynamic Multipliers 
Dynamic effects on some endogenous variables 
of £,1 billion increase in 
SP t 
(Initial Conditions 1963 I) 
Quarter y - y B - 8 Md- Ms (r ) - (rs)s (rL)d- (rL)s d s d s s d 
1 0.011 0.105 0.121 -2.189 -0.231 
2 . 0.024 0.16A 0.209 -2.144 -0.501 
3 0.040 0.206 0.277 -2.112 -0.726 
4 0.062 0.232 0.333 -2.081 -0.876 
5 0.087 0.248 0.372 -2.054 -0.955 
6 0.106 0.260 0.406 -2.034 -0.981 
7 0.118 0.269 0.432 -2.021 -0.977 
8 0.122 0.274 0.452 .-2.015 -0.959 
9 0.121 0.277 .0.467 -2.015 -0.939 
10 0.118 0.278 0.478 -2.017 -0.923 
1 1 0.116 0.279 0.485 -2.019 -0.913 
12 0.114 0.280 0.491 -2.020 -0.909 
13 0.114 0.279 0.495 -2 • .020 -.0.907 
14 0.114 0.279 0.497 -2 • .02.0 -0.9.07 
15 .0.115 0.280 .0.500 -2.019 -.0.9.07 
16 .0.116 .0.280 .0.502 -2 • .018 -.0.9.07 
17 .0.116 0.279 .0.5.03 -2.018 -.0.9.07 
18 .0.117 .0.28.0 .0.504 -2 • .018 -.0.907 
19 .0.117 .0.28.0 .0.5.06 -2 • .017 -.0.9.07 
2.0 .0.118 0.28.0 .0.5.06 -2 • .018 -0.906 
21 .0.118 .0.280 0.507 -2 • .017 -.0.907 
22 0.119 .0.28.0 0.5.07 -2.017 -0.9.06 
23 .0.118 .0.281 .0.5.08 -2 • .017 -0.905 
24 .0.118 0.281 .0.507 -2 • .017 -.0.9.06 
25 0.119 .0.28.0 0.5.08 -2 • .016 -.0.9.05 
76 .0.119 0.28.0 .0.508 -2 • .016 -.0.9.05 
27 0.119 0.281 .0.5.08 -2.017 -.0.9.04 
28 0.119 .0.281 0.5.09 -2.017 -.0.9.04 
29 .0.119 .0;281 0.5.09 -2 • .016 -0.9.04 
30 .0.12.0 .0.28.0 .0.5.09 -2 • .016 -.0.9.04 
31 0.12.0 .0.28.0 0.5.09 -2 • .016 -.0.9.04 
32 0.12.0 0.280 0.5.09 -2 • .016 -0.904 
33 0.12.0 0.28.0 0.5.09 -2 • .016 -0.9.04 
34 .0 .120 .0.280 .0.509 -2 • .016 -.0.9.04 
.0.28.0 0.5.09 
.. 
-2 • .016 35 .0.12.0 -.0.9.04 
36 .0.120 .0.28.0 0.. 5.09 -2 • .016 -.0.904 
. 
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absorbed after a period of 9 years. Nonetheless 98.3 percent 
of the whole adjustment would have been accomplished within 
7 quarters and the remaining 1.7 percent needs more than 7 
years to die out. It is interesting also that in the 8 th quarter 
we have a small overshooting of the ~inal path which is 
ultimately reached through an oscillatory process. 
A measure of the intermediate lag ~ the time lag between 
the change in policy and the emergence of changed financial 
conditions facinq the banking system, as measured by changes 
in the monetary base -is provided by examining the dynamic 
multipliers of the mon~tary base. As can be seen from column 
(2) of table IV.1. 83 percent of the whole adjustment has 
been completed within one year, with 37.5 percent of the 
total effect coming in the same quarter, 60 percent within 
the first two quarters and 74 percent within three quarters. 
Thus a change in monetary policy induced by open market 
operations is felt very quickly in the banking sector and 
hence open market operations ought to be considered as an 
effective instrument of monetary control. This comes as a 
. . th th' t· (2) d t b l' th surprlse Slnce e au orl les 0 no e leve at open 
market operations could be relied upon to effect a change 
in the monetary base with any degree of precision either 
in time or in size. 
In practice dynamic multipliers have been calculated 
with respect to money or the monetary base. Keeping in line 
with this tradition, mainly for ~urposes of comparison, we· 
(2) See, e.g., the Hddge Memorial Lecture delivered by the 
Governor of the 8ank of England (1971). 
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have calculated dynamic multipliers with respect to the 
monetary base which appear in table IV.2. The monetary 
base is of course an endogenous variable in our model, 
and thus no multiplier as such exists. However, one can 
calculate arithmetic multipliers by dividing,e.g., the 
income mlJltiplier of open market operations by the mone-
tary base multiplier of open market operations. 
The income multiplier of the monetary base provides 
an estimate of the joint lag - intermediate and outside. 
Thus it takes six quartes for 96 percent of the total effect 
on income to work out with almost a quarter of the total 
appearing within the same quarter and 63 percent coming in 
the first year. 
The various components of income however are affected 
differently by monetary polity. Table IV.3. shows the per-
centage to equilibrium covered in each quarter for income 
and some of its components. One can immediately see that 
the most quickly affected component of income is investment 
in dwellings. Thus within the first quarter 94 percent of 
the total effect has already been worked out and after a 
year more than 97 percent. Changes in invetories is the 
component of income with the second shorter lag. The effect 
builds up very fast - in less than a year the totai effect 
has already been felt - but then greatly fluctuates around 
its fiRal equilibrium. Thus in the seventh quarter the effect 
overshoots its final aquilibrium~by more than a half. The 
next component with the" shortest lag is consumption for 
durables. The effect blJilds up gradually with little variation 
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Table 1Vd 
Dynamic Multipliers 
Dynamic effects on some endogenous variables 
of f1 billion increase in 
SP t 
(Initial Conditions 1963 I) 
y - y Cn ... Cn Cd Cd I Id Id 
Quarter d 5 Cum. d 5 d- s 
I d- s d- s 
8 d- 8 8 - 8 8d- 8 8d- S 8 d- 8 s d s s s s 
1 0.105 0.105 0.010 0.010 0.000 0.067 
2 0.143 0.248 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.060 
3 0.194 0.442 0.024 0.015 0.019 0.063 
4 0.267 0.709 0.039 0.030 0.043 0.069 
5 0.351 1.060 0.OS2 0.048 0.077 0.073 
6 0.408 1.468 0.069 0.062 0.115 0.069 
7 0.439 1.907 0.089 0.067 0.145 0.071 
8 0.·445 2.352 0.106 0.073 0.164 0.073 
9 0.437 2.789 0.123 0.072 0.181 0.072 
10 0.424 3.213 0.137 0.072 0.183 0.072 
1 1 0.416 3.629 0.140 0.072 0.183 0.072 
12 0.407 4.036 0.150 0.068 0.182 0.071 
13 0.409 0.158 0.072 0.179 0.072 
14 0.409 0.161 0.068 0.179 0.072 
15 0.411 0.164 0.068 0.179 0.075 
16 0.414 0.168 0.068 0.175 0.075 
17 0.416 0.176 0.068 0.179 0.072 
18 0.418 0.175 0.068 0.179 0.071 
19 0.418 0.179 0.068 0.179 0.071 
20 0.421 0.179 0.068 0.179 0.071 
Hd- H s 
8d - 8 s 
0.038 
0~071 
0.107 
0.147 
0.185 
0.196 
0.197 
0.179 
0.157 
0.140 
. 
0.125 
0.121 
0.122 
0.125 
0.129 
0;129 
0.129 
0.129 
0.129 
0.129 . 
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Table IV.3 
Perc~nta~AS of the total effect of 
t h 8 Ion IJ run e qui 1 i b r i u m 
Quarter Yt en t Cd t It 
Id 
t Ht 
1 0.25 0.06 0.15 0.00 0.94 0.30 
2. 0.33 0.07 0.18 0.07 0.85 0.55 
3 0.45 0.13 0.22 0.11 0.89 0.83 
4 0.63 0.21 0.44 0.24 0.97 1.14 
I 
5 0.82 0.29 0.70 0.43 1.03 1.43 
6 0.96 0.~8 0.91 0.64 0.97 1.52 
7 1. 03 0.49 0.99 0.81 1.00 1. 53 
8 1.04 0.58 1.07 0.92 1.03 1.39 
9 1.02 0.68 1.06 1.01 1.01 1.23 
10 0.99 0.75 1.06 1.02 1.01 1.09 
1 1 0.97 0.77 1.06 1.02 1.01 0.97 
12 0.95 0.82 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 
around its final equilibrium. One can see that it takes a 
year for 44 percent of the total effect to be felt in the 
economy. Investment and consumption for non durables have 
the longest lags with only 21 and 24 percent of the total 
effect having been worked out within one year respBctively~ 
The above results tend to'confirm two major conc~rns 
about .monetary policy. First that the housing industry 
probably bears the brunt of monetary policy actions. Second, 
that the lag in effect is probably quite long for consumption 
for non-durables and business investment. This is rather 
unfortunate, because these two components are the ones which 
the monetary authorities would like to affect quickly. 
In conclusion our estimate of the lag in the effect of 
monetary policy in the U.K. is of approximately 2 years time. 
This is twice as long as the st.Louis estimate for the U.S. 
economy - the full effect of monetary policy in this model 
is felt within a year. Our estimate of the lag on the other 
hand compares well with the estimate of the FMP - model -
University of Pennsylvania model - for the U~S. economy, . 
although in the latter 80 percent of the total effect is 
felt within the first year. Finally our estimate is a bit 
smaller then that implied by the FRS-MIT model for the U.S. 
economy.(3) 
As far as the ultimate size of the effect of a monetary 
change is concerned our model suggests that it is quite 
(3) All of our compari~ns are concerned with the U.S. 
economy. This is unfortunAte but we are not familiar with 
any estimate of the lag for the U.K. economy~ 
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high-higher than the estimate of the FRB-MIT model but 
less nevertheless than that implied by the st.Louis or 
the fMP model. 
The next question to be dealt with is how our model 
accounts for these lags. The answer lies in the behaviour 
of the interest rates, so it is necessary to examine their 
hehaviour. As a starting point one should notice that all 
models agree that the initial impact on interest rates is 
to reduce both the short and the long rate. In our model 
the permanent increase by £1 hillion in open market purchases 
resul~ in a permanent decrease in the short term rate of 
interest by 2.016 and by 0.904 in the long term rate of 
interest - table IV.1. The striking think about the short 
term interest rate is its behaviour in the first.period. 
It immediately jumps to, and even more it overshoots, its 
final equilibrium ( it is about 1.0B of the long run value ). 
In later periods, the short term rate of interest approches 
equilibrium asymptotically. ( "Its adjustment path is depicted 
in fig.1. ) 
This behaviour is more or less in line with that found 
by Tanner (1969) and suggested by Tucker (1966). As the 
latter has long before pointed out the explanation for 
this hehaviour of the short-term rate of interest lies 
in its function as the variable that cleaps the money 
market. In addition, the great movements of the short-term 
rate of interest can be accounted for by the lag in the 
demand for money which 1ndependently contributes to th~ 
variation of th~ short rate. The~e substantial changes in 
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the rate of interest affect the level of aggregate demand 
through their effects on the various forms of expenditure. 
In this context even though there might exist long lags in 
the various expenditure functions the lag in the demand for 
money counteracts these lags providing a short lag in the 
effect of monetary policy. 
Although our model, provides support for such a behaviour 
in the rate of interest we are not in agreement with the 
above conclusion of Tanner and Tucker ahout the lag in the 
effect of monetary policy. The main reason lies in the distiM-
ction between short and long rates and in the specification 
of our expenditure functions which are assumed to be primarily 
affected by the long rather than the short rate~4) In our 
formulation of the term structure of interest rates the' effect 
on the long rate builds up gradUally. As it turns . out from 
tahle IV.1. and is depicted in fig.2 it takes more than a 
year before a small overshooting occurs and then the final 
equilibrium is not to be reached before another two years 
have elapsed •. On these grounds the lag in the effect of 
monetary policy turns out to be in our case of approximately 
two years. 
Now what do all these amount to in terms of the conduct 
of monetary policy? Two major points seem to emerge~ first, 
although the lag in the effect is something less than two 
years discretionary monetary policy might not turn to be 
(4) In Tanner's and Tuc~er's model there i~ no distinction 
between short and long rate. 
destabilizing if it is udertaken moderately early in a 
cyclical phase since almost fifty percent of the total 
effect is felt in nine months. Second, although money 
is important it could not be considered as the predomi-
nant factor explainina b~siARss cycles. On these grounds 
one does not expect simple rules to perform satisfactorily. 
An attempt to establish more specific statements for 
or against simple rules rather than general comments as 
put forward above is a very difficult matter. The main 
reason is that more specific statements require more strict 
and severe assumptions and hence loss of generality. For 
example a clear cut case aaainst a specific rule might be 
established only at the cost of so many assumptions that 
practically make it a special case and therefore it becomes 
logically invalid to derive conclusions about simple rules 
in general from such evidence alone. One can always say 
with strong persuassive power that what has been established 
is that this particular case is not to be preferred while 
nothing is said about alternative rules. We are aware of 
this problem of sacrifising a general point of little impor-
tance for something less general but of greater importance; 
we feel, however, that at this stage more insight is to 
be gained by attempting a direct test and evaluation of 
the two alternative policies - discretion versus rules -
even at such a cost. 
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IV.3 Rules versus Discretion: A Direct Test 
The cond\Jct of monetary policy is nAver a simple 
matter. And it is even more difficult to evaluate differ-
ent policy prescriptions. It must be stressed that an 
evaluation of two altRrnativA policies depends on the 
assumption "that had a different policy been followed 
in pr~ctice, the sructure would have remained the same~ 
But even if this assumption i!'l satisfied an evaluation 
of two alternative policies is still a difficult matter; 
for one thinq there is no way to test - using the previous 
experience - which one is the best. The trouble lies in 
that previous experience is the result of the specific 
policies that were pursued in the past. 
To illustrate this point, what we have called the 
"control solution,,~5)is not a situation that can meaning-
full y be com par e d IJ i t h , for e x amp Ie, the "r u 1 e sol uti 0 n ".( 6 ) 
Theoretically a control solution must be one that is indepen-
dent of any government intervention. Only then the comparison 
of the control solution with the rule solution would pro-· 
vide a true test for the performance of the latter. Thus, 
an ideal and objective comparison is not possible. Never-
theless the comparison is meaningful and constructive when 
one is content with less strict propositions, like whether 
(5) Control solution is the result of simulating the econo-
my by assigning to all exogenousdand policy control variables 
their actual values. 
(6) The rule solution differs from the control solution in 
that the values for one policy control variable are arbitra-
rily chosen so as to satisfy a rule. 
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a specific rule wOllld have produced better results compared 
with the actual situation for which we cannot trace its causes. 
Indeed the actual situation might be the result of discre-
tionary policy or the result of another rule or the result 
of no intervention at all or finally the result of any possible 
comhination among them. In fact our first test is of this 
kind •. It compares the actual behaviour of the economy or 
rather the behaviour implied by the model by plugging in 
the actual values.- what we call the control solution -
with the behaviour that.would have resulted had the autho-
rities followed a rule - what we call the rule solution. 
Aut this is not enough. What one needs is an objective 
or a priori criterion according to which it can be decided 
whether the control 6r the rule solution is t6 be preferred. 
The role for such a priori criterion could be played by an 
ideal or desired state. This desired state mainly depends 
on the governments' objectives. Possible canditates could 
be price stability, full-employment, boost of economic growth, 
income distribution etc. In theory unless Gne knows all 
these objectives and the weights attached to each one of 
them it is impossible to judge and evaluate two alternative 
policies. The situation might become even more difficult 
to appraise if one considers a long period of time during 
which the objectives change or at least the weights attached 
to them change. This is very likely to happen since within 
a long period the various governments might have pursued 
quite different prog~am~ and objectives. 
Thus as a broad principle one can say that detailed 
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identification of the government's objectives implies shaky 
conclusions - in the sense that an evaluation of two alter-
native policies is not possible if the objectives vary over 
time. Alternatively the more crude one considers the obje-
ctives to he the greater the likelihood that these objectives 
WOllld hold for a longer period of time. 
On these grounds we assume that among the many objectives 
that a government might have one that must surely hold for 
every government is the stabilization of economic activity_ 
This means that although we assign to the government two 
objectives - full employment and price stability - we do 
not attempt to disentangle. for the reason given above, the 
broader objective of a stable economic activity into its 
components. In practice of course the authorities might 
not attempt to stabilize the level of economic activity 
as such bllt the inflation rate and the level of employment 
separately. Given however that each one of them- varies with 
the level of economic activity and particularly in such a 
way so that a trade off exists, at least in the short-~un, 
it makes sense to speak about stahilization of the economic 
activity instead of stabilization of the price level and 
the employment rate separately. 
In very broad terms one can say that the trend of eco-
nomic activity could be considered from the point of view 
of stabilization as the desired state. One might, in addition, 
dare say that, above the TT line in fig.3, the situation is 
one of rising prices -an~ unemployment but the dominant problem 
is that of inflation. On the other hand, the area below the '. 
Q) 
e 
'.-1 
I-
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TT line might again be associated with rising prices and 
unemployment but the main problem could he considered to 
be that of unemployment. The situation on the line is a 
desired state in that each point is associated with a given 
price rise ann a given unemployment rate. These points could 
be regarded as equilibrium points in the sense that each 
one of them represents an inflation rate that is fully 
expected and a natural rate of unemployment - that is an 
unemployment level that is only due to friction. If such 
an interpretation is too much to ask one can interpret this 
situation as the least harmful from all possible alternatives. 
The rationale behind this point is the following. If it is 
reasonable to assume that the inflation rate rises, on ave-
raqet as we move along the upward phase of the cycle while 
the unemployment rate declines on average, the opposite 
happening on the dOlJnswing, then it makes sense to Assume 
that somewhere between the peak and the trough there exists 
a situation that according to some objective could be consider-
ed as the least harmful. 
Therefo~e in sum the test for or against simple rules 
consists in comparing the deviations of the control solution 
from the trend with the deviations of the rule solution from 
the trend and examining which deviations could be regarded 
on average as the minimum. 
The problEm however of evaluating the case of rules is 
difficult to formulate even at this stage. There are another 
two questions involved. The first is to select the monetary 
aggregate for which to formulate the rule. There is no simple 
answer here. Arguments could be put forward against or in 
favour of formulating a rule for the monetary base, for a 
narrow or a wider definition of the money stock. The point 
is that IJithout examining every single case one cannot speak 
of a rule in Qeneral and conclude that simple rules ought 
to be avoided or preferred. The trouble lies in that while 
produce a worse one. 
one rule might produce abetter situation'another rule might/ 
In our case it is not at all simple to device tests for 
each possible monetary aggregate. Thus we have to select only. 
one monetary aggregate and we do not conceal that our choice 
is to some extent arbitrary. The rule is to be formed for 
the monetary base. Our only excuse is that we regard it as 
simpler for the authorities to establish a rule for the mo-
netary base rather than for the supply of moriey. The reason 
is that the leakages over the control of the base are suppos-
ed to be fewer than the leakages that exist in the control 
of the stock of money, however narrowly defined. Thus we 
believe that we are not committing a great error when arguing 
that if the rule for the monetary b~se is to be rejected, 
then we can reasonably assume that the rule for the stock 
of money should also be rejected.(?) In other words, we 
helieve that in a sense we are justified in saying that 
from all possible monetary aggregates for which a rule 
could be formed, the easiest to achieve and establish,' on 
the part of the authorities, is the monetary hase. We re-
r.oQnize however that this is not a particularly strong 
(?) This seems to be a principle with which even friedman 
aqrees. friedman (1960). 
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proposition so that one could alternatively regard the test 
as simply a test for or aqainst the rule of the monetary base. 
Having selected the monetary aggreqate for which to formu-
late a rule there remains the problem of choosing among alter-
native rules. For example one can speak of a 3 or 5 percent 
increase in the monetary base. If it is established that the 
3 percent rule should be rejected on the grounds that it wors-
ens the situation one can simply say that this was the case 
heCalJSe the correct or optimum rule should have been a 5 per-
cent rule. 
The problem is not so difficlJlt to ~et round to as it 
might first appear. We have already said that the first test 
consists in comparing the control solution-- ie. the actual 
situation - with the rule solution. In the former the mone-
tary base fluctuates over a trend. Thus the obvious rule for 
the monetary base is the trend values. -This ~s so since the 
question we are asking is this: Given the actual values of 
the hase during the period 1963-75 what values the base ought 
to have assumed so that it rather had a constant percentage 
increase from quarter to quarter than a fluctuation. Thus 
the rule is easily found by regressing the monetary base on 
time only. It turns out that the appropriate rule is a 6.7 
percent increase. 
Now it is very important to note that from all possible 
rules this is the best - the optimum from one point of view _ 
that can be formulated. Suppose for example that instead an 
8 percent rule was adopted. In this case it would have turned 
,~ 
out that/the ecoriomy would have circulated more money, on 
average, than it actually had. In this instance the compa-
rison between the control and the rule solution would have 
been biased since the ceteris paribus assumption would not 
have been held any longer{more money circulates on average 
in the economy). On the other hand if a smaller than 6.7 
percent rule had been assumed the experiment would have been 
conducted with less on average money in the economy. Thus 
this rule is the best - the optimum - since in both solu-
tions we have on average the same quantity of money. 
Now in our model the monetary base is an endogenous 
variable. This means that the authorities would have to 
manipulate their instruments if the base is to be set at 
the desired values. Thus if the rule of 6.7 percent for the 
monetary base had to be followed for the period 1963-75 
then additional open market operations would have had to 
be undertaken for each quarter than had actually been under-
taken. The ceteris paribus assumption entails the following 
question: What should have been the size of open market oper-
ations for each period so that the base would have followed 
the rule. The answer is provided by solving the equation for 
the base for the security portfolio and then setting for 
every variable the actual values while for the base the 
values of the trend. The thus obtained values for the security 
portfolio constitute the values that ceteris paribus had 
to be assumed had R rulQ beenfolloLled. 
It must be sressed that although the authorities might 
attempt to set a 6.7 percent rule for the base the economy 
might react to such a behaviour so that it does not experi-
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ence a 6.7 percent increase but in some cases a greater 
and in others a smaller rAte. 
On these grounds the rule solution is obtained by 
simulating the economy with all exogenous and policy control 
variables assigned their actual values with the e~ception 
of the security portfolio for which we set the values need-
ed for the monetary base to follow the r~le of 6.7 percent. 
On the other hand the control solution is obtained by aSBign-
ing to all exogenous variables, including the security port-
folio, their actual values. 
The results of these policy simulations are graphed in 
fig.4. The overall picture that emerges is against simple 
rules. Thus one can immediately see that in 40 ou.t of the 52 
quarters examined the deviations from the trend would have 
been increased had a rule been followed. This could be i~ter-
preted as an indication that had a rule been adopted, the 
economy, as represented by our model, would have been even 
more destabilized compared with what h~s actually been.(8) 
How aggravated the situation becomes from a policy of a 
rule is even clearer if one considers the average deviation 
from the trend, calculated in absolute terms. This turns 
out to be £379m. for the rule and £229m. for the actual 
case. This could be interpreted that the economy would 
have deviated byan averaqe of £379 from its desired or 
equilibrium path or simply from its trend had a rule been 
(8) Strictly speaking this is not correct. What we call the 
actual situation is th~ one implied by our model by giving 
the Axogennus variables their actual values. 
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followed while it actually deviated on average by bnly [229m. 
Thus on both occasions and strength the economy would have 
been worse from the point of view of stability in the case 
of rules. 
One can go one step further in the evaluation of the 
two policies by examining the behaviour of the economy in 
the case of a rule and in the case where 'a vigorous discre-
tionary stahilization policy is undertaken. This test improves 
our judgment about the two policies since it overcomes a 
problem raised earlie~ in this chapter. The problem was 
that the actual behaviour of the economy could have been 
the result of various policies and that therefore by compar-
ing the control with the rule solution one was not sure 
whether one WAS disregarding the case of simple rules while 
in fact the control solution was itself the result of a 
better rule. Although this is an unlikely situation its 
possihility must not be disregarded without any consideration. 
As every test, this new one solves some problems by 
creating others. We can overcome the problem raised above 
by only making strong assumptions about the behaviour of 
the authorjties in undertaking vigorous discretionary sta-
hilization policy. ThD qllRstion is one of time - when to 
interfere - and one of quantity - by how much. And we must, 
if we want to device a test, provide answers to these problems. 
We do so by assuming the validity of some new criteria 
although there is no uay to kno~ whether these newassumpt~ons 
are to be satisfied in practice or not. Nevertheless the 
temptation is very strong since the stronger a comclusion 
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is the greater the number of cases which support it, in 
particular when each one of them comes from a different 
direction, that is when Bach one of them starts from an-
other set of assumptions. In other words when it becomes 
very difficult to test the validity of the underlying 
assumptions one can start the analysis from another set 
of assumptions and test whether he comes 'to the same con-
clusion. Such overwhelminQ evirlence makes a conclusion stronger. 
The problem of when and by how much the authorities 
should interfere i~ taken care of by aAsuming that the 
equation for the monetary base - as analysed in chapter III 
that is as a reaction function -can be'expected to remain 
a qood approximation to reality. There is no way to test 
whether this is so. The only t~ing we know is that from a 
statistical point of view the equation performs well. But 
we do not know whether the objectives of the authorities 
and the implicit trade offs are in fact the ones we have 
assumed. As in every test however this is an assumption 
that we have to accept. 
Nevertheless the question of the validity of this 
assumption weakens and loses some of its importance when 
we sidestep the ~uestion of the direct objectives - flJIl 
employment and price stability - by considering again the 
case of stabIlizing the level of economic activity. That 
is we make once more the assumption that the authorities 
attempt to set the level of economic activity on its trend, 
so that devi~tion from .it and thus the associated cycles are 
eliminated. This is what we call dis~retionary stabilization 
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policy. The authorities' target is a final objective such 
as incom~ which they attempt to set by manipulating their 
instruments in such a way so that any deviation of the current 
value of incomA from its desired value, that is thought to 
exist, is assumed to be covered hy a change in theinstru-
ments. In thH policy of R rule on the othAr hanrl the final 
objective is the same but now the authorities manipulate 
their instrumAnts to effect a specified change in an inter-
mediate target - such as the stock of money - in the first 
place rather than in a final target. It should be sressed 
however that the authorities' decision to do so does not 
relate to the fact that corrective procedure can be more 
easily undertaken for an intermediate rather than a final 
target on the basis that information for the former is more 
readily available in addition to also being more reliable 
than the information for the latter. The main qlJestion is 
not therefore one of targets anrl indicators but rather the 
validity of the proposition that there is a mechanism which 
secures that whenever thA intermediate target is achieved 
the final tar~et is also achieved. In thA monAtarist approach 
thA role of this mechanism is played' by the quantity theory 
of money. 
In order to achieve the desired change in the level 
of economic activity, represented by the trend values of 
income, the authorities must manipulate their security port-
folio in much the same way as w~ assumed them to do when 
they wanted to set the base on the trend. In this instance 
too the question is what should have been the size of open 
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market operations for each period so that income would 
have assumed its trend values. The answer is provided, 
as in the case of a rule, by solving the equation of the 
monetary base for the security portfolio. On this occasion, 
however, we assign to every variable, including the base, 
its actual values IJhile we assian to income it.s trend values. 
The thus obtained values of the sDcurity portfolio consti-
tut.e the values that ceteris paribus have to be assumed 
had the authorities undertaken an active dis~retionary 
stabilizntion policy. 
It must be remembered that the authorities might not 
succeed in stabilizing the level of economic activity and 
thus it is expected that the economy would grow following 
again a cyclical path. In those terms the discretionary 
solution is obtained hy simlJlating the economy wit.h all 
exogenous and policy control variables assigned their act-
ual values with the exception of the security portfolio for 
which we set the values needed for the level of economic 
activity to follow its trend~ 
The test of rules versus discretion in this case 
consists in comparing the deviations of the rule solution 
from the trend with the deviations of the discretionary 
solution from the trend and axa min ina which deviations 
could be regarded on average as the minimum. 
The reslJlts of these policy simulations are graphed 
in fig.5. The overall picture is much the same as the one 
that emerged in the previous test. Here an active discre-
tionary stabilization policy is more succesful than a rule 
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in 42 out of 52 quarters. And the average deviation from 
the trend is £220 m for the former and £379 m for the 
latter. Thus' Discretion is to be preferred over Rules. 
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IV.4 Summary and Conclusions 
The present thesis has attempted to evaluate two 
broad principles upon which stabilization of the U.K. 
economy can be pursued. One of the purposes of chapter 
I has been to show that whether Rules or'Discretion 
should be used depends on whether one's view of the 
working of the economy is in line with the new quantity 
theory of money_ In addition, it has been shown that 
an evaluation of the two policies is only possible 
through a model that captures the whole of the economy 
- that is, a general equilibrium analysis is needed 
rather than a partial one. In this context the main 
problem which one is faced with when attempting to eva-
luate Rules versus Oiscretibn is to provide a structure 
that is not biased towards either a Keynesian or a mone-
tarist viewpoint. The reason is that each camp has deve-
loped its own thinking regarding both the working of the 
economy and the methodology upon which to tsst such work-
ing. Thus, one reasonably wonders whether an evaluation 
of the two policies is possible without introducing a 
bias towards one camp or the other. In other words, the 
question is whether we are allowed to test monetarist pro-
positions through a Keynesian framework. The answer is 
given in chapter I where we have shown that at a theore-
tical level a common structure can be found which captur-
es most of th~ differences between the two s6hools of 
thought; at an empirical level small scale models can 
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be thought of as the least biased towards either view-
point. 
On these grounds a model was specified (chapter II) 
in such a way as to allow for the different hypotheses 
which underlie both camps to be tested. The model was 
then estimated, evaluated and subjected to simulations 
in order to test its performance. In this model moneta-
ry policy is thought to be transmitted through two main 
channels: interest rates and wealth. 1M particular, non 
durables are influenced through liquid assets. The short 
term rate of interest does not seem to be important. 
OUrables are influenced by the long term Zg~~ rate of 
interest and the availability of credit. Investment in 
dwellings is affected by changes in the short term rate 
of interest. investment in plant and equipment is affected 
by the cost of capital. Changes in inventories are affect-
ed by the long term rate of interest and liquid assets. 
Import credit affects imports. The supply of money is 
determined partly exogenous and partly endogenous by the 
monetary base the rediscount rate, prices and income. 
The long term rate of interest i~ influenced by expect-
ations of its own rate and expectations about the general 
economic conditions reflected in changes in the level 
of economic activity and changes in the price level. 
Finally the monetary base is determined through a react-
ion function of the authorities behaviour and their ~on­
straint to provide finance to the government·s budget 
deficit. 
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The model was then used for policy simulations to 
test whether Rules or Discretion produces a better sta-
bilization of the economy as this is represented by the 
model. In terms of these tests it has been suggested 
that discretionary stabilization should be preferred to 
rules. Such preference is justified on the grounds that 
among the factors that contribute to the cyclical beha-
viour of the economy money is only one of them with chang-
es in autonomous expenditure and expectations about fu-
ture developments being equally, if not more, important. 
A successful stabilization policy, therefore, should 
attempt to control these factors as well as money. Thus 
by only controlling money stabilization could not be so 
successful. Professor Sayers, an advocate of discretion, 
has put it like this: "the essence of central banking is 
discretionary control of the monetary system" and con-
cluded that "we are doomed to disappointment if we look 
for rules applicable to all times and places. We have 
central banks for the very reason that there are no such 
rules". 
Judging now discretionary stabilization policy on its 
own, our results seem to support the view that it is 
quite effective. The dynamic multipliers we have calcu-
lated indicate that monetary policy is a strong weapon 
the effects of which are distributed over two years but 
with a sizeable effect-occurring within the first 6 to 
9 months. In addition it seems that the brunt of moneta-
ry policy is borne primarily by the housing market with 
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changes in inventories and consumer durables bearing the 
second and third largest effect respectively. The biggeat 
lag is for non durables and investment in plant and equip-
ment. Thus, if the primary concern of the authorities is 
in these two components of aggregate demand, other poli-
cies might also be used if a quicker effect is needed. 
Although our study points to discretionary policy 
it does not deal with the question of which are the best 
instruments through which it can be applied. It could be 
that interest rates or the money stock have. the greatest 
effect. In this context Arestis (1976) has shown that 
interest rates are the optimal instruments through which 
discretionary monetary policy should be applied in the 
case of the U.K. economy. 
It is reasonable to ask how well documented is the 
preference of Discretion over Rules in our study. One 
cannot conceal that stabilization here is taken to mean 
elimination of the devi~tions of the level of economic 
activity from its trend. Obviously as it was discussed 
in this chapter the authorities might attempt to stabi-
lize the level of employment and the inflation rate se-
parately. Such treatment, however, would have required 
a number of equations that would have determined these 
two varibles. In this context the simplicity of our 
model would have been lost and with it the unbiasedness 
to a Keynesian and monetarist viewpoint. In addition, a 
sufficient explanation of the general price level seems 
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to us a very difficult problem in itself. It is not our 
purpose here to discuss the theories of inflation, but 
we cannot help saying that none of the existing approach-
es satisfies us. Thus we thought it best not to disent-
angle the objective of stabilizing the level of economic 
activity into its components, output (employment) and 
prices. 
The next question is ~hether the authorities are 
free to pursue a policy of discretionary stabilization. 
For example the authorities might be preoccupied ~ith the 
balance of paymants. Or they might not be able to alter 
interest rates because these are strongly influenced by 
the Euro-dollar market which in its turn might be in-
fluenced by the U.S. monetary policy. One should there-
fore explore this situation in future work. Our study 
has absolutely nothing to say on this point. This problem 
requires a detailed analysis of the authorities' object-
ives, the weights attached to each one of them, and the 
instruments they have used and believe that they can use. 
Although this problem is very important the significance 
of our study, ~e believe, lies in helping the authorities 
to reconsider their objectives or at least the ~eights 
attached to them. 
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APPENDIX 
Definition and Sources of Variables 
Yt • Gross domestic product at 1970 factor cost prices. 
Cn t = 
Cd 
t = 
Economic Trends(1). 
Consumer's expenditure for non-durables at 1970 pri-
ces. Total less durables. Economic Trends. l1 ) 
Consumer's expenditure for durables at 1970 prices. 
Durable household goods and cars and motor cycles. 
Economic Trends(1). 
Y~ = Disposable income at 1970 prices. Economic Trends.(1) 
I~ = fixed investment in dwellings at 1970 prices. Econo-
mic Trends(1). 
It = Gross domestic fixed capital formation at 1970 prices. 
Total less investment in dwellings, Economic Trends(1). 
AH t = stockbuilding at 1970 prices. The sum of the value 
of the physical increase in stocks of materials and 
fuels, of finished goods, and the change in work in 
progress. Economic Trends(1). 
Gt = Government expenditure at 1970 prices. Economic Trends(1). 
Xt = Exports of goods and services at 1970'prices. Eco-
nomic Trends(1). 
IM t = Imports of goods and services at 1970 prices. 
Economic Trends(1). 
Et = Residual error in the income identity. 
(1) Annual Supplement 1975 and later issues. Variables 
are seasonally adjusted. 
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Pt = G.O.P. price deflator. Economic Trends. 
Lt _1 = Selected liquid assets of the personal sector, 
defined as national savings, tax reserve certificat-
es, local authority temporary debt, deposits with 
banking sector, .building societies, finance houses. 
Financial Statistics, table 90, various issues. 
LCt- 1 = Selected liquid assets of industrial and commerc-
ial companies. Economic Trends, table 60 • 
BAt = Sank advances to the personal sector. Financial 
Statistics, table 90, various issues. 
BA t = Bank advances to industrial and commercial compa-c . 
nies. Economiq Trends, table 12B, various issues. 
BAB t = Bank advances to builders. Monthly Digest of Sta-
tistics, various issues. 
AHPt = Hire purchase credit; changes in debt outstanding. 
Economic Trends, table 12. 
lC t = lmprt credit; Economic Trends. 
rst = Interest rate on three months local authority tempo-
~ary debt. Economic Trends, table 64. 
r Lt = 2~ Consols yield. Economic Trends, table 64. 
r dt = Minimum lending rate. Economic Trends. 
M1 = Money stock defined as currency held by the public 
plus current accounts. BEQB. 
Bt = Base money, defined as currency held by the public 
plus bank reserves. SEQB. 
SPt = Bank's security portfolio. BEQB. 
BR t • Public sector borrowing requirement. Economic Trends, 
table 52. 
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